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Gatekeeping
Peter B. Oh*
ABSTRACT

Gatekeeping is a metaphor ubiquitous across disciplines and within fields of law.
Generally, gatekeeping comprises an actor monitoring the quality of information,
products, or services. Specific conceptions of gatekeeping functions have arisen
independently within corporate and evidentiary law. Corporate gatekeeping entails
deciding whether to grant or withhold support necessary for financial disclosure;
evidentiary gatekeeping entails assessing whether expert knowledge is relevant and
reliable for admissibility. This article is the first to identify substantive parallels between
gatekeeping in these two contexts and to suggest their cross-treatment. Public corporate
gatekeepers, like their judicial evidentiary analogues, should bear a duty of reliable
monitoring.
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INTRODUCTION

Gatekeeping is a metaphor ubiquitous across disciplines and within fields of law.
1
The metaphor describes functions in diverse subjects such as communications,
economics, 2 education, 3 political science, 4 and psychology. 5 And the metaphor crops up
7
6
cyberspace, 8
in legal analyses of commercial systems, criminal procedure,
1. See, e.g., PAMELA J. SHOEMAKER, GATEKEEPING 2 (1991) (citing Kurt Lewin, Channels of Group
Life: Social Planning and Action Research, in FIELD THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE: SELECTED THEORETICAL
PAPERS 186 (1951)) ("[G]atekeeping is the process by which the billions of messages that are available in the
world get cut down and transformed into the hundreds of messages that reach a given person on a given day.").
See also EDITORS AS GATEKEEPERS (James J. Fyfe & Rita James Simon eds., 1994); Lewis A. Coser,
Publishers as Gatekeepers of Ideas, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLISHING 14 (Philip G. Altbach & Sheila McVey
eds., 1975); Wilbur Schramm, The Gatekeeper: A Memorandum, in MASS COMMUNICATIONS 175 (Wilbur
Schramm ed., 1949).
2. See, e.g., SYLVIA MAXFIELD, GATEKEEPERS OF GROWTH: THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF CENTRAL BANKING INDEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1998).
3. See, e.g., GATEKEEPING IN BSW PROGRAMS (Patty Gibbs & Eleanor H. Blakely eds., 2000)
(containing articles about how administrators and educators in Baccalaureate Social Work (BSW) programs act
as gatekeepers for the profession); JACQUES STEINBERG, THE GATEKEEPERS: INSIDE THE ADMISSION PROCESS
OF APREMIER COLLEGE (2002); Andrea Guerrero, Silence at the CaliforniaLaw Review, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1183,
1204 (2003) (referencing the Law School Admission Test as a '"gatekeeping' device"); Linda S. Moore &
Charlene A. Urwin, Gatekeeping: A Model for Screening BaccalaureateStudents for Field Education, 27 J.
SOCIAL WORK EDUCATION 8 (1991).
4. See, e.g., Arthur T. Denzau & Robert J. McKay, Gatekeepingand Monopoly Power of Committees: An
Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated Behavior, 27 AM. J. POL. SCI. 740 (1983); David Epstein, An
Informational Rationale for Committee Gatekeeping Power, 91 PUB. CHOICE 271 (1996) (describing the
gatekeeping power of congressional committees as the capacity to control the flow of information and obstruct
legislation); Tim Groseclose & Keith Krehbiel, Gatekeeping (Mar. 13, 2002) (gatekeeping is a procedural right
existing
in
collective-choice
institutions
to
enforce
the
status
quo),
available at
http://www.yale.edu/las/conference/papers/GateV9.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2004); James M. Snyder, Jr.,
Gatekeeping or Not, Sample Selection in the Roll CallAgenda Matters, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 36 (1992).
5. See, e.g., E. RAE HARCUM & ELLEN F. ROSEN, THE GATEKEEPERS OF PSYCHOLOGY: EVALUATION OF
PEER REVIEW BY CASE HISTORY (1993) (regarding peer review evaluators as gatekeepers of scientific
literature).
6. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Regulating Internet Payment Intermediaries, 81 TEX. L. REV. 681, 708
(2004) (suggesting banks operate as a "gatekeeper that will both monitor the [intemet] intermediary to ensure
that it behaves appropriately and exclude those that cannot be induced to behave appropriately"), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract--446420 (last visited Sept. 19, 2004); George G. Triantis, The Interplay of Liquidation
and Reorganization in the Bankruptcy Systems of Canada and the United States: The Role of Screens,
Gatekeepers, and Guillotines, in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: COMPARATIVE AND
EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 449 (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Alan 0. Sykes eds., 1997).
7. See, e.g., Allen Ides, Habeas Standards of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1): A Commentary on
Statutory Text and Supreme CourtPrecedent, 60 WASH & LEE L. REV. 677, 679 (2003) ("[S]ubsection (d)(1) is
enormously important because it performs a gatekeeper function for federal habeas review of state court
judgments."); Daniel Richrnan, Prosecutorsand Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L.
REv. 749, 758-67 (2003) (analyzing the "Prosecutorial Gatekeeping Monopoly"); Samuel C. Seiden & Karine
Morin, The Physician as Gatekeeper to the Use of Genetic Information in the CriminalJustice System, 30 J. L.
MED. & ETHICS 88 (2002).
8. See, e.g., Michael R. Baye & Roy John Morgan, Information Gatekeepers on the Internet and the
Competitiveness of Homogeneous Product Markets, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 454 (2001) (examining gatekeepers
that charge fees to firms for information that consumers acquire and transmit); Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal
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12
10
insurance policies,' 1 intellectual property,
environmental agencies, 9 health care,
16
15
14
13
securities regulation, and
international issues, judicial roles, litigation strategy,

Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1099-1100 (2001) (referencing lack of incentives for intemet
service providers to behave as gatekeepers).
9. See, e.g., David L. Markell, "Reinventing Government": A ConceptualFrameworkfor Evaluating the
ProposedSuperfund Reform Act of 1994's Approach to IntergovernmentalRelations, 24 ENVTL. L. 1055, 1067
(1994) (discussing Environmental Protection Agency's role as a gatekeeper in the Superfund context).
10. See, e.g., Richard L. Cohen & Alexander J. Ciocca, InstitutionalReview Board:Ethical Gatekeeper,in
RESEARCH FRAUD IN THE BEHAVIORAL AND BIOMEDICAL SCIENCES 204 (David J. Miller & Michel Hersen
eds., 1992); Mark A. Hall, The Theory and Practice of Disclosing HMO Physician Incentives, 65 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 207, 208 (2002) (referencing how Health Maintenance Organizations engage in public
managed care strategies such as "primary care gatekeeping"); James M. Malcomson, Health Service
Gatekeepers (Oct. 2003), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=462444 (last visited Sept. 19, 2004); David
Orentlicher, The Rise and Fall of Managed Care: A Predictable "Tragic Choices" Phenomenon, 47 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 411,417 (2003) (analyzing "primary care gatekeeping" as a managed care strategy); Robert A. Shumsky
& Edieal J. Pinker, Gatekeepers and Referrals in Services, 49 MGMT. SCI. 839 (2002), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=-297803 (last visited Sept. 19, 2004).
11. See, e.g., Richard L. Kaplan, Cracking the Conundrum: Toward A Rational Financingof Long-Term
Care, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 47, 78-79 (analyzing insurance policies' "gatekeeper provisions" that determine
long-term care), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=398800 (last visited Sept. 19, 2004).
12. See, e.g., Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 712 (2003) (referencing "[c]opyright
law's long dependence on a gatekeeping regime").
13. See, e.g., LAN BACHE, THE POLITICS OF EUROPEAN UNION REGIONAL POLICY: MULTI-LEVEL
GOVERNANCE OR FLEXIBLE GATEKEEPING? (1998); MARY TROY JOHNSTON, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL:
GATEKEEPER OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1994); Jacqueline Bhabha, InternationalistGatekeepers?: The
Tension between Asylum Advocacy and Human Rights, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 155, 160-61 (2002) (describing
asylum advocates as "legitimizers, or essential intermediaries within the system" that "sifts out worthy from
unworthy forced migrants," a "process that keeps migration exclusion morally defensible while protecting the
global gatekeeping operation as a whole"); Nicole M. Healy, The Impact of September 11th on Anti-Money
Laundering Efforts, and the European Union and Commonwealth Gatekeeper Initiatives, 36 INT'L LAW. 733
(2002); Sharon K. Horn, Engendering Chinese Legal Studies: Gatekeeping, Master Discourses, and Other
Challenges, in BASIC CONCEPTS OF CHINESE LAW 42, 45 (Tahirih V. Lee ed., 1997) (using gatekeeping to refer
to "disciplinary parochialism with its attendant fear of and discomfort with the messiness of multiplicity and the
challenge of epistemological differences").
14. See, e.g., KEVIN L. LYLES, THE GATEKEEPERS: FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS IN THE POLITICAL
PROCESS (1997); Pierre H. Bergeron, District Courts as Gatekeepers? A New Vision of Appellate Jurisdiction
Over Orders Compelling Arbitration, 51 EMORY L.J. 1365 (2002); Gregory A. Caldeira et al., Sophisticated
Voting and Gatekeeping in the Supreme Court, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549, 553 (1999) (using gate-keeping to
refer to the Supreme Court's "well-known binary procedure for decisions on certiorari and the merits," and
contending its plenary agenda is substantially affected by sophisticated voting, the "looking forward to the
decision on the merits and acting with that potential outcome in mind"); Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of
Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role of Facts in ConstitutionalTort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV.
1, 8 (1998) (describing qualified immunity and summary judgment as "gatekeeping mechanisms"); Stasha D.
McBride, Note, Civil Procedure: Time to Stand Back: Unnecessary Gate-keeping to Oklahoma Courts, 56
OKLA. L. REV. 177 (2003); Vincent L. McKusick, Discretionary Gatekeeping: The Supreme Court's
Management of Its OriginalJurisdiction Docket Since 1961, 45 ME. L. REV. 185 (1993); Cheryl L. Wade,
When Judges Are Gatekeepers: Democracy, Morality, Status, and Empathy in Duty Decisions (Help from
Ordinary Citizens), 80 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1996); Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The
Visibility Presumption and the Case of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, " 108 YALE L.J. 485, 558, 562-63 (1998)
(contending elevated judicial protection of race- and sex-based classifications effectively has acted as an
exclusionary gatekeeper for the protection of other interest groups).
15. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective,49
MD. L. REV. 869, 877 (1990) [hereinafter Gilson, Devolution] ("[A] gatekeeper approach-using lawyers as an
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tax policy. 17
The corporate context recently has supplied one of the more vivid instances of
gatekeeping, or rather, its failures. On the heels of Enron's disclosure of accounting
errors in 2001 was an extraordinary procession of large-scale financial fraud and
misreporting that has yet to reach a satisfactory conclusion. 18 And there is no shortage of
blame (or commentators) fixed on the role of market gatekeepers in these debacles. 19 For
instance, Frank Partnoy has testified before the Senate that "[t]he collapse of Enron
makes it plain that the key gatekeeper institutions that support our system of market
capitalism have failed."'20 Similarly, William Bratton has concluded that "[i]n our selfex ante screen to prevent, rather than punish, strategic litigation-seems to me to explain ... the limited role of
direct enforcement in this area."); see also infra note 102.
16. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Brave New World?: The Impact(s) of the Internet on Modern Securities
Regulation, 52 Bus. LAW. 1195, 1232 (1997) ("The gatekeeper has played a critical role in the history of
securities regulation."); see also infra notes 70-72.
17. See, e.g., Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Tax as Gatekeeper: Why Company Stock Is Not Worth the Money,
23 VA. TAX. REv. 365, 412 (2003) (contending tax law "can serve as a gatekeeper for retirement policy, an
efficient alternative to either inefficient direct or nonexistent regulation").
18. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, Downturn and Shift in Population Feed Boom in White-Collar Crime,
N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2002, at Al. See also infra note 24 and accompanying text. According to William S.
Lerach of Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach LLP, lead counsel in a class action against Enron, see
www.Enronfraud.com/pdf/masterlstamd.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2004), there have been "over 700 accounting
restatements in three years." William S. Lerach, "The Chickens Have Come Home to Roost, " How Wall Street,
The Big Accounting Firms and Corporate Interests Chloroformed Congress and Cost America 's Investors
Trillions, 1324 PLI/CORP. 759, 777 (2002).
19. See, e.g., PanelDiscussion: Enron: What Went Wrong?, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. S1, S4 (2002)
[hereinafter Panel Discussion] ("We can talk about blame forever, and there is more than enough to go
around.") (Statement of Constantine Katsoris, Professor of Law, Fordham University). The amount of
culpability may be exceeded only by the volume of related scholarship, simply illustrated by the number of
symposia on corporate fraud and misreporting since Enron's bankruptcy filing in December, 2001. See, e.g.,
Symposium, Corporate Irresponsibility:America's Newest Export?, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 867 (2002); F.
Hodge O'Neal Corporate and Securities Law Symposium, Conflicts of Interest in Corporate and Securities
Law, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 449 (2002); Socio-economics and Corporate Law Symposium: The New Corporate
Social Responsibility, What Is The "New" Corporate Responsibility?, 76 TuL. L. REv. 1187 (2002);
Symposium, Corporate Bankruptcy in the New Millennium, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 1225 (2002); Symposium,
Enron: Lessons and Implications, 8 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 1 (2002); Symposium, Enron and Its Aftermath:
Rebuilding CorporateBoards and Refocusing Shareholdersfor the Post-Enron Era, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 787
(2002); Lessons from Enron: A Symposium on Corporate Governance, 54 MERCER L. REv. 663 (2003);
Symposium on Ethics in Corporate Governance, 3 WYO. L. REv. 365 (2003); Symposium, International
Accounting Standards in the Wake of Enron, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 725 (2003); Symposium, The
Changing Role of Directors in Corporate Governance, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 839 (2003); Symposium,
Lessons from Enron, How Did Corporateand Securities Law Fail?,48 VILL. L. REv. 989 (2003); Symposium,
Crisis in Confidence: Corporate Governance and Professional Ethics Post-Enron, 35 CONN. L. REv. 1013
(2003); F. Hodge O'Neal Corporate and Securities Law Symposium, After the Sarbanes-OxleyAct: The Future
of the Mandatory Disclosure System, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 229 (2003); Symposium, Agency Law Inside the
Corporation, 71 U. CN. L. REv. 1167 (2003); Symposium, On Enron, WorldCom, and Their Aftermath, 27
VERMONT L. REv. 817 (2003); Symposium, Enron and the Future of U.S. Corporate Law and Policy, 88
CORNELL L. REv. 269 (2004).
20. Frank Partnoy, Enron and Derivatives (Jan. 24, 2002), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-302332
(last visited Sept. 10, 2004); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control
of the Modern Business Corporation:Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1233, 1249 (2002) ("The
Enron matter will prove to be a very important event in the history of American shareholder capitalism.");
David Millon, Who "Caused" the Enron Debacle?, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 309, 312 (2003) ("In order to
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regulatory system of corporate law, the job of insisting on trustworthy numbers devolves
in the first instance on the gatekeepers." 2 1 Perhaps none summarizes such views more
succinctly than the title of John Coffee's article: Understanding Enron: "It's About the
22
Gatekeepers, Stupid."
This sort of reasoning, focusing on Enron's meaning, has been generalized to other
instances of financial fraud and misreporting. For instance, Harvey Pitt, then Chairman of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), has testified before the Senate that
"Enron is the poster child for something that has been evident for a long time-our
financial disclosure and reporting system ... does not work as well as it should."'23 And
assign responsibility for what happened and to prevent future Enrons ... [i]t is... necessary to deal with the
gatekeepers' failures to perform their public functions. Until this is done, we cannot expect a restoration of
public confidence in our equity markets."); Hillary A. Sale, Gatekeepers, Disclosure, and Issuer Choice, 81
WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 407 (2003) ("What we know about Enron, and many other companies, is that the
gatekeepers did not do their jobs."). But see Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial
Statement Insurance Alternative to Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter
Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers] ("This Article's title uses the word 'gatekeepers' metaphorically, and the
Article never uses the word again because it has no analytical or legal significance."), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-554863 (last visited Sept. 10, 2004).
21. William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents,
48 VILL. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (2003); see also The Enron Debacle and Gatekeeper Liability: Why Would the
Gatekeepers Remain Silent?, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation 1 (Dec. 18, 2001) (Statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolph A. Berle Professor of Law,
Columbia University) ("[T]he Enron example shows that the much vaunted transparency of the American
securities markets can sometimes prove illusory .... When this happens, the inevitable question arises: Why
didn't the gatekeepers stop them?"); Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal
and Ethical Issues, 58 Bus. LAW. 143, 144 (2002) ("[C]ompliant lawyers as well as greedy executives, lazy
directors and malleable accountants are necessary for large corporate frauds to come to life and persist long
enough to cause major harm."); PanelDiscussion, supra note 19, at S24 ("Enron is simply the most recent tick
mark on the timeline that marks the devastating entwinement of corporate wrongdoing and gatekeeping
failures.") (Statement of Mary Daly, Professor of Law, Fordham University).
22. John C. Coffee, Jr., UnderstandingEnron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid, " 57 BUS. LAW. 1403
(2002) [hereinafter Coffee, UnderstandingEnron]. According to Coffee, "[n]one of the watchdogs that should
have detected Enron's collapse-auditors, analysts or debt rating agencies-did so before the penultimate
moment. This is the true denominator in the Enron debacle: the collective failure of the gatekeepers." Id. at
1409; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of FashioningRelevant
Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 318 (2004) (same) [hereinafter Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure]. Cf Coffee,
Understanding Enron, supra, at 1419 ("This Comment has sought to explain that Enron is more about
gatekeeper failure than board failure."); Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure,supra, at 304 ("[Tlhe wave of accounting
and financial reporting irregularities that surfaced in 2001-2002 ... [was because] the gatekeepers failed ....
[N]ot in all cases, to be sure, but at a markedly higher rate than during the immediately preceding period."). For
an analysis of Coffee's particular conception of gatekeepers, see infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
At the same time, Coffee presciently acknowledges that Enron's recent and "strange failure is becoming a
virtual Rorschach test in which each commentator can see evidence confirming what he or she already
believed." Coffee, Understanding Enron, supra, at 1403; see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, Sharing
Accounting's Burden: Business Lawyers in Enron 's DarkShadows, 57 BuS. LAW. 1421, 1422 (2002) ("Enron's
cacophonous commentators share the trait of the proverbial man with a hammer, to whom every problem looks
like a nail."). William Bratton has identified four influential "causation stories" that summarize different
theories commentators have advanced for Enron's collapse, which he attempts to consolidate into one proposed
theme. See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 12991320 (2002); but see, e.g., Gregory Mitchell, Case Studies, Counterfactuals, and CausalExplanations, 152 U.
PA. L. REV. 1517, 1529-32 (2004) (critically examining Bratton's use of "causation stories").
23. Written Testimony of Chairman Harvey L. Pitt Before S. Comm. Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
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the focus on gatekeepers has followed the spread of these financial scandals abroad:
"[t]he most distressing similarity between the Parmalat and Enron scandals is the failure
of the financial system's gatekeepers .... And where-you can lift this chapter heading
24
from any Enron post-mortem-where Were [Parmalat's] auditors?"
Current analyses of gatekeepers in the corporate context all derive from the
paradigmatic framework developed by Reinier Kraakman and Ronald Gilson. In a series
of articles they conceptualized corporate gatekeepers as third party monitors with the
capacity to interdict in wrongdoing by withholding their necessary cooperation. 25 For
instance, parties engaged in certain transactions may require an auditor's sanction to
close. 26 Similarly, a bond or credit agency's rating can play an integral role in

Re: ConcerningAccounting and Investor ProtectionIssues Raised by Enron and Other Public Companies, 1342
PLI/CORP. 11, 15 (2002); see also Steven J. Choi, A Framework for the Regulation of Securities Market
Intermediaries, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 45, 45 (2004) ("Recent scandals in the United States highlight both the
importance and the fallibility of the security market intermediary institutions to which investors typically turn
for protection, such as auditors, analysts, and proxy advisory firms."). According to one commentator:
Today, 'Enron' has gone beyond name recognition. It has become part of the language. The name
has become synonymous with corporate greed, deceit, and failure. The collapse of the Enron
Corporation has already become a milestone in the history of American business, and events are
described as "pre-Enron" and "post-Enron."
Patrick Emergy Longan, Lessons from Enron: A Symposium on Corporate Governance - Foreword, 54
MERCER L. REV. 663, 664 (2003); see also Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, The Enron Failure and
CorporateGovernance Reform, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 855, 855 (2003) ("Enron is not just the hundred year
flood of fraud, but is in fact a warning that there are fundamental weaknesses that require immediate attention.")
(quoting William T. Allen, Remarks on Corporate Governance Post-Enron at the Meeting of the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York Committees on Corporation Law and Mergers, Acquisitions & Corporate
Control Contests (Apr. 1, 2002)) (quotation marks omitted); Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses:
Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate Concerning the Relative Efficiency of Mandatory Versus Enabling
Rules, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 334 (2003) ("Unfortunately, one of the object lessons in the Enron collapse is
that every component in [the] complex corporate governance infrastructure is fundamentally broken."); Steven
L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the DisclosureParadigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 2 ("[T]he
Enron debacle highlights the increasingly widespread problem of complexity, illuminating concerns that arise
in-and indeed are intrinsic to-virtually all securitization and derivative deals and other forms of structuredfinancing transactions."). And though the collapse of Enron was not an isolated occurrence, the generalizability
of its lessons is debatable. See generally Mitchell, supra note 22 (examining methodological problems
presented by some causal accounts of Enron's collapse that rely on counterfactual and inductive reasoning).
24. Got Milked?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2004, at A12; see also Andrea Melis, Corporate Governance
Failures. To what extent is Parmalat a particularly Italian case? (2004), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-563223 (last visited Apr. 21, 2004); Cf GHOSTBUSTERS (Columbia Pictures 1984)
("Wait for the sign, and our prisoners will be released. You will perish in the flame as soon as I find the
Gatekeeper.") (Rick Moranis as Vinz Clortho, a.k.a, the Keymaster).
25. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing,94 YALE
L.J. 239, 288-93 (1984) [hereinafter Gilson, Value Creation]; Gilson, Devolution, supra note 15, at 883-84;
Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-PartyEnforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. EcoN. & ORG.
53, 53-56, 61-66 (1986) [hereinafter Kraakman, Gatekeepers]; Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability
Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 890 (1984) [hereinafter Kraakman, Corporate
Liability]; Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549,
620-21 (1984) [hereinafter Gilson & Kraakman, MOME]. See also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman,
The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715 (2003)
(incorporating insights from behavioral theory into the MOME thesis).
26. See, e.g., Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 25, at 54 ("Accountants... are natural gatekeepers for
fraudulent securities transactions that require audits.., in order to close .... "); see also infra note 101. Though
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determining a company's standing in the marketplace. 27 The simple absence of an
auditor's sanction or a downgrade in a bond or credit agency's ratings can effectively
block an issuer's prospects for successful misconduct. 28 Because the issuer perforce
depends on the gatekeeper's support, interdiction by omission represents, "at least
formally, the least burdensome of the possible 'response duties' that a third-party
enforcement strategy might prescribe."

29

Applications of this framework in the corporate context, however, have been
confused and unnecessarily self-limited. Commentators often conflate the role of
gatekeepers with that of reputational intermediaries, 30 which lend their credibility to a
party to signal the value of its disclosures to investors. 3 1 In contrast, gatekeepers bear a
duty to investors to monitor the quality of such disclosures. 3 2 The conflation stems from

related (and sometimes consolidated), the terms "auditors" and "accountants" refer to distinct functions
In the broadest sense, the discipline of accounting includes auditing. However, accounting can be
described as measuring and reporting the effects of economic activities of individual entities.
Auditing, on the other hand, involves an independent examination to determine the propriety of
accounting processes, measurement, and communication. Stated simply, the accountant prepares
financial information; the auditor checks it.
COMMISSION ON AUDITORS' RESPONSIBILITIES, REPORT, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS xiii (1978);

see also Theodore Eisenberg & Jonathan R. Macey, Was Arthur Andersen Different? An EmpiricalExamination
of Major Account Firms' Audits of Large Clients (Nov. 2003) (manuscript at 4) ("The role of the auditor is not
to prepare financial reports for clients (that is the role of the accountant). Rather, the auditor's role is to provide
a reliable verification of the company's financial reports."), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=468761 (last
visited Apr. 21, 2004).
27. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney As Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L.
REv. 1293, 1297 (2003) [hereinafter Coffee, Attorney As Gatekeeper] (citing, as an example of gatekeepers,
"the debt rating agency that evaluates the issuer's creditworthiness"). According to New York Times columnist
Thomas Friedman, "[t]here are two superpowers in the world today in my opinion. There's the United States
and there's Moody's Bond Rating Service. The United States can destroy you by dropping bombs, and Moody's
can destroy you by downgrading your bonds, And believe me, it's not clear sometimes who's more powerful."
Frank Partnoy, The Paradox of Credit Ratings, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL
SYSTEM 65, 79 (Richard M. Levich et al. eds., 2002) (quoting Interview with Thomas L. Friedman, The News
Hour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 13, 1996)). Partnoy regards this statement as "patently
absurd," something paradoxically at odds with the fact that these agency ratings are of "scant informational
value." Partnoy, supra, at 65-66. Partnoy explains the paradox by contending that Moody's and S&P are not
pure private certifiers because of their dependence on property rights granted through regulations. Frank
Partnoy, Barbariansat the Gatekeepers?:A Proposalfor A Modified Strict LiabilityRegime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q.
491, 508-10 (2001) [hereinafter Partnoy, Barbarians].
28. See, e.g., Gilson, Devolution, supra note 15, at 883 ("[M]isconduct cannot occur without the
gatekeeper's participation."); Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 25, at 62-63 ("In the usual case where
gatekeepers and enforcement targets transact, gatekeepers can disrupt misconduct either by refusing to transact
with would-be wrongdoers at all or by refusing requests by wrongdoers for illicit or substandard performance
during the course of a broader transaction."); see also infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
29. Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supranote 25, at 54 n.3.
30. See infra Part I.A.
31. See, e.g., Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV. 15, 23 (1995)
(discussing reputational intermediaries as parties that "will lease their reputation to the client by offering
various forms of third-party verification to the other party to the transaction. By joining in the client's
assurances, these intermediariesstake their reputations on behalf of the client.") (emphasis added); see also
infra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 53, 109 (2003) [hereinafter
Hamdani, GatekeeperLiability] (referencing "widespread disagreement over the proper means through which to
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the fact that attorneys, auditors, bond or credit rating agencies, investment bankers, and
33
securities analysts can be both reputational intermediaries and gatekeepers.
One, however, cannot infer a certain role simply based on whether a certain party is
present within a transaction. For instance, just because a securities analyst has issued an
opinion letter does not mean that party has assumed the role of either a reputational
intermediary or a gatekeeper. Rather, the question of which role is involved turns on what
the securities analyst is doing. As a reputational intermediary, the securities analyst elects
to bond itself to an issuer's disclosures, regardless of whether they are accurate or
misleading. In contrast, as a gatekeeper, the securities analyst bears a duty to interdict in
an issuer's misleading disclosures. Accordingly, the distinction between reputational
intermediaries and gatekeepers does not turn on which party performs these roles, but
34
rather on what the roles themselves are and entail.
Moreover, the current focus on corporate gatekeepers is exclusively devoted to the
private sorts, 35 which are motivated by market-based incentives. 36 But there are also
public gatekeepers, such as regulatory agencies, which are motivated by pre-defined
social goals. 3 7 In fact, no one has systematically examined the benefits of public
gatekeepers in the corporate context. 38 The neglect is especially curious since these
public gatekeepers are positioned to provide distinct monitoring from, and arguably
superior monitoring to, their private counterparts. For instance, regulatory agencies such
as the SEC can assess the quality of not only disclosures by issuers, but also of the
harness gatekeepers to the task of improving the quality of corporate disclosure"); Sale, supra note 20, at 403
("[M]arket facilitators are charged with measuring quality, so to speak. These facilitators, or gatekeepers, are
supposed to vet offerings ....).
33. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
34. This is not to say that the roles are mutually exclusive, only distinct. See infra Part I.A.
35. Attorneys, auditors, bond or credit rating agencies, investment bankers, and securities analysts are
among the parties that can perform private gatekeeping functions. See, e.g.,
Choi, supra note 23, at 46
(referencing "securities market intermediary institutions, such as institutional investors, auditors, and analysts
among others"). See also infra notes 101-105 and accompanying text. Reinier Kraakman has labeled such
parties "market gatekeepers." Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 25, at 62 ("Gatekeepers ...might be divided
into market gatekeepers, who.., face powerful private incentives to prevent misconduct, and public
gatekeepers, who do not.") (emphasis in original). Kraakman proceeds to conjoin this distinction between
market and public gatekeepers with a distinction between bouncer and chaperone regimes, a subject beyond this
article's scope. Id. at 65. This article refers to market gatekeepers as "private" to sharpen the contrast with
"public" types, as well as to take advantage of the well-established public-private distinction that even
Kraakman recognizes. See id. at 75 n.67 (observing the "cost of administering gatekeeper enforcement may be
public or private, depending on how gatekeeper rules are enforced") (emphasis added); see also generally
Gillian Hadfield & Eric L. Talley, On Public Versus Private Provision of CorporateLaw, American Law &
Economics Association 14th Annual Meeting, Working Paper 49 (May 3, 2004), available at
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art49 (last visited Sept. 22, 2004); Symposium, Public/PrivateDistinction, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982); Joan Williams, The Development of the Public/PrivateDistinction in American
Law, 64 TEX. L. REV.225 (1985). This article collectively refers to private and public gatekeepers as "corporate
gatekeepers."
36. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
37. See infra note 113 and accompanying text. Other non-profit groups, such as Consumers Union, also
qualify as public corporate gatekeepers. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
38. Reinier Kraakman does cite the SEC's powers under the Securities Act of 1933, but only as an
example of a "complex gatekeeping regime that is custom-fitted to a single specialized transaction in a
regulated market." Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 25, at 82. This article contends public corporate
gatekeepers such as the SEC can handle broader monitoring duties. See infra Part III.C.
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services provided by private gatekeepers. 39 And the SEC has arm's length relationships
with issuers that avoid the conflicts of interest that plague private gatekeepers. 40 Finally,
the SEC is involved at multiple stages of the disclosure process, and thus has the unique
capacity to engage in both corrective and punitive monitoring of fraudulent issuers. 4 1 In
sum, public gatekeepers can perform a significant role in ensuring the production of more
comprehensive and reliable disclosures.
Conceptualizing the SEC as a public corporate gatekeeper does not require
reinventing the wheel. These duties can be corroborated and supplemented by a more
mature gatekeeping analogue that has arisen independently within the field of evidentiary
law. 4 2 As with issuers, expert witnesses may find sacrificing their reputations to
introduce substandard opinions profitable. 43 Further, like public investors, jurors may
experience severe difficulties evaluating biased or conflicting testimony. 44 To combat
these difficulties, the Supreme Court has prescribed a notion of evidentiary gatekeeping
that shifts responsibilities for monitoring experts away from litigants to judges. Expert
knowledge now must be adjudged relevant and reliable to be admissible. 45 The wrinkle
to this analogy is that, while the principle of evidentiary relevance resembles the notion
of materiality operative in securities regulation, 46 there is no direct corporate corollary to
47
the principle of evidentiary reliability.
This article contends public corporate gatekeepers should bear a duty of reliability
culled from that of their more established evidentiary analogue. Part I focuses on
corporate gatekeeping. After distinguishing reputational intermediaries from corporate
39. See, e.g., Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 25, at 56-57, 61. See also infra notes 119-120, 124, and
accompanying text. This should not be confused with analyses of the SEC itself. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi &
A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2003) (applying certain behavioral
insights to the SEC's operations and responsibilities). This article simply contends that regulatory agencies such
as the SEC can be characterized as a public gatekeeper.
40. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 134-141 and accompanying text.
42. Robert Prentice independently has made a connection between certain corporate gatekeepers (e.g.,
attorneys, auditors, investment bankers, and securities analysts) and expert witnesses, albeit only for the purpose
of illustrating the legal decision notion of "self-serving bias." See Robert A. Prentice, The SEC and MDP:
Implications of the Self-Serving Bias for Independent Auditing, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1597, 1619-29 (2000). See also
infra note 123.
43. See infra notes 152-160 and accompanying text. See also infra Part I1.A.1.
44. See infra Part II.A.2.
45. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (establishing gatekeeping test for
scientific expert evidence); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999) (extending gatekeeping
test to all types of expert evidence). See also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142-43 (1997) (establishing
an abuse of discretion standard of review for expert admissibility decisions). For analysis of the common law
test for expert gatekeeping, see infra Part II.B.
46. Compare, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 4.2, at 157 (3d ed.
2003) ("Under FRE 401, 'materiality' is merged into the definition of relevancy by the requirement that the fact
proved must be 'of consequence to the determination of the action."'), with TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,
426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) ("[M]ateriality... contemplate[s] ... a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under
all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the
reasonable shareholder."). See infra Part III.B.
47. Jill Fisch and Hillary Sale independently have proposed a notion of corporate reliability, albeit only
for securities analysts. See Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the
Regulation ofAnalysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1039 (2003). I address this narrower alternate proposal, which is
not connected to evidentiary reliability, in Part III.C.
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gatekeepers, Part I focuses on public entities such as the SEC. Part I1 shifts to evidentiary
gatekeeping. After using economic analysis to illustrate some persistent problems with
expert knowledge, Part II critically examines the common law components of evidentiary
gatekeeping. Part III then reconciles corporate and evidentiary gatekeeping. After
establishing structural and substantive similarities between these conceptions of
gatekeeping, Part III uses these similarities to forge a notion of corporate reliability.
Before proceeding, a methodological note is warranted. The comparison here
between corporate and evidentiary gatekeeping is an example of "intradisciplinarity, ''4 8 a
' 49
method that "transfers theories, practices, and technologies across legal domains.
Intradisciplinarity has a distinguished lineage, 50 which has connected seemingly
disparate fields such as contract and tort law, 5 1 tort and criminal law, 52 as well as
48. Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholdersand Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119, 152 (2003).
49. Id. (citing Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: Interdisciplinarity,100 MICH. L. REV. 1217, 1221 (2002)
(proposing this description for interdisciplinary work)). Chander perspicuously observes that "intradisciplinarity
seems especially appropriate to law, a discipline that relies on analogical reasoning." Chander, supra note 48, at
152. I agree with Chander's implicit point that intradisciplinarity is neither necessarily nor advisedly restricted
to law. However, as support for his specific unified treatment of minorities across the constitutional and
corporate contexts, Chander cites Gary Becker's claim that economic analysis of law is a "universal science that
can encompass all human relations." Id. at 151 (citing GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO
HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976)). At the risk of seeming ironically territorial, resorting to economic analysis (either
of the orthodox or behavioral sort), along with other disciplines, seems more appropriately part of the
interdisciplinary tradition deeply rooted in law. See generally Sullivan, supra. Moreover, Becker's specific
claim may be too aggressive now even for some members of the Chicago School. See, e.g., RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 17 (6th ed., 2003) ("[A]bstraction is of the essence of scientific inquiry,
and economics aspires to be scientific.") (emphasis added).
50. Within legal discourse the method can be traced back to Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972),
which developed a framework integrating property and tort law. A natural affinity seems to exist between
intradisciplinarity and quasi-meta-subjects, such as constitutional and international law, that encompass a broad
range of legal fields. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977); David
A. Anderson, First Amendment Limitations on Tort Law, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 755 (2004); F. Scott Kieff& Troy
A. Paredes, The Basics Matter: At the Periphery of Intellectual Property, STAN. L. & ECON. Olin Working
Paper No. 275, WASH. U. SCH. L. Working Paper No. 04-02-03, 2004 (distilling core principles and features of
antitrust, contract, and property law within the framework of intellectual property law), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=501142 (last visited Sept. 21, 2004); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination:
Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1 (2002); Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., InternationalLaw and
InternationalRelations Theory: A New Generation of InterdisciplinaryScholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367,
372 (1998) (observing a "lively intradisciplinary debate" within international law about the relationship
between comparative politics and constitutional law). Commentators certainly have extended the method's
utility certainly beyond quasi-meta- and procedural subjects to substantive areas such as criminal, tort, and
contract law. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. I see no reason why intradisciplinarity cannot be
extended even further to so-called procedural subjects, such as the law of evidence as well as that of civil and
criminal procedure.
51. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW (4th ed. 1987) (comparing and
connecting compensation systems within criminal, insurance, labor, and tort law); GRANT GILMORE, DEATH OF
CONTRACT (1976) (arguing that contract law is being reabsorbed into the mainstream of tort law); Thomas C.
Galligan, Jr., Contortions Along the Boundary Between Contracts and Torts, 69 TUL. L. REV. 457 (1994)
(examining the intersection between contract and tort law). But see, e.g., Jeffrey O'Connell, The Interlocking
Death and Rebirth of Contract and Tort, 75 MICH. L. REV. 659 (1977) (suggesting a way to segregate problems
associated with characterizing them as lying in either contract or tort).
52. See, e.g., Symposium, The Intersection of Tort and CriminalLaw, 76 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1996). See also
Richard A. Epstein, Crime and Tort: Old Wine in New Bottles, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION,
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criminal and corporate law. 53 And a recent movement revitalizing the method appears to
be afoot particularly in corporate circles. 54 Cynics might be inclined to dismiss the
method as a simple pursuit of consistent approaches among legal fields. 55 With all due
respect to Ralph Waldo Emerson, 56 this article endeavors to demonstrate that
RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 231 (Randy E. Barnett & John Hagel III eds., 1977); Richard A.
Nagareda, Outrageous Fortune and the Criminalizationof Mass Torts, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1121 (1998) (arguing
for distance between criminal law and the law of mass torts).
53. See, e.g., LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF
THE LAW (1996); James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider
Trading, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1413 (1992). Indeed, the paradox of blackmail alone has attracted intradisciplinary
interaction between contractual and criminal analyses. See, e.g., Arthur L. Goodhard, Blackmail and
Consideration in Contracts, 44 L.Q. REv. 436 (1928), reprinted in ARTHUR L. GOODHARD, ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COMMON LAW 175 (1931); Symposium, Blackmail, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1565 (1993).
See also Mitchell N. Berman, The Evidentiary Theory of Blackrnail: Taking Motives Seriously, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV. 795 (1998) (justifying criminalization of blackmail with a theory based on harm and wrongful motives);
Richard A. Epstein, Blackmail, Inc., 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 553 (1983) (justifying criminalization of blackmail on
economic and moral aversion grounds).
54. See generally Chander, supra note 48 (reconciling the notion of "minorities" within constitutional and
corporate law); Symposium: The Intersection of Race, Corporate Law, and Economic Development, 77 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 701 (2003). See also Stephen Choi & Jill Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing
Proposalfor Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269 (2003) (grafting the notion of vouchers from school
and campaign finance schemes to certain private intermediaries); Thomas W. Joo, Race, Contract, Property,
and the Role of Metaphor in CorporationsLaw, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 779 (2002) (examining the relative
merits of the contractarian metaphor, based on consent and enforceability, and the property metaphor, based on
rights and duties, for corporations law); Peter B. Oh, A JurisdictionalApproach to Collapsing Corporate
Distinctions, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 389 (2003) [hereinafter Oh, JurisdictionalApproach] (assessing corporate
entity rationalization through substantive principles of civil procedure); Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law,
Corporate Law, and Capital Market Efficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 565 (2003) (comparing corporate and trust
instruments in relation to capital markets). Interestingly, two pieces suggest connections between the SarbanesOxley Act of 2001, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 et seq. (Supp. 2003), as a response to recent financial scandals, and the
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2003), as a response to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. See Lawrence Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to Fight Fraud,
Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267 [hereinafter Cunningham, Appeal and Limits]; Faith Stevelman Kahn,
Bombing Markets, Subverting the Rule of Law: Enron, FinancialFraud,and September 11, 2001, 76 TUL. L.
REv. 1579 (2002). And a piece even has analogized the recent financial scandals to the political fallout from
Watergate. See Arnold Rochvarg, Enron, Watergateand the Regulation of the Legal Profession, 43 WASHBURN
L.J. 61 (2003).
55. This objection is formally expressed by the Fallacy of the Transplanted Category. See Moffatt
Hancock, Fallacy of the TransplantedCategory, 37 CAN. B. REV. 535, 547 (1959) ("When a legal category...
is imported into a different context where a different legal result (involving different legal policies) is in issue,
the transplanted category may well suggest a result which frustrates the relevant policies which should control
the determination of the new issue."). For applications of the Fallacy of the Transplanted Category, see, for
example, Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1058 (1996) (examining,
within the law of wills and inheritance of property, the problem of structural inconsistency, "[t]he theoretical
antithesis of... the so-called fallacy of the transplanted category"); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Antitrust, Interest
Analysis, and the New Conflict of Laws, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1976, 1979 n.20 (1982) (criticizing efforts to import
the notion of "subject matter jurisdiction" into the international context); William M. Richman, Evolved Into
Firms, 80 IOWA L. REv. 419, 427 (1995) (challenging an attempt to construct an overarching model of legal
professionalism that encompasses diverse types of practice organizations); Amy Sinden, In Search of
Affirmative Duties Toward Children Under A Post-Deshaney Constitution, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 227, 252 n.128
(1990) (questioning whether the Court would cursorily import the state action requirement in civil rights actions
into the family law notion of special relationships).
56. See Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self-Reliance, in ESSAYS AND ENGLISH TRAITS 66 (Charles W. Eliot ed.,
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intradisciplinarity is not foolishly concerned with its own shadow, but instead has much
to do with gatekeeping in particular and corporate law in general.
I.

CORPORATE GATEKEEPING

Gatekeeping is a powerful interdiction strategy against fraud in the corporate
context. The strategy harnesses the fact that issuers depend upon the support of certain
third parties to disclose information. Obtaining this support is the "gate" that issuers
seeking to perpetrate fraud must pass to be successful. Accordingly, third parties can act
as gatekeepers protecting this "gate" by deciding whether to grant or withhold support for
the issuer's disclosures. Without such support, there can be no fraud. In this way
corporate gatekeepers monitor fraudulent disclosures and prevent them from harming
investors.
Commentators, however, frequently conflate corporate gatekeepers with reputational
intermediaries. Issuers retain reputational intermediaries to signal the value of disclosures
to investors. These actors lend their reputations to issuers that want additional credibility
for their disclosures. Reputational intermediaries may even vouch for fraudulent
disclosures, provided the payoffs exceed the losses from diminished credibility. This
calculus for fraud has been applied to corporate gatekeepers, and they are now
conceptualized as reputational intermediaries. Sanctioning fraud as a legitimate course of
action not only distorts the seminal conception of corporate gatekeepers, but also
precludes analysis of their core monitoring duties.
Moreover, the reputational calculus cannot even account for the entire population of
corporate gatekeepers. Current reform efforts have focused exclusively on attorneys,
auditors, bond or credit rating agencies, and securities analysts, all of whom are private
corporate gatekeepers. But there are also public corporate gatekeepers. Regulatory
agencies such as the SEC primarily serve public interests whereas private corporate
gatekeepers respond to market-based incentives. And as a non-profit organization, the
SEC is highly resistant to conflicts of interest and capable of monitoring not only issuers,
but also other gatekeepers. Finally, the SEC uniquely possesses the capacity to participate
in multiple stages of an issuer's disclosure process, and thus engages in corrective and
punitive monitoring. These attributes suggest that reform efforts should consider public
corporate gatekeepers as a significant and valuable part of any interdiction strategy.
This Part establishes the analytical framework for public corporate gatekeepers. The
first step in this framework is to recognize that, unlike reputational intermediaries,
corporate gatekeepers bear monitoring duties. These duties are part of the decision
whether to grant or withhold support for an issuer's disclosures. The second step is to
recognize that public corporate gatekeepers can engage in monitoring that is comparable,
if not superior, to their private counterparts. The analytical framework proposed here fills
a critical void in the existing corporate gatekeeping literature without displacing it, and
sets up the intradisciplinary comparison with evidentiary gatekeeping.

1909) ("A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and
divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. He may as well concern himself with his
shadow on the wall.").
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A. ReputationalIntermediariesv. CorporateGatekeepers

The distinction between reputational intermediaries and corporate gatekeepers is a
subtle but significant one. 5 7 According to Reinier Kraakman, "[a]ccounting, law, and
investment banking firms serve as private gatekeepers because they are 'reputational
intermediaries' in the securities markets." 58 Formally defined, gatekeepers are "third
parties who can disrupt misconduct by withholding support .... 59 This support, "the
57. A useful orientational point for this distinction is its theoretical relation to whistleblowers, who
"disclose misconduct directly to potential victims or enforcement officials." Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra
note 25, at 56; see also James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering CorporateInner
Circles, 83 OR. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004) (contending certain behavioral group dynamics contributed to the
recent financial scandals), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=471261 (last visited Sept. 9, 2004); Janet P.
Near & Marcia P. Miceli, OrganizationalDissidence:The Case of Whistleblowing, 4 J. BUS. ETHICS 1, 4 (1985)
(defining whistleblowing as "disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral or
illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to effect
action"); Richard W. Painter, Toward a Market for Lawyer Disclosure Services: In Search of Optimal
Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221, 238 (1995) (broadly defining whistleblowing as "one of
several strategies for enlisting lawyers and professionals, such as consultants and accountants, to monitor
enterprise conduct" while recognizing that "[w]histleblowing rules are not all alike"). According to Reinier
Kraakman, whistleblowing is "available whenever private monitors might be induced to detect and report
misconduct," and "almost invariably punishes as well." Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 25, at 58, 59 n.16.
In contrast, neither reputational intermediaries nor gatekeepers are invariably punitive in nature. Id. at 58. But
see, e.g., Peter C. Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs: Multidisciplinary Partnershipsin Corporate Legal
Practice,84 MINN. L. REV. 1213, 1246 (2000) ("Rather than presenting a stark dichotomy, gatekeeping (with
the preservation of confidences) and whistleblowing (with a duty to disclose confidences) are best seen as
points on a continuum in which the potential to disclose will often increase the effectiveness of the ability to
deter wrongdoing.").
58. Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 25, at 61 n.20 (citing Gilson, Value Creation, supra note 25, at
288-93; Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-CostEconomics: The Governance of ContractualRelationships, 22
J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979)) (emphasis added). Cf infra note 74.
59. Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 25, at 54 n.3; see also Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, supra note
32, at 58 (deriving from Kraakman's definition a broader formulation of "parties who sell a product or provide a
service that is necessary for clients wishing to enter a particular market or engage in certain activities"); infra
notes 91-93 and accompanying text. But see, e.g., Partnoy, Barbarians,supra note 27, at 491 n.2 (noting,
without any further explanation, that Kraakman's definition "is not entirely consistent with the historical
meaning of 'gatekeeper'). Significantly, Kraakman proceeds to draw a distinction between this definition of a
gatekeeper and gatekeeper liability. The latter refers to "liability imposed on private parties who are able to
disrupt misconduct by withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers," Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note
25, at 53, through "civil or criminal sanctions," id. at 54 n.3; see also Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, supra
note 32, at 57 (defining gatekeeper liability as a form of third party liability). Kraakman has observed that a
"private analogue to gatekeeper liabilitymay be found in risks assumed by reputational intermediaries ... who
place established reputations on the line ....
Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note 25, at 898 n.124
(emphasis added).
According to Howell Jackson, gatekeeper liability is, "at most, a supplement to the dominant form of
regulation in the field: direct controls over financial intermediaries." Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on Kaye,
Scholer: Enlisting Lawyers To Improve the Regulation of FinancialInstitutions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1048
(1993). This article focuses on gatekeeping duties, and thus does not address directly the extensively examined
question of gatekeeper liability. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditionsfor
Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 787-89 (2001); Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for
Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 916, 951-59 (1998) [hereinafter Choi, Gatekeepers]; Stephen J. Choi,
Gatekeepers and the Internet: Rethinking the Regulation of Small Business Capital Formation,2 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BuS. L. 27, 48-51 (1998) [hereinafter Choi, Internet Gatekeepers]; Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure,
supra note 22, at 318-23; Luigi Alberto Franzoni, Independent Auditors as Fiscal Gatekeepers, 18 INT'L REV.
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'gate' that the gatekeepers keep," 60 may assume a variety of forms, "usually a specialized
good, service, or form of certification that is essential for the wrongdoing to
succeed.. .,,,61 as well as consent to a transaction or a favorable credit rating. 62 The
linchpin to this interdiction strategy is the prospective wrongdoer's dependent
relationship with a gatekeeper; the interdiction strategy is effective only insofar as the
gatekeeper's decision to grant or withhold support is necessary.
In contrast, reputational intermediaries are actors "paid to verify another party's
information" 63 by "signal[ing] [that information's] value through their individual
reputations." 64 Under the "reputational capital view,"'65 such signaling will be attractive
when informational asymmetry exists, 66 and when parties can or do not want to bond
L. & ECON. 365, 365-67 (1998); Victor P. Goldberg, Accountable Accountants: Is Third-Party Liability
Necessary?, 17 J. LEGAL STUD.295, 300-01, 307-08 (1988); Assaf Hamdani, Who's Liablefor Cyberwrongs?,
87 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 930-38 (2002); Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, supra note 32, at 98-108; Jackson,
supra, at 1049-55; Partnoy, Barbarians,supra note 27, at 540; Frank Partnoy, Strict Liabilityfor Gatekeepers:
A Reply to Professor Coffee, 84 BOSTON U. L. REV. 365, 365-66 (2004).
60. Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 25, at 54.
61. Id.; see also Coffee, Attorney As Gatekeeper, supra note 27, at 1297 ("Structurally, gatekeepers are
independent professionals who are so positioned that, if they withhold their consent, approval, or rating, the
corporation may be unable to effect some transaction or to maintain some desired status.").
62. See id. (citing, as an example of gatekeepers, "the auditor who provides its certification that the
issuer's financial statements comply with generally accepted accounting principles"). See also supra note 28
and infra notes 91-93.
63. Gilson, Value Creation,supra note 25, at 289.
64. Gilson & Kraakman, MOME, supra note 25, at 613-21. The notion of signaling hails, of course, from
A. MICHAEL SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING: INFORMATIONAL TRANSFER IN HIRING AND RELATED SCREENING
PROCESSES (1974); see also ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NoRMs 24 (2000) ("The signaling theory
suggests that any costly action can be a signal, that is, a mechanism for establishing or preserving one's
reputation.").
65. The seminal paper advancing this view is Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market
Forces in Assuring ContractualPerformance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981); see also generally Carl Shapiro,
Premiumsfor High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations, 98 Q.J. ECON. 659 (1983); John R. Lott Jr.,
Brand Names, Ignorance, and Quality GuaranteeingPremiums, 20 APPLIED ECON. 165 (1988) (generating
results contrary to Klein and Leffler's model). According to Frank Partnoy, "[flor centuries, scholars have noted
the importance of reputational capital in sustaining a self-policing society." Partnoy, Barbarians,supra note 27,
at 494 (citing ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JUSTICE, POLICE, REVENUE, AND ARMS 253-54, 505 (Edward

Carman ed., 1896) (defining the view as a composite of arguments concerning reputational intermediaries)). The
flip-side of this bonding is what is known as a "reputational penalty" :
The supplier's market-based incentive to maintain quality at a high level derives from (i) each
reputable firm's ability to earn a positive price-cost margin ('quality-assuring premiums') on each
unit sold and (ii) consumers' credible threats that they will individually and simultaneously
terminate all business dealings with the supplier if he or she does not meet their (high) expectations
about product quality.
Cindy Alexander, On the Nature of the Reputational Penaltyfor Corporate Crime: Evidence, 64 J.L. & ECON.
489,493-94 (1999).
66. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the
Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 632 (1999) [hereinafter Partnoy, Siskel and Ebert]
("Information asymmetry exists in markets where sellers have superior information to buyers about product
quality, yet cannot costlessly convey this information to buyers."). See also Black, supra note 59, at 788 ("The
principal role of reputational intermediaries is to vouch for disclosure quality and thereby reduce information
asymmetry in securities markets."); Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 25, at 96 ("Reputations are particularly
important when buyers cannot verify the quality of goods or services prior to their purchases, and enforceable
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themselves to certain disclosures. 67 Reputational intermediaries exhibit three primary
attributes:
First, the certifying agent must have reputational capital at stake in the
certification activity.... Second, the loss in reputational capital must exceed
the gain possible from false certification. Third, the [certifying] agent's
services must be costly and the cost must be related to the asymmetric
68
information associated with the issuing firm.
For high-quality producers, reputational intermediaries represent an attractive thirdparty strategy for credibly communicating the value of disclosures to investors. 69 For less
than high-quality producers, reputational intermediaries may be bribed or fooled into
warranties prove costly or effective."); Okamoto, supra note 31, at 22 ("[T]he reputation capital paradigm
predicts that a firm selling quality products in a market plagued with asymmetric information will make
investments in firm-specific assets such as a reputation for quality."). Ironically, according to Bernard Black,
"information asymmetry in the market for reputational intermediaries limits their ability to play this role."
Black, supra note 59, at 788. This is because investors may not be able to discern so-called "bogus reputational
intermediaries" that are not invested in protecting their own reputations. Id.
67. See, e.g., Gilson, Value Creation,supra note 25, at 290 ("The intermediary is paid only because its
reputation renders it trustworthy in circumstances when a party to the transaction could not be trusted.");
Partnoy, Barbarians,supra note 27, at 495 ("[W]hen it is too costly for the issuer to bond itself...
one or more
third party intermediaries will be able to step in to offer their reputation as a replacement for the issuer's
bond."); Poonam Puri, Taking Stock of Taking Stock, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 99, 104-05 (2001) ("Reputational
intermediaries serve important functions in situations in which companies are unable to make credible or
effective reputational capital commitments to third parties on their own.").
68. Partnoy, Siskel and Ebert, supranote 66, at 632-33. Richard Posner has observed another condition:
An action must be costly in order to be a signal, but this necessary condition is not also a sufficient
condition. A further requirement is that observers have an adequate understanding of the cost of an
action relative to the gains for different types from cooperation, in any given context, so that they
can tell that bad types cannot or usually cannot engage in that action.
POSNER, supra note 49, at 26; Black, supra note 59, at 788 ("[Reputational] intermediaries can credibly vouch
for the quality of particular securities because they are repeat players who will suffer a reputational loss, if they
let a company falsify or unduly exaggerate its prospects, that exceeds their one-time gain from permitting the
exaggeration."). Credit rating agencies are an example of a reputational intermediary that satisfies all three
conditions. See, e.g., Gilson, Value Creation,supra note 25, at 290; Partnoy, Siskel and Ebert, supra note 66, at
623. A wide variety of third parties can be effective signalers. See, e.g., Black, supra note 59, at 787 ("Among
the most important institutions are reputational intermediaries-accounting firms, investment banking firms, law
firms, and stock exchanges."); Choi, Gatekeepers, supra note 59, at 919-21 (focusing on a specific subset of
reputational intermediaries, denominated as "certification intermediaries"); John R. Lott Jr., An Attempt at
Measuring the Total Monetary Penaltyfrom Drug Convictions: The Importance of an Individual'sReputation,
21 J. LEGAL STUD. 159 (1992). Furthermore, the signaling can assume a variety of forms. See, e.g., Choi,
Internet Gatekeepers, supra note 59, at 45 ("The variety of information contained on the Internet will spawn a
number of different certification services.").
69. See, e.g., Richard W. Painter & Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyer Disclosure of Corporate Fraud:
Establishing a Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. REV. 225, 258 n.200 (1996) ("Investors rely on 'reputational
intermediaries' ... to cost effectively tap into the information market on their behalf.") (citing Gilson &
Kraakman, MOME, supra note 25, at 620). See also Stephen J. Choi & Kon Sik Kim, EstablishingA New Stock
Market for Shareholder Value Oriented Firms in Korea, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 277, 285 (2002) (describing how
reputational intermediaries are "able to protect the interests of unsophisticated investors in the market");
Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, Regulating Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems: A Law and
Economics Perspective, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 17, 40 (1999) (referencing how "[t]raditionally, organized
exchanges helped issuers and investors overcome... information problem[s] by serving as 'reputational
intermediaries' for listing firms").
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70
overstating the value of disclosures to investors.
Over time the distinction between gatekeepers and reputational intermediaries in the
corporate context has become obscured. For instance, Reinier Kraakman has been
interpreted as "making the case for lawyers and accountants... serving as 'gatekeepers,'
that is, serving as reputational intermediaries in third-party enforcement regimes." 7 1 Such
an interpretation comports with the operative modem conception that "[i]nherently,
gatekeepers are reputational intermediaries who provide verification and certification
services to investors." 72 Underlying this conception are two precepts, "[f]irst, the
gatekeeper is a person who has significant reputational capital ....
Second, the
gatekeeper receives a far smaller benefit or payoff for its role, as an agent, in approving,
certifying, or verifying information than does the principal from the transaction that the

70. See, e.g., Choi, Gatekeepers, supra note 59, at 941 ("Certifiers... may purposefully mislabel a known
low-quality firm as high quality.... Some certifiers, for instance, may take a bribe from a low-quality producer
to certify the producer as high quality."). See also Clayton P. Gillette, Reputation and Intermediaries in
Electronic Commerce, 62 LA. L. REV. 1165 (2002) (evaluating the efficacy of low-quality and high-quality
reputational intermediaries to facilitate commercial intemet transactions). According to Choi, in a market
containing producers of both high- and low-quality products, "intermediaries will all choose to screen with no
accuracy, and the certification market will collapse." Choi, Gatekeepers, supra note 59, at 940. One solution
might be to seek multiple certifications. See, e.g., id. at 926 n.31 ("[lhf each individual certifier screens with
only limited accuracy, multiple certification may raise the information signal purchasers receive from
certification."). Another solution might be to use second-tier reputational intermediaries, such as regulatory
agencies, that vouch for first-tier intermediaries. See, e.g., Black, supra note 59, at 788.
71. Therese H. Maynard, Spinning in a Hot IPO-Breach of FiduciaryDuty or Business as Usual?, 43
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2023, 2049 n.67 (2002) (citing Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 25, at 53) (emphasis
added).
72. Coffee, UnderstandingEnron, supra note 22, at 1405 (emphasis added). In subsequent articles, Coffee
apparently has relaxed this relationship by omitting the word "inherently." See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., What
Caused Enron?: A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990's, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 279 (2004)
[hereinafter Coffee, What Caused Enron?] ("As used in this article, the term [gatekeeper] refers to
intermediaries who provide verification and certification services to investors."); Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure,
supra note 22, at 309 ("[Tlhis article will use the term 'gatekeeper' more narrowly to mean a reputational
intermediary who provides verification or certification services to investors."). Certainly Coffee's original
formulation has been influential. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Enron-When All Systems Fail: Creative
Destruction or Roadmap to Corporate Governance Reform?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 989, 996 (2003) (deriving from
Coffee's original formulation a description of gatekeepers "as a subset of monitors who supply essential
verification and certification services to corporations") (citing Coffee, UnderstandingEnron, supra note 22, at
1405); John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in Lawyer Independence: Lawyer Equity
Investments in Clients, 81 TEX. L. REV. 405, 481 n.381 (2002) (describing a predecessor to Coffee's
UnderstandingEnron as "an interesting paper on gatekeepers as reputational intermediaries") (citing John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Acquiescent Gatekeeper: Reputational Intermediaries, Auditor Independence and the
Governance of Accounting (May 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-270944 (last visited Sept. 15,
2004) [hereinafter Coffee, Acquiescent Gatekeeper]; Millon, supra note 20, at 312-13 ("[T]he value of a
gatekeeper's endorsement depends on its reputation for trustworthiness. If it violates that trust... [tihe
gatekeeper then loses its reason for being.") (citing Coffee, UnderstandingEnron, supra note 22, at 1405);
Robert Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 417, 421 n.7 (2003) ("Coffee finds
problems with the financial system's gatekeepers-auditors, attorneys, and other reputational intermediariesat the core of the Enron debacle."); Perry E. Wallace, Accounting, Auditing and Audit Committees After Enron,
et al.: Governing Outside the Box Without Stepping Off the Edge in the Modern Economy, 43 WASHBURN L.J.
91, 96 (2003) ("Professor Coffee, for example, believes that reputational intermediary actors, or 'gatekeepers,'
are the problem.") (citing Coffee, UnderstandingEnron, supranote 22, at 1403).
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gatekeeper facilitates or enables." 73 These precepts explicitly link the definition of
gatekeepers with the reputational capital view, and equate them with reputational
74
intermediaries.
Correspondingly, gatekeepers are now examined chiefly through their reputational
incentives. For instance, "investors who typically engage in large transactions" have been
characterized as "gatekeepers, the underwriters, accountants, and lawyers who.., have
reputational interests at stake in guarding against incomplete and inaccurate
disclosure." 75 Similarly, trustworthy lawyers have been described as having a superior
capacity to "serve as reputational intermediaries or 'gatekeepers,' vouching for the
credibility of their clients' positions .... ,76 And in this vein, "use of third party
gatekeepers and intermediaries... may be used to enhance credibility... [by]
77
provid[ing] a signal to investors regarding issuer quality and candor."
These analyses, however, proceed from a problematic premise that gatekeepers are
defined by their reputation and, by extension, are synonymous with reputational
intermediaries. Frank Partnoy, for instance, has concluded that reputational arguments as
to corporate gatekeepers are sufficiently complex that "it seems... inappropriate to
assume [that] gatekeepers always will play the role of reputational intermediary ....
Further, Ronald Gilson has indicated that corporate gatekeepers and reputational

73. Coffee, GatekeeperFailure,supra note 22, at 308.
74. One might generously interpret Coffee as conceptualizing gatekeepers as a subset of reputational
intermediaries, that is, while all gatekeepers are reputational intermediaries, the converse may or may not hold.
That commentators do not adhere to this interpretation is of little consequence, since Coffee expressly dismisses
Reinier Kraakman's conception as "overly broad." Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure,supra note 22, at 309; see also
infra note 92. Coffee believes that defining gatekeepers from the standpoint of their capacity to withhold
support, see infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text, "ignores both the deterrent capacity of the gatekeeper
and whether it possesses reputational capital," Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 22, at 309. This
conceptualizes gatekeepers as indistinguishable from gatekeeper liability, see supra note 59, and fails to leave
room for any possible core monitoring duties such as what Kraakman envisions, Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra
note 25, at 79-81, and the duty of reliability this Article proposes. See infra Part III.C.
75. Dennis S. Corgill, Insider Trading,Price Signals, and Noisy Information, 71 IND. L.J. 355, 402 n.225
(1996) (citing Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency
Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 851, 880-81 (1992)); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Re-Engineering Corporate
Disclosure: The Company Debate Over Company Registration, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1143, 1169 (1995)
("[A] high prestige underwriter places its 'seal of approval' on [a securities] offering. In 'law and economics'
shorthand, the underwriter pledges its reputational capital and thereby becomes a reputational intermediary.");
Michael P. Dooley, The Effects of Civil Liability on Investment Banking and the New Issues Market, 58 VA. L.
REV. 776, 786 (1972) ("In less drastic circumstances, the underwriter's self-interest in avoiding liability and
preserving its own reputation may go a long way toward ensuring the accuracy of the registration statement and
prospectus.").
76. W. Bradley Wendel, Informal Methods of Enhancingthe Accountability of Lawyers, 54 S.C. L. REV.
967, 972-73 (2003); see also Coffee, Attorney As Gatekeeper, supra note 27, at 1293 ("Is the attorney's role that
of... a gatekeeper-that is, a reputational intermediary with some responsibility to monitor the accuracy of
corporate disclosures?"). Wendel, however, elsewhere does reference gatekeepers and reputational
intermediaries as implicitly discrete "economic concepts." Wendel, supra, at 972. The capacity of lawyers to act
as gatekeepers is beyond this paper's scope. See infra note 102.
77. Joseph A. Franco, Why Antifraud Prohibitions Are Not Enough: The Significance of Opportunism,
Candor and Signaling in the Economic Case for MandatorySecurities Disclosure, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV.
223, 308; see also Sale, supra note 20, at 403 ("[G]atekeepers... are supposed to vet offerings, and their
reputations are supposed to serve as the check on their thoroughness.").
78. Partnoy, Barbarians,supra note 27, at 498.
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intermediaries "may have entirely different meanings."
A reason for these different meanings is that reputational intermediaries bear no
specific duties for monitoring the quality of information. The absence of these duties is
evident in the fact that committing fraud is a legitimate course of action for reputational
intermediaries, In the short-run, reputational intermediaries will rarely provide fraudulent
monitoring because the immediate gains usually fall short of prospective gains as a
reputable repeat player that can command higher fees. 80 But in the long-run, reputational
intermediaries will commit fraud if the risk is acceptable either for the firm or its agents.
Formulated in reverse, the reputational capital view stipulates that, "[t]o the extent the
long-term reputational loss is greater than the short-term gain the producer receives from
overstating the value of... lower quality [information], producers will not engage in
such fraud." 8 1 This is the same calculus that applies to reputational intermediaries, or for
82
that matter, any party analyzed through the lens of reputational incentives.
Though sound, the calculus is thus not a safeguard against fraud. In essence, the
likelihood of fraud is based on a sliding scale; as the amount of profit at stake increases,
the likelihood it will exceed reputational loss, and thus make fraud prudent, also
increases. 83 Certainly this sliding scale is mitigated by the amount of reputational capital

79. Id. at 491 n.2 (At the Institute for Law and Economic Policy and Washington University-St. Louis
School of Law, March 9-10, 2001, conference, "Professor Gilson suggested that 'gatekeeper' and 'reputational
intermediary' may have entirely different meanings."); see also Christine Hurt, Counselor, Gatekeeper,
Shareholder, Thief- Why Attorneys Who Invest in Their Clients in a Post-Enron World Are "Selling Out," Not
"Buying In, " 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 897, 929 (2003) (noting that the "gatekeeping function obviously flows from a
[law] firm's function as a reputational intermediary, but it is slightly different in that the law firm is scrutinizing
the client because of the firm's short-term and long-term interests").
80. See, e.g., DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.) ("An
accountant's greatest asset is its reputation for honesty, followed closely by its reputation for careful work. Fees
for two years' audits could not approach the losses [the auditor] would suffer from a perception that it would
muffle a client's fraud....").
81. Choi, Gatekeepers,supra note 59, at 920.
82. See, e.g., Black, supra note 59, at 787 ("[I]nvestors' reliance on reputational intermediaries merely recreates the fraud problem one step removed. An environment in which most reputational intermediaries guard
their reputations creates an opportunity for new entrants to pretend to be reputational intermediaries."); Stephen
J. Choi, Company Registration: Toward a Status-BasedAntifraud Regime, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 567, 585 (1997)
("Indeed, left only to market-based incentives, a range of different quality reputational intermediaries may
arise."); Coffee, What Caused Enron?, supra note 72, at 280 ("[T]he gatekeeper's relative credibility stems
from the fact that it is, in effect, pledging reputational capital ... over many years of performing similar
services for numerous clients. In theory, a gatekeeper would not sacrifice such reputational capital for a single
client or a modest fee."). See also infra notes 83-85, and accompanying text. But see, e.g., Coffee, Gatekeeper
Failure,supra note 22, at 309 ("Characteristically, the professional gatekeeper essentially assesses or vouches
for the corporate client's own statements about itself or a specific transaction. This duplication is desired
because the market recognizes that the [private] gatekeeper has a lesser incentive to deceive than does its
client .... "); Andrew McLennan & In-Uck Park, The Marketfor Liars: Reputation and Auditor Honesty (June
2003) (contending honest auditors charge higher fees and, at a certain threshold, their increased entry into the
reputational intermediary market may actually decrease the incentives for refusing bribes), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-422701 (last visited Sept. 15, 2004).
83. See, e.g., Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 22, at 310 (identifying circumstances when his
reputational conception of gatekeepers will result in fraud, including "an increase in inducements for
gatekeepers to breach their duties" and "a decline in reputational capital within a 'bubble market'). But not all
factors are based on reputational capital. For instance, agency problems, where individuals act without regard
for the firm's reputational capital, operate independently from this reputational fraud calculus. See, e.g., Choi,
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84
involved, where high-quality reputational intermediaries are less inclined to risk fraud.
85
But as recent history attests, no reputational intermediary is free from this risk. And
because these high quality firms possess significant reputational capital, any incidence of
fraud assuredly will involve grand sums and, therefore, have a significant impact.
Moreover, effective reputational signaling does not even depend on whether or not a
certification or warranty actually issues. In the first instance investors can glean the value
of disclosures based on the reputational intermediary's credibility; the presence of a
certification or warranty provides affirmative information from a party with reputational
incentives separate from those of the producer. 86 Investors, however, also can glean
information from the absence of a certification or warranty; 87 producers that choose not
to purchase a third party's assurances or intermediaries that elect not to risk their own
reputational capital prompt a certain degree of suspicion in the securities markets.
Though more ambiguous, 88 the signals in this second instance are nevertheless useful for
investors. Reputational intermediaries thus can perform their role for investors without
89
undertaking any affirmative action.

Gatekeepers, supra note 59, at 920. But see, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral
Economics of CorporateCompliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 73, 90-91 ("[A]gents will be slow
to appreciate the opportunistic nature of what they are doing, and hence the threat to their own reputations. On
the other side, the other party is also slow at perceiving the opportunism and thus imposing any reputational
penalty."). The point here is that reputational intermediaries can and will decide rationally to commit fraud in
certain circumstances.
84. See, e.g., Melder v. Morris, 27 F.3d 1097, 1103 (5th Cir. 1994) ("[fln this case, it seems extremely
unlikely that [the auditor] was willing to put its professional reputation on the line by conducting fraudulent
auditing work for [the client].").
85. See, e.g., Coffee, What Caused Enron?, supra note 72, at 280 ("[E]xperience during the 1990s
suggests that professional gatekeepers will acquiesce in managerial fraud, even though the apparent reputational
losses would seem to dwarf the gains to be made from an individual client."). But cf Gary J. Aguirre, The
Enron Decision: Closing the Fraud-FreeZone on Errant Gatekeepers?, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 447, 451 (2003)
(Arthur Andersen "foresaw $100 million in annual fees from Enron. Yet, that sum is inconsequential when
compared to its $9.34 billion in revenues for 2001 .... Why would a company generating more than $9 billion
in annual revenues gamble all for a $100 million fee?"); Coffee, What Caused Enron?, supra note 72, at 281
("Even if Arthur Andersen saw Enron as a potential $100 million client, it must be remembered that Arthur
Andersen['s]... expected Enron revenues would total only around one percent of its aggregate revenues.").
Coffee's analysis of gatekeepers is based on his conception that they are equivalent to reputational
intermediaries. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text. By no means, however, does the reputational
calculus amount to an explanation of why the recent financial scandals occurred, a subject rife with
disagreements and speculation. See supra note 22.
86. See, e.g., Gilson, Value Creation, supra note 25, at 290 ("[A] third party can offer its reputation as a
bond that the seller's information is accurate. The value of the transaction then increases because information
costs are reduced, and the reputational intermediary is paid some portion of the increase as compensation for the
pledge of its reputation."). See also supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Choi, Gatekeepers, supra note 59, at 924-25 ("Armed with better information, purchasers
will ... adjust the price they are willing to pay for certified and noncertified products.").
88. This ambiguity includes the possibility of screening error, Choi, Internet Gatekeepers, supra note 59,
at 44, of naive or imperfectly informed investors, Choi, Gatekeepers, supra note 59, at 939-41, and of
"problems of mistake, inflexibility, and regulatory capture." Id. at 934, 946-49. But cf Choi, Internet
Gatekeepers, supra note 59, at 44 n.87 ("Intermediaries ... need not screen with 100% accuracy to provide
investors with useful information. So long as the screening accuracy is greater than 50%, investors learn
something from certification.").
89. This assumes that purchasers are rational and understand the reputational calculus. See, e.g., Choi,
Gatekeepers,supra note 59, at 922.
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In contrast, corporate gatekeepers are perforce subject to monitoring duties that
govern the decision to grant or deny support. These duties need not be formally defined
or required, 90 but they are essential to the core of gatekeeping: the decision to provide or
withhold support. 9 1 This decision protects what Reinier Kraakman terms the "gate" that
an issuer must confront to disclose information, 92 and what Ronald Gilson has stated "the
wrongdoer must have to accomplish his goal."' 93 When confronted with fraud, the
gatekeeper must respond in a way "roughly equivalent to the duty to withhold
'substantial assistance' from wrongdoers, as this is construed in determining the scope of
aiding and abetting misconduct. '94 A gatekeeper, therefore, is obligated to grant or
withhold support as a means of expressing its decision about the quality of an issuer's
information. 95 Equally important, the compulsory nature of this determination is what
makes monitoring duties necessary to gatekeeping; for if the information's status is
predicated on sanction, the decision to grant or deny support effectively becomes a
question of when wrongdoing merits a corporate gatekeeper's interdiction. 96
This is not to say that reputational intermediaries and corporate gatekeepers cannot
overlap

in certain

respects.

Certainly some reputational

intermediaries

perform

90. For instance, "regulatory measures such as licensing requirements can create gatekeepers where none
existed before." Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 25, at 54; see also Gilson & Kraakman, MOME, supra
note 25, at 604-05. Indeed, Frank Partnoy has argued forcefully that "much of the value of credit ratings is
derived from regulatory licenses, which since the 1970s increasingly have come to pervade securities, banking,
insurance, and pension regulation." Partnoy, Barbarians, supra note 27, at 509. Partnoy, however, concludes
that these "[h]undreds of legal rules depend substantively on certification by credit rating agencies," indirectly
contributing to the agencies' survival and prosperity. Id. But see, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating
Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43, 65-66 (2004) (contending Partnoy "overstates the case" based on evidence that
firms routinely pay for multiple ratings, and for ratings even when they may be "below-investment-grade").
Whatever the extent of regulatory dependence, the point here is that relevant legal rules serve to institutionalize
and support the use of credit rating agencies, and not to define their duties.
91. See, e.g., Gilson, Devolution, supra note 15, at 883 ("[T]he misconduct cannot occur without the
gatekeeper's participation.").
92. Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 25, at 54. But see, e.g., Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note
22, at 309 n.14 (contending that Kraakman's definition "would potentially hold liable persons who sold pencils
to Al Capone's gang on the grounds that one could not run a brewery and tavern business without using pencils
to keep records"); see also supra note 74. While this charge of over-breadth may have some merit, it implicitly
admits that a hallmark of gatekeeping is the decision to provide or withhold support, which this article contends
is a point of distinction from the reputational intermediary function.
93. Gilson, Devolution, supra note 15, at 883 ("[T]here must be a gatekeeper and a gate-some service
which the wrongdoer must have to accomplish his goal and someone in a position to decline to provide that
service to those who would misuse it."); see also Franzoni, supra note 59, at 366 (arguing that gatekeeping is
more likely to be desirable when: "(1) the private audit cost is low; (2) the share of liability placed on the
auditor [when a case of noncompliance is detected] is large; (3) the tax placed on liable taxpayers is high; and
(4) the incentives for the public enforcer [to exert effort in monitoring without gatekeeping] are low").
94. Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 25, at 54 n.3.
95. But cf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, supra note 32, at 63 n.34 (noting the necessity of certification
or warranty "often turns on the cost of entering a market without the services of the gatekeeper").
96. See, e.g., Lewin, supra note 1,at 186 ("Understanding the functioning of the gate becomes equivalent
then to understanding the facts which determine the decisions of gatekeepers."). According to Gary Aguirre,
however, the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994), relaxed this gatekeeping duty: "[Central Bank] was a license under the seal of the
Supreme Court to commit fraud up to the point of its final execution. Lawyers, accountants, and investment
bankers could conceive the fraud. Like architects, they could guide their clients step-by-step through execution
of the fraud." Aguirre, supra note 85, at 484.
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monitoring functions of gatekeepers. 97 And some gatekeepers can signal the value of
particular information to consumers. 98 Such interchangeable functions are possible
because they confusingly can be performed by the very same parties. 99 But the fact that
these capacities can be swapped only reinforces that they do not define the attributes of

both corporate gatekeepers and reputational intermediaries. 10 0 And the ability to swap
capacities certainly does not support characterizing reputational intermediaries as

corporate gatekeepers.
B. Privatev. Public Gatekeepers

The population of private gatekeepers is diverse. Among the familiar types are
auditors1 ° 1 and attorneys1 0 2 that evaluate disclosed information in relation to accounting
97. See, e.g., Gilson, Value Creation, supra note 25, at 288-93 (contending that accountants, attorneys,
and investment bankers may serve as gatekeepers because they are reputational intermediaries); Kraakman,
Gatekeepers, supra note 25, at 94 (implicitly defining "reputational intermediaries" as repeat players that
frequently, but not always, engage in monitoring "in order to protect their own reputations") (citing Gilson &
Kraakman, MOME, supra note 25, at 613-21); Langevoort, supra note 83, at 76 (stating that "reputation is
given preeminent place as a control mechanism in economic relationships, and reputational incentives require
something akin to monitoring-accurate observation of opportunistic behavior-in order to succeed") (footnote
omitted). See also Choi, Gatekeepers, supra note 59, at 918 (referencing efforts "to impose legal duties on
intermediaries in certain markets to act as gatekeepers" as a remedy for unreliable reputational signals).
98. See, e.g., id. at 917 ("In markets in which purchasers lack the ability to distinguish between products
of different quality, intermediaries able to screen for product quality offer one solution to fraud."); Partnoy,
Barbarians,supra note 27, at 495-96 ("If buyers of securities find it too expensive to determine on their own
whether an issue is worth the price ... a reputable gatekeeper might be able to bridge this gap.").
99. See, e.g., Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 25, at 94 ("Even without formal gatekeeping duties,"
rating agencies and securities analysts "frequently serve as 'reputational intermediaries."') (citing Gilson &
Kraakman, MOME, supra note 25, at 613-21; Gilson, Value Creation, supra note 25, at 288-93); see also
Kostant, supra note 57, at 1214 (discussing "ways in which both lawyers and accountants can be reputational
intermediaries in third-party enforcement 'gatekeeper' regimes") (citing Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 25,
at 62-66) (emphasis added).
100. See, e.g., Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 25, at 94 ("Reputation may sometimes be enough ....
[A]nd intermediaries do occasionally warrant their monitoring skill indirectly ....
").
101. See, e.g., Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, supra note 32, at 67 ("Auditors, for example, do have the
ability to scrutinize an issuer to determine whether its financial statements comply with accounting principles
and accurately reflect its revenues and expenses."); Patricia A. McCoy, Realigning Auditor's Incentives, 35
CONN. L. REv. 989, 991 (2003) ("[A]uditors act as gatekeepers. Certain major transactions involving
potentially large information asymmetries cannot get off the ground without audit opinions ....); Robert W.
Hamilton, The Crisis in CorporateGovernance: 2002 Style, 40 Hous. L. REv. 1, 34 n.208 (2003) (referencing
how the "U.S. financial system... has long relied on 'professional gatekeepers' . . . [that] include the
independent outside auditor who certifies the accuracy of financial statements prepared by publicly held
companies...."). See also supra note 26. But see, e.g., Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 762 (Cal.
1992).
An auditor is a watchdog, not a bloodhound.... Because the auditor cannot in the time available
become an expert in the client's business and record-keeping systems, the client necessarily
furnishes the information base for the audit. Thus, regardless of the efforts of the auditor, the client
retains effective primary control of the financial reporting process.
Id. (citations omitted); Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 454 (7th Cir. 1982) (Auditors should
not act as "detectives hired to ferret out fraud, but if they chance[d] on signs of fraud they may not avert their
eyes .. ");Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, supra note 32, at 60 ("As a practical matter, [however,] auditors
will inherently lack the information necessary to assess precisely the likelihood of fraud by each prospective
issuer."); infra note 312. According to Peter Kostant, however, this conception of the auditor as a watchdog has
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or legal standards. And there are investment bankers 10 3 and securities analysts10 4 that
"changed [dramatically]... at least for the auditors of public corporations registered with the SEC" because it
is no longer a tenable presumption that the client is honest. Kostant, supra note 57, at 1243. In his view,
"[a]uditors are no longer merely 'watchdog[s),' but now 'bloodhound[s]' or 'detective[s]' whose duty it is to
ferret out fraud." Id.
102. See, e.g., Coffee, Attorney As Gatekeeper, supra note 27, at 1299 (proposing a specific definition of
attorney as corporate gatekeepers based on four attributes: (1) autonomy from the client, (2) skepticism of the
client, (3) a duty to the investing public, and (4) a duty to resign when a threat to integrity is posed). See
generally Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There A Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future Enrons?, 48
VILL. L. REV. 1097 (2003); Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After
Enron, 35 CoNN. L. REv. 1185 (2003); Fred C. Zacharias, Lawyers as Gatekeepers, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1387 (2004). See also Royce de R. Barondes et al., Law Firm Prestige and Performance in IPOs:
Underwriter's Counsel as Gatekeeper or Turnstile (Sept. 2003) (manuscript on file with author). For prescient
analyses of attorneys acting as gatekeepers before the recent financial scandals, see, for example, Gilson,
Devolution, supra note 15; Jackson, supra note 59; Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingency Fee Lawyers as
Gatekeepers in the American Justice System, 81 JUDICATURE 22 (1997) (stating that "[l]awyers, particularly
contingency fee lawyers, are gatekeepers who control the flow of civil cases into the courts."); Langevoort,
supra note 83. The propriety of and wisdom of imposing gatekeeping duties on attorneys entails peculiar
concerns that are beyond this article's scope. See, e.g., Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on
Corporate Responsibility 22 (Mar. 31, 2003) [hereinafter ABA Task Force Report] ("The Task Force
acknowledges that lawyers for the corporation-whether employed by the corporation or specially retained-are
not 'gatekeepers' of corporate responsibility in the same fashion as public accounting firms."), available at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/ final report.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2004).
103. See, e.g., Partnoy, Barbarians, supra note 27, at 517-28 (referencing the gatekeeping function
investment banks perform). But see, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of
Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REv. 747, 778 (1985) (arguing that technological changes in capital raising
ultimately could eliminate the need for investment bankers to act as corporate gatekeepers). More recently,
however, Langevoort has contended that "the rapid pace of innovation at a number of levels offered motive,
opportunity and rationalization for a downshift in financial reporting norms, which in turn made outright fraud
more probable" in recent scandals. Donald C. Langevoort, Technological Evolution and the Devolution of
Corporate Financial Reporting (Dec. 2003) (manuscript at 2-3), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=480704
(last visited Nov. 1, 2004). With respect to investment banks, Hillary Sale has contended that "[t]he [SarbanesOxley] Act... largely ignores one key set of gatekeepers-investment bankers. Although the investmentbanking problems may be harder to address as corporate governance problems, for the most part, SarbanesOxley simply does not address them." Sale, supra note 20, at 409. But cf, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6 (Supp. 2004)
(calling for the SEC to implement rules "designed to require each securities analyst to disclose in public
appearances, and each registered broker or dealer to disclose in each research report, as applicable, conflicts of
interest that are known or should have been known ...to exist at the time of the appearance or the date of
distribution of the report).
104. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658-59 (1983).
It is commonplace for [securities] analysts to 'ferret out and analyze information,' ... and this
often is done by meeting with and questioning corporate officers and others who are insiders. And
information that the [securities] analysts obtain normally may be the basis for judgments as to the
market worth of a corporation's securities.
Id. (quoting Exchange Act Release No. 34-17479, 21 SEC Docket 1401, 1406 (1981)); see also Fisch & Sale,
supra note 47, at 1038 ("[T]he theory that [securities] analysts function as unbiased market gatekeepers... is
premised on the assumption that analysts act as conduits of information from company to shareholder and from
shareholder to company."); but cf, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 452, 469 n.241 (2003) (observing how the
gatekeepers, most notably securities analysts, were afraid of upsetting management for fear of losing other
business, such as lucrative investment banking or underwriting business).
A distinction exists between buy-side, sell-side, and so-called independent securities analysts. Buyside securities analysts advise their institutional employers, and thus are highly susceptible to conflicts of
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directly or indirectly underwrite a company's appraised value, as well as bond or credit
rating agencies 10 5 that assess a company's quality or risks. Perchance all of these
gatekeepers played some part in the demise of Enron, 10 6 a rare confluence of gatekeeper
interest. See Fisch & Sale, supra note 47, at 1043. Sell-side securities analysts perform research and make
recommendations for clients and other investors. See id. at 1041; see also infra note 118. Independent securities
analysts "provide research without an underwriting or other relationship to the firms that they cover" and thus
bear a minimal risk of client capture. Fisch & Sale, supra note 47, at 1041 n.18 (noting, however, that "[t]ruly
independent research can be expensive"); see also Choi & Fisch, supra note 54, at 284 (questioning the amount
of valuable research independent analysts provide, and noting that "[a]lthough analysts who are not affiliated
with investment banks are sometimes categorized as independent analysts, there are reasons to question the true
extent of this independence"); James C. Spindler, Conflict or Credibility: Analyst Conflicts of Interest and the
Market for UnderwritingBusiness (July 2004) (manuscript at 6, 9) (noting that "very few investors purchas[e]
independent research," and thus "independent analysts play only a small role in the market," while "savvy
purchasers of public offerings appear[ ] to value conflicted analyst research... [which] implies that conflicted
analysts [a]re thought to add value in some fashion"), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=564381 (last visited
Oct. 1, 2004).
105. See, e.g., Partnoy, Barbarians,supra note 27, at 505-16 (critically examining credit rating agencies).
See also Hill, supra note 90, at 61 (delineating how these agencies monitor with the "implicit threat" of publicly
disclosing negative or downgraded ratings). But see, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public
Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox,2002 U. ILL. L. REV. I (arguing against additional regulation of credit
rating agencies). Moody's Investor Services ("Moody's") and Standard & Poor's Ratings Services ("S&P")
effectively enjoy a duopoly in rating corporate and government debt. See, e.g., Partnoy, Siskel and Ebert,supra
note 66, at 649 (stating that Moody's and S&P "dominate the world business of rating"); Claire A. Hill, Rating
Agencies Behaving Badly: The Case of Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1145, 1147 (2003) (reporting that Moody's
and S&P "together have approximately 80 percent of the market; Fitch [IBCA] has the bulk of the remainder")
(citing Aline Van Duyn, Big Three Learn Lessonsfrom Enron, FIN. TIMES (London), May 27, 2002, at 4); Hill,
supra note 90, at 48 ("[N]ot only are most bonds traded on the public markets rated by both Moody's and
Standard and Poor's, most industrial companies themselves are also rated by both agencies.").
106. See, e.g., Aguirre, supra note 85, at 449-50 ("Where were the gatekeepers?... The answer has
surfaced... Enron's investment bankers, accountants, and lawyers. These gatekeepers were not merely asleep
at the switch, rather, each allegedly played a key role in the fraud itself"); Marleen A. O'Connor, The Enron
Board: The Peril of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1265-66 (2003) (indicting "corporate gatekeepers
[that] failed to detect the problems at Enron, such as [securities] analysts, auditors, outside counsel, lead
lenders, institutional investors, credit rating agencies, journalists, investment bankers, and regulators ....
").As
John Korger, a prosecutor with the United States Justice Department's Enron Task Force, has summarized:
[s]ince the 1930s, America has relied on a complex and evolving public-private system of checks
and deterrents to prevent companies and their executives from misleading investors. This regime
relies on four primary institutional watchdogs to prevent and deter misconduct before it happens
and to catch and disclose actual misconduct when it occurs: independent auditors, corporate boards
of directors, private securities analysts, and securities regulators at the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"). Behind this initial line of defense lies a fifth institutional force, the criminal
prosecutors with the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ"), who enforce the federal criminal
laws ....If we are going to prevent more Enron-style disasters in the future, it is these five
institutional players that will do it ....Simply put, Enron sought to mislead investors about its
financial position and commercial success, and it got away with this deception from 1997 to late
2001 because all five institutional players failed massively in their task.
John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraudand Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor'sPerspective,75 U. COLO. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 4), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=537542 (last visited Sept. 22, 2004).
But cf, e.g., Paredes, supra note 104, at 452, 452-59 (while contending "expert 'filters'-securities analysts,
money managers, institutional investors, sophisticated individual investors, arbitrageurs, brokers, and other
securities market professionals and financial intermediaries" all may be overloaded by information and prone to
overconfidence, astutely noting that "they use information differently and have different capacities to search
and process information"). See also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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failures that some have characterized as the "perfect storm." 107
Accordingly, these private gatekeepers have been the target of recent reform efforts.
Auditors can no longer provide issuers with "non-audit" services that are likely to
generate conflicts of interests.10 8 Securities analysts must now certify the integrity of
their recommendations and disclose any compensation received in connection with
them. 10 9 And attorneys face new minimum standards of professional conduct requiring
reports to escalating levels of managers and directors about their company's material
securities violations.I 10
But the broad net these reform efforts cast over different corporate gatekeepers has a
gaping hole. Absent is any discussion about the perpetually neglected monitoring of the
public corporate gatekeeper. 11 ' Governmental regulatory agencies, for instance,
scrutinize disclosures to protect investors and facilitate their ability to make informed
decisions. 112 According to Reinier Kraakman, such monitoring is the next step for reform
efforts. For "even if [private] gatekeeper liability is justified... lawmakers will wish to
push one step further: to ask why [public gatekeeper strategies] cannot yield the same
results just as economically .... 113
The public-private distinction between corporate gatekeepers turns on the types of
motivating considerations involved. On the one hand, market-based incentives drive
private corporate gatekeepers to maximize their own welfare against the costs of
107. Nancy B. Rapoport, Enron, Titanic, and the Perfect Storm, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 1373, 1373 (2003)
(quoting Laura Goldberg, Did No Wrong, Skilling Says: Defends His Role in Enron Fall, Hous. CHRON., Jan.
17, 2002, available at http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/special/enron/dec01/1183520) (last visited Apr.
21,2004); see also generally Mark A. Sargent, Lawyers in the Perfect Storm, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (2003). The
"perfect storm" metaphor "irks" Rapoport "to no end." Rapoport, supra, at 1375; see also id. at 1394 ("Enron's
collapse wasn't due to a 'perfect storm' of mere coincidence-the collapse was caused by humans and their
hubris .... It's all about character."; "Enron's demise was a synergistic combination of human errors and
hubris: a 'Titanic' miscalculation, rather than a 'perfect storm."'). But cf Mitchell, supra note 22, at 1529
(citing Rapoport's explanation as an example of how "the causal stories being told about Enron vary in their
specificity about the causal processes supposedly at work and the complexity of the causal story being told").
108. See 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (Supp. 2003); 17 C.F.R. § 210 (Supp. 2003). Among the prohibited services are
bookkeeping, financial information systems design and implementation, appraisal or valuation services as well
as fairness opinions, actuarial services, internal audit outsourcing services, management functions or human
resources, broker or dealer or investment services, and unrelated legal or expert services, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78jl(g)(l)-(8) (Supp. 2003) (Current through P.L. 108-279 approved 7-22-04). A one-year ban on auditing services
also exists for firms that employ certain top executives from an issuer. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7206 (2003) ("If a chief
executive officer, controller, chief financial officer, chief accounting officer, or any person serving in an
equivalent position for the issuer, was employed by that registered independent public accounting firm and
participated in any capacity in the audit of that issuer during the 1-year period preceding the date of the
initiation of the audit."). See also generally Jonathan Macey & Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the Role of
Commodification, Independence, and Governance in the Accounting Industry, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1167 (2003);
Sean M. O'Connor, The Inevitability of Enron and the Impossibility of "Auditor Independence" under the
CurrentAudit System (Mar. 2002), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract-303181 (last visited Apr. 7, 2004).
109. See 15 U.SC. § 7201 (Supp. 2003); 17 C.F.R. § 242 (2003).
110. See 15 U.S.C. § 7307 (Supp. 2003); 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2003); see also supranote 102.
111. See, e.g., Choi, supra note 23, at 45 (providing "a taxonomy of the various forms of securities market
intermediary institution failure," but focusing on "why private market intermediaries fail in their function to
protect the interests of investors") (emphasis added). Choi, however, does proceed to compare the private
institutional failures against present regulatory responses. See id. at 69-80.
112. See infra notes 121-122 and accompanying text.
113. Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 25, at 101.
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detection. 1 14 On the other hand, pre-defined social goals drive public corporate
gatekeepers to balance the costs of detection and enforcement against the value of
deterrence strategies.1 15 Pursuit of these social goals by public corporate gatekeepers has
two primary implications. First, these public corporate gatekeepers generally eschew
profit, enabling them to monitor targets at arm's length and thus without conflicts of
interest. 116 This is in contrast to private corporate gatekeepers, whose profit motive
renders them highly susceptible to capture by monitoring targets, 11 7 and thus
compromises their capacity to grant or withhold support impartially. 1 18 Second, the

114. See, e.g., Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 25, at 62 (defining private gatekeepers as actors that
"face powerful private incentives to prevent misconduct").
115. See, e.g., id. ("By hypothesis, only the performance of direct deterrence matters to an analysis of
public gatekeeper regimes .. "). This concern with effective deterrence is an organizational one, separate from
the problem of agency costs where individual employees may pursue self-interested, profit-maximizing goals.
See, e.g., ABA Task Force Report, supra note 102, at 11 ("[S]enior executive officers of public companies may
sometimes succumb to the temptation to serve personal interests by maximizing their own wealth or control
through manipulation or misreporting of corporate information, at the expense of long-term corporate wellbeing .. "); Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business
Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1236-37 (2002) ("No one who observed the
firm-threatening bridge loans made in leveraged transactions in the 1980s by investment bankers eager for a
success fee can believe that there is necessarily a link between what is rational for the firm and what actions
may be taken by the firm's self-interested agents."). I address the problem of agency costs in connection with
the SEC infra note 121.
116. See infra notes 121-122 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 22, at 1287 ("It is clear that Enron had captured its auditor .... Similar
situations of capture are ubiquitous in America's corporate landscape."); Robert R. Keatinge, Multidimensional
Practice in a World of Invincible Ignorance:MDP, MJP, and Ancillary Business after Enron, 44 ARIZ. L. REV.
717, 719 (2002) ("The Enron collapse suggests that the accountants' audit function might be compromised
where the accountants have an excessive financial incentive to please their clients and that a law firm may not
be in a position to objectively provide a second opinion with respect to its own work .... "); Robert A. Prentice,
The Case of the IrrationalAuditor: A Behavioral Insight Into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 Nw. U. L. REV.
133, 218-19 (2000). But see, e.g., Neil H. Aronson, Preventing Future Enrons: Implementing the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, 8 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 127, 135 (2002) ("In fact, one can find few instances of
independent auditors colluding with companies to defraud investors. Instead, auditors are usually defrauded in
almost all instances.").
Regulation S-X identifies symptoms of such capture, such as when the relationship between the
auditor and its monitoring target:
creates a mutual or conflicting interest between the accountant and the audit client; places the
accountant in the position of auditing his or her own work; results in the accountant acting as
management or an employee of the audit client; or places the accountant in a position of being an
advocate for the audit client.
17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(2) (2003). This is not to suggest that all auditors or private corporate gatekeepers are
captured by their clients. Indeed, there are persuasive arguments that "[c]lient capture is only part of the
problem" where "audits no longer serve the economic purposes-providing information that protects investors
and leads to efficient pricing of securities-that they once served." Macey & Sale, supra note 108, at 1169, 1167.
Jonathan Macey and Hillary Sale partially attribute this ineffectiveness to the introduction of the LLP as well as
confusion by the SEC between "[a]udit firm independence" with "auditor independence" in enforcing
regulations. Id. at 1176-79. See also William W. Bratton, Shareholder Value, Financial Conservatism, and
Auditor Independence, 53 DUKE L.J. 439, 444-45 (2003) (contending auditors can better serve their clients'
interests by adhering to GAAP principles rather than by "catering to transient client demands, particularly the
demand to maximize shareholder value").
118. See, e.g., Choi & Fisch, supra note 54, at 273 ("[Securities] [a]nalyst reports are often influenced by a
brokerage firm's desire to attract or retain investment banking business."); Fisch & Sale, supra note 47, at 1081
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independent nature of public corporate gatekeepers enables them to monitor a broad class
of fraudulent actors. 119 This class includes not only the fee-paying issuers that private
corporate gatekeepers service and scrutinize, but also corporate gatekeepers of both the
private and public variety. 120
Consider the SEC, whose self-described mission is "to protect investors and
maintain the integrity of the securities markets." 12 1 In this vein, the SEC seeks to deter
disclosure of materially misleading or false information to investors. Via a myriad of
securities regulations, the SEC is a public agency that performs gatekeeping duties for no
profit. 122 Like private corporate gatekeepers, the SEC monitors the quality of financial
(observing that "[t]he fact that [sell-side] analysts act for the benefit of several different groups ... creates an
unavoidable conflict"). A significant source of conflict stems from the fact that these securities analysts can and
often do invest in their monitoring subjects. See, e.g., Fisch & Sale, supra note 47, at 1043 (Sell-side securities
"[a]nalysts consistently invest in the companies they cover."), and 1044 ("An SEC investigation revealed that
nearly one-third of the analysts investigated owned securities in companies they covered .. "). Fisch and Sale
contend that such ownership is troubling regardless of whether securities analysts trade contrary to or consistent
with their recommendations to investors:
[A]nalysts trading contrary to their public recommendations... is problematic because, at a
minimum, it suggests a lack of faith by the analysts in the accuracy of their reports. Analyst trading
that is consistent with a recommendation is also problematic, however, as the analyst may have an
incentive to distort the information for personal gain.
Id. at 1044 (citing Jessica Sommer, Red-Faced SEC Targets Two-Faced Analysts, N.Y. POST, May 24, 2002, at
41; Christian Berthelsen, BofA Tightens Rules for Analysts, S.F. CHRON., June 21, 2002, at B 1). But cf Choi &
Fisch, supra note 54, at 276 (contending "elimination of conflicts facing [certain] intermediaries is a flawed
solution" because these services may depend on conflicted activities for financing"). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
addresses these conflicts by requiring securities analysts to disclose their ownership interests. See 15 U.S.C. §§
7201-09 (Supp. 2003). Similarly pernicious are what Fisch and Sale call "access" conflicts, where sell-side
securities analysts attempt to maintain their standing with or curry favor from clients that are valuable sources
of information. Fisch & Sale, supra note 47, at 1054-56. The oft-criticized Regulation FD attempts to address
these access conflicts. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-103 (2003).
119. See infra notes 122-123 and accompanying text.
120. See infra note 123 and accompanying text. The class may be of varying breadth, depending on the
nature of the public corporate gatekeepers' pre-defined social goal. But because the goal is social in nature, that
is, abstractly concerned with improving public welfare, the class is assuredly broader in scope than the
competitive market in which private corporate gatekeepers compete. See, e.g., Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability,
supra note 32, at 65 ("The market for [private] gatekeeper services is competitive.").
121. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Introduction-The SEC: Who We Are, What We Do,
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtm (last visited Apr. 8, 2004). According to the SEC, to
achieve the goal of enabling "all investors .. . [to] have access to certain basic facts about an investment prior to
buying it," the agency "requires public companies to disclose meaningful financial and other information to the
public, which provides a common pool of knowledge for all investors to judge for themselves if a company's
securities are a good investment." Id.
122. See, e.g., Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 25, at 82 (observing how "Section 11 [of the Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 et seq.].. . builds upon [certain] features of the registration statement to frame a set
of gatekeeping duties [for the SEC] on behalf of investors"). As a governmental agency, the SEC represents a
clear case of a corporate gatekeeper that does not operate for profit and thus is public in nature. A less apparent
case might be a non-governmental organization such as Consumers Union. In a conventional sense, Consumers
Union is a private gatekeeper by virtue of its primary dependence on revenue derived from CONSUMER
REPORTS, a publication containing product quality reviews. See, e.g., Robert S. Saunders, Note, Replacing
Skepticism: An Economic Justificationfor Competitors' Actions for False Advertising under Section 43(A) of
the Lanham Act, 77 VA. L. REv. 563, 582 n.86 (1991) ("[P]rivate organizations such as Consumers Union
invest in research to compile [information relevant to making purchasing decisions] for accuracy and
impartiality so that consumers can rely on their data."). Indeed, Frank Partnoy deems Consumers Union to be a
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information issuers provide in publicly available filings. At the same time, however, the
SEC and its employees have proven relatively resistant to conflicts of interests. 12 3 And,
"purely private rater," more so than even bond or credit rating agencies such as Moody's and S&P, whereas the
United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") is a "pure government rater." Partnoy, Barbarians,supra
note 27, at 510. But Consumers Union is a non-profit organization that relies upon sales of CONSUMER
REPORTS because of a self-imposed ban on commercial advertisements or endorsements:
We accept no advertising, and buy any products we test on the open market. We are not beholden
to any commercial interest. Our income is derived from the sale of CONSUMER REPORTS and other
publications and information services, and from nonrestrictive, noncommercial contributions,
grants and fees ....
Neither the Ratings nor the reports nor any other information, nor the name of
Consumer[s] Union or any of its publications, may be used in advertising or for any other
commercial purpose, or for any use on the Internet. Consumers Union will take all steps open to it
to prevent commercial use of its materials, its name, or the name of CONSUMER REPORTS.
Consumers Union, About Consumers Union (Consumers Union ...is an independent, nonprofit testing and
information organization serving only consumers ....
"),available at http://www.consumersunion.org/
aboutcu/about.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2004); see also Sarah Deutsch, Comment, Fair Use in Copyright Law
and the Nonprofit Organization:A Proposalfor Reform, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 1327, 1356 (1985) ("Consumers
Union will not accept or permit advertising in connection with either its name or its ratings. Without revenue
from advertising, Consumers Union's primary source of income is from the sale of its publications.") (citations
omitted). This ban allows Consumers Union to be an impartial gatekeeper with the self-described mission of
"test[ing] products, inform[ing] the public, and protect[ing] consumers." Consumers Union, supra ("Since
1936, our mission has been to test products, inform the public, and protect consumers."); see also Ellen S. Aho,
Note, Fair Use and the First Amendment Protect Commercial Advertising: Consumers Union of United States,
Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 17 CONN. L. REv. 835, 846 (1985) ("Perceiving that a strict noncommercial policy is
essential to its reputation as an objective and impartial organization, Consumers Union accepts no advertising
for Consumer Reports or any other Consumers Union materials and forbids the commercial use of any of its
reports ....
")(citing Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 5-6, Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Gen. Signal
Corp., 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983)). And through its publication, the organization seeks to identify and
thereby deter manufacturers of hazardous or otherwise substandard products in the name of consumer welfare.
So while non-governmental organizations such as Consumers Union may be private from a certain vantage
point, they exhibit corporate gatekeeping attributes that are approximately more public in nature.
123. See, e.g., LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 52 (3d ed.
1995) ("Throughout its history, the [SEC] and its employees have generally avoided the types of conflict of
interest or corruption that have periodically bedeviled other federal agencies."). But see generally SUSAN M.
PHILLIPS & J. RICHARD ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1981) (citing examples where the SEC
has implemented regulations that have benefited institutional investors and securities analysts with no
corresponding benefit to the public welfare); Jonathan R. Macey & David 0. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC:
The Failure of the National Market System, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 315 (criticizing the SEC's lackadaisical
pursuit of the congressional goal of a national market system). According to Jonathan Macey, the "SEC has
engaged in agency imperialism in the form of 'turf-grabbing,' agency 'capture' by special interest groups,
agency distortion of information flow to the public, and agency manufacture or fabrication of crises." Jonathan
R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at
Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 909, 923 (1994); see also Jill E. Fisch, Corporationsand the Lawmaking Process:
The Case of Federal Express (Dec. 2003) (introducing the "political capital model," which explains how
corporations
can develop and flex their influence on regulatory bodies), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=467347 (last visited Oct. 1, 2004). Empirical evidence, however, suggests that there is
more "public-regarding behavior in [government agencies and institutions] than simple [public choice] theory
predicted." Tom Ginsburg, Ways of Criticizing Public Choice: The Uses of Empiricism and Theory in Legal
Scholarship, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 1139, 1160. Ginsburg suggests that "[rielations between administrative
agencies and private parties might.., be subject to the... dynamics of norm-building and reciprocity,"
resulting in cooperation that "could reduce the levels of 'adversarial legalism' that are alleged to entail costs for
the American economy." Id. at 1161 (citing Robert A. Kagan, AdversarialLegalism and American Government,
10 J. POL. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 369, 375 (1991)). Whether this sort of cooperation can and does occur, or
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by virtue of its publicly oriented mission, the SEC monitors other actors that provide
corporate gatekeeping services. 124 Accordingly, as a public corporate gatekeeper, the
SEC can supply monitoring in a fashion that is more impartial and comprehensive than
125
what private corporate gatekeepers can offer.
Moreover, the SEC offers a unique advantage over its private counterparts: the
capacity for both ex ante and ex post monitoring. 126 Ex ante monitoring occurs before or
while an issuer decides to engage in misconduct. Such monitoring is potentially
corrective in allowing identification and redress of misconduct before it becomes
whether the problem remains a compelling one, is "an empirical question." Ginsburg, supra, at 1161.
Stephen Choi and A.C. Pritchard have identified another source of concern with the SEC. See, e.g.,
Choi & Pritchard, supra note 39, at 41 ("Regulators do not fit neatly into either the opportunistic or completely
selfless boxes-a range of motivations exists. Within this range, cognitive biases may encourage regulators to
equate self-interest and the public interest."). This argument is based on insights drawn from behavioral theory
that is "fast becoming the latest craze in the pages of legal academia," Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and Social
Science in the Twenty-First Century, 12 S.CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1,1nn.l-2 (2002), and is beyond this article's
scope. Notably, however, a number of scholars have raised legitimate concerns about the methodological
soundness and conclusive breadth of how behavioral theory is being applied to legal problems. See, e.g.,
Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics'PerfectRationality Should Not Be Tradedfor BehavioralLaw and
Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 72 n.8 (2002) ("[B]ehavioral law and economics reaches
debatable conclusions about human judgment and choice not only because of causal indeterminacy and other
inherent problems with social science research, but also because the conclusions of behavioral law and
economics ignore contrary existing data."). But see generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The "'New" Law and
Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 739 (2000). More
relevantly, whether these sorts of criticisms are based on behavioral or public choice theories, the point here is
that the SEC has historically been less susceptible to the kinds of conflicts of interest that afflict private
corporate gatekeepers. This article does not suggest that the SEC is the perfect or even preferred party to engage
in corporate gatekeeping. Rather, the contention here is that the SEC should be regarded as a public corporate
gatekeeper and can provide monitoring of comparable and complementary value to that provided by private
corporate gatekeepers.
124. See, e.g., U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 121 ("The SEC also oversees other
key participants in the securities world, including stock exchanges, broker-dealers, investment advisors, mutual
funds, and public utility holding companies."). And via charges from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC
formulates, implements, and enforces a broad range of regulations and standards governing attorneys, auditors,
and securities analysts. See supra notes 106-108 and accompanying text. There are also private actors that
provide something akin to meta-certification services. See, e.g., Choi, Internet Gatekeepers, supra note 59, at 44
("Some intermediaries... may specialize in assessing the different certifiers of information, acting to certify
the certifiers."). But these meta-certifiers still operate for profit and remain vulnerable to the problems of client
capture and rogue agents.
125. Cf supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text.
126. Ex ante and ex post here refer, respectively, to forward- and backward-looking perspectives. See, e.g.,
POSNER, supra note 49, at 7 (describing ex ante as "before the fact" and ex post as "after the fact," where
"[rnational people based their decisions on expectations of the future rather than on regrets about the past"). The
ex ante/ex post distinction has appeared most prominently in debates between welfarist-based (as well as
consequentialist) and fairness-based (as well as deontological) theories. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1007 (2001) ("most notions of fairness reflect an ex
post perspective on the situations under examination"); id. at 1008 n.93 ("most notions of fairness are
understood to be nonconsequentialist") (emphasis in original), reprinted in LOUIS KAPLOW & STEvEN
SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2001). See also generally Barbara H. Fried, Ex Ante/Ex Post, 13 J.
LAW & CONTEMP. THEORY 123 (2003) (providing an excellent comparison between economic and
philosophical treatments of whether there should be ex post compensation for ex ante risk). Arguably a tenuous
relationship exists between the distinction's parallel existence in economic and philosophical accounts, a subject
beyond this article's scope.
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public. 127 This is because detection at this stage causes even the issuer that prefers
fraudulent disclosure to reevaluate its prospects for success. In contrast, ex post
monitoring occurs after an issuer decides to engage in misconduct. 128 Such monitoring is
potentially punitive in the significant costs associated with restating financial
information. 129 Even when the issuer does not prefer fraud, the corporate gatekeeper's
withheld support ex post creates a conspicuous cloud of uncertainty within the minds of
investors. 130
Neither private nor public corporate gatekeepers have a monopoly on ex ante or ex
post monitoring. Auditors, for instance, are directly involved in an issuer's preparation of
disclosures and thus can perform corrective functions. 13 1 And bond or credit agencies
rate issuers based on already disclosed information and thus can perform punitive
functions. 132 With both types of monitoring, the corporate gatekeeper's decision to grant
or withhold support remains a critical means for identifying and interfering with
133
misconduct.
Only public corporate gatekeepers such as the SEC, however, perform both types of

127. See, e.g., Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 25, at 57 (describing ex ante gatekeeping strategies as
those that "prevent or interrupt harmful conduct without regard for how wrongdoers respond to possible
punishment").
128. See, e.g., id. (describing ex post gatekeeping strategies as those that "increase the probability that
misconduct will be prosecuted after the fact"). But cf, e.g., Gilson, Devolution, supra note 15, at 882 ("Ex post
direct enforcement fails because it cannot define strategic litigation with precision.").
129. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Macey, supra note 26 (manuscript at 9) (restating earnings have, "on average, a
significant negative impact on equity returns") (citing numerous studies). According to Eisenberg and Macey, a
"GAO study, consistent with academics' analyses, found that restatements cost investors 10 percent of the
equity value of their shares ....
Firms issuing restatements also tend to be less profitable, slower growing, more
heavily leveraged and have received more qualified audit opinions." Id. (manuscript at 10).
130. For public corporate gatekeepers such as the SEC, ex post withheld support can assume the form of
prosecuting issuers with fraudulent disclosures. See infra notes 138-140 and accompanying text. Such issuers
might still decide that committing fraud was not worthwhile, but the decision would be based on only an
estimated probability of getting caught.
131. This is most purely manifest in the internal auditor, whose monitoring "is perfectly positioned to nip in
the bud an accounting irregularity problem." AcCOUNTING IRREGULARITIES AND FINANCIAL FRAUD 17
(Michael R. Young ed. 2002). However, the reality is that "the internal audit department has been somewhere
between nonfunctional and nonexistent." Id. at 18. And audit committees tend to lack the requisite
sophistication and credibility to engage in effective ex ante monitoring. See id. at 16-17. See also Paul M. Healy
& Krishna G. Palepu, The Fall of Enron (Spring 2003) (manuscript at 17) ("If management is fraudulent or the
auditors fail, the audit committee probably won't be able to detect the problem fast enough."), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-417840 (last visited Apr. 7, 2004). Accordingly, much of the onus of gatekeeping
functions by auditors has fallen on the external sort. To be sure, monitoring by the external auditor has its share
of problems; for instance, the external auditor is inherently distanced from "the all-important corporate
environment and culture, which is where financial fraud has its origins," and "where the fraud approaches the
thresholds at which outside auditor detection becomes a realistic possibility, deception of the [external] auditor
becomes one of the preoccupations of the perpetrators." ACCOUNTING IRREGULARITIES, supra, at 19.
Nevertheless, the external auditor also assumes a position that enables it to monitor misconduct either before or
during its commission.
132. Claire Hill nicely summarizes the meaning of ratings: "What the agencies are saying is 'if
what the
company officers tell us is true, the company (or the debt) is of X quality."' Hill, supra note 90, at 79 (emphasis
added).
133. See, e.g., Choi, Internet Gatekeepers, supra note 59, at 50 ("In some sense, both public and private
intermediaries provide securities market participants the same service: investor protection.").
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monitoring as a matter of course. 13 4 On the one hand, the SEC engages in ex ante
monitoring through its "selective" review-and-comment process for registration
statements. 135 The SEC identifies through "deficiency letters" material items that may be
potentially misleading, offers the opportunity for comments through personal or
telephone conferences, and issues "no-action letters" to issue advisory opinions; 136 this
process seeks to "suggest" critical amendments for the purpose of obtaining an order
sanctioning the registration statement as effective. 137 And the SEC engages in ex post
monitoring through its prosecutorial processes for false, manipulative, or misleading
statements. 138 These processes, which are publicly known, 139 announce the SEC's
134. As Reinier Kraakman correctly observes, "the same evaluative criteria [for ex post gatekeeping] apply
to [ex ante] gatekeeping and may help explain its relative rarity." Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 25, at 62
n.23. To be sure, analyses of liability regimes have demonstrated how prospective ex post penalties can shape
actual ex ante behavior. This is distinct from the focus here, as manifested by how, for instance, the SEC's
actual performance of ex post gatekeeping duties does not preclude actual performance of ex ante gatekeeping
duties to the same party. In contrast, actual ex post penalties for one party precedes actual ex ante adjustment of
behavior for other parties.
135. See SEC News Digest, Issue 80-222 (1980) (announcing the SEC Division of Corporation Finance's
"selective review" system); Exchange Act Release No. 6510, 29 SEC Doc. 1005 (1984) (extending this process
to investment companies). Another example of where the SEC exhibits an ex ante attribute is its ban on insider
trading. Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (Supp. 2003) ("Securities
Exchange Act"), for instance, provides recovery without requiring a showing of actual unfair use of inside
information. Id. at § 16(b); see also id. at § 10(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003); H.R. REP. No. 98-355, 98th
Cong. 5, 1st Sess. (1983) (Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984). Insider trading remains an unsolved puzzle,
corporate law's version of the "sound of one hand clapping," that has been examined from numerous angles.
For a nice summary of the basic arguments for and against regulating insider trading, which is beyond this
article's scope, see LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 123, at 760-68. For comprehensive treatments of the puzzle,
see generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING (1999); HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND
THE STOCK MARKET (1966); WILLIAM K. S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING (1996 & Supp.
2000).
136. See, e.g., U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 121 ("Among the more important
goals of the examination program is the quick and informal correction of compliance problems. When the
Office [of Compliance Inspections and Examinations] finds deficiencies, it issues a 'deficiency letter'
identifying the problems that need to be rectified and monitor the situation until compliance is achieved.");
Manual of Publicly Available Telephone Interpretations, available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/
telephone.shtml (last visited Apr. 7, 2004); U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 121 ("The
Division [of Corporation Finance] uses no-action letters to issue guidance in a more formal manner. A company
seeks a no-action letter from the staff of the SEC when it plans to enter uncharted legal territory in the securities
industry."). No-action letters arguably have less value as an ex ante monitoring strategy, however, because they
are publicly available. See http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2004).
137. See, e.g., U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 121 ("The [Division of Corporation
Finance]'s staff provides guidance and counseling to registrants, prospective registrants, and the public to help
them comply with the law."). But see, e.g., LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 123, at 105 ("Although in theory the
Commission's staff merely 'suggests' amendments, the practicalities of financing do not allow any real
alternative to compliance. The privilege of testing the staff s views by defending a stop order proceeding is an
expensive one in terms of the success of the financing.").
138. See, e.g., U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, About the Division of Enforcement, available at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/about.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2004) ("The Commission's enforcement
staff conducts investigations into possible violations of the federal securities laws, and prosecutes the
Commission's civil suits in the federal courts as well as its administrative proceedings."). The SEC also has
emergency power to suspend trading. But see generally Choi & Pritchard, supra note 39 (contending and
cataloguing a list of possible legal decision theory biases that may plague SEC enforcement decisions); see also
supra note 123.
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decision to interdict in misconduct through civil or criminal liability. 140 The SEC thus
14 1
executes both corrective and punitive functions.
At the very least, the SEC's attractive combination of gatekeeper attributes raises the
question of why current reform efforts continue to exclusively target private monitors.
Legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act attempts to improve monitoring through
heightened deterrence, 14 2 and yet ignores its primary conduit, public corporate
gatekeepers. 143 Regulations and commentary attempt to mitigate conflicts of interest and
agency problems in attorneys, auditors, and securities analysts, and yet overlook the nonprofit model exemplified by the SEC. 144 Reformers evidently suffer from a vividness
139. See, e.g., U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Litigation, (providing, inter alia, reports from
investigations, information concerning administrative proceedings and litigation, and releases about trading
suspensions), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation.shtml (last visited Apr. 23, 2004).
140. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a) (Supp. 2003) (general antifraud) ("Securities Act"); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 9(a) (Supp. 2003) (manipulation by brokers or dealers in connection with registered
securities), 10(b) (manipulation in connection with purchase or sale of all securities), 15(c) (manipulation in
connection with over-the-counter-transactions) (Supp. 2003) ("Securities Exchange Act"); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a9 (2003) (false or misleading proxy statements); 17 C.F.R. § 243 (2003) (Regulation FD prohibiting selective
disclosure); 17 C.F.R. § 244 (2003) (Regulation G governing pro forma financial information); 18 U.S.C. §§
1962(c), 1964(c) (Supp. 2003) (RICO).
141. See, e.g., Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 25, at 101 (indicating that "gatekeeper liability can do
double duty as an ex ante and an ex post enforcement strategy (as many SEC enforcement actions during the
1970s were apparently intended to do)") (emphasis in original).
142. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7215(c)(4) (Supp. 2003) ("Sarbanes-Oxley Act"); 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (Supp. 2003)
("Corporate Fraud Accountability Act"). See also generally Michael A. Perino, Enron 's Legislative Aftermath:
Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 671
(2002). See also, e.g., Cunningham, Appeal and Limits, supra note 54, at 317 (contending Sarbanes-Oxley is an
example of the "deterrence model [that] hypothesizes that target decision-making is conducted by comparing
the cost of compliance with the product of enforcement threats and penalty levels"); Hamdani, Gatekeeper
Liability, supra note 32, at 55 (referencing the "apparent consensus that insufficient deterrence of
gatekeepers ... is to blame for debacles like Enron"). But see, e.g., Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure,supra note 22,
at 305 ("Although enhancing liability rules is probably the most obvious and traditional response to scandals,
this was also the one strategy that business interests effectively resisted during the enactment of SarbanesOxley."); id. at 337 ("In short.., the expected costs to [auditors] from gatekeeper failure also remain low
because the level of deterrence that they once faced has not been restored. Arguably then, the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act represents an incomplete response."). V.S. Khanna, however, has contended that corporate interests may
have preferred Sarbanes-Oxley over enhancements to corporate civil liability because the legislation was
inevitable, as well as more predictable and controllable. See V. S. Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A
Political Economy Analysis (2003) (manuscript at 21-22), available at http://ssm.com/abstract--444120 (last
visited Apr. 7, 2004). In any event, this article makes no claim that Congress's strategy seeks, much less
achieves, optimal deterrence.
143. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act does create the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) as a way to mitigate the conflicts of interests that plague auditors. See
15 U.S.C. § 7211 (Supp. 2003). See also generally George J. Benston, The Regulation of Accountants and
Public Accounting Before and After Enron, 52 EMORY L.J. 1325 (2003) (examining the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) in the context of existing regulations governing accountants and their
procedures); James D. Cox, Reforming the Culture of FinancialReporting: The PCAOB and the Metrics for
Accounting Measurements, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 301, 302-04 (2003) (same). Some have given the PCAOB the
nickname of "Peekaboo." See Jerry W. Markham, Accountants Make Miserable Policemen: Rethinking the
FederalSecurities Laws, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 725, 789 (2003) (citing Judith Bums, Deals and
Deal Makers: Accounting Board Tackles Its Mission, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2003, at C5). In Joel Seligman's
opinion "[n]o incident in SEC history ever subjected the Commission to more criticism than the appointment of
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problem, 145 concentrating only on the types of private corporate gatekeepers that have
been implicated by the recent financial scandals. Further, these reformers' approach has
been to improve the performance of these parties only from within, rather than to look
outside and see how private corporate gatekeepers themselves can be monitored or
reviewed by their public counterparts. 146 And instead of limiting the analysis to either ex
ante or ex post monitoring, the SEC offers a joint interdiction strategy towards
misconduct. This is not to suggest that public corporate gatekeepers such as the SEC
should supplant or even precede private corporate gatekeepers as a vehicle for reform
efforts. But reform efforts should consider a complete set of options, and that should
include the benefits public corporate gatekeepers offer.
II. EVIDENTIARY GATEKEEPING

Part I established the analytical framework for public gatekeepers in the corporate
context. The task now is to delineate the precise contours of what these public
gatekeepers can and should perform. But there is no need to reinvent the wheel. An
illuminating analogy can be found in judges that already perform gatekeeping functions
to assess the admissibility of expert knowledge. These functions have evolved as part of a
protracted effort to safeguard triers of fact from prejudicial or unreliable expert
testimony.

Expert testimony introduces two significant problems for triers of fact. As "hired
guns," experts may provide favorable testimony for clients. These partisan experts will
sacrifice their reputational capital so long as the payoffs exceed the losses from
diminished credibility. Moreover, when litigants proffer opposing experts, their
conflicting testimony may cancel each other out without any net conclusions. Both
problems undermine the trier of fact's ability to evaluate and apply expert testimony with
any confidence.
The solutions to these problems have evolved over time. The early common law test
charged litigants with the responsibility of monitoring each other's experts. Litigants bore
the burden of persuading the court that an expert's testimony was based on methods or
techniques that were "generally accepted" in the relevant peer community.
Dissatisfaction with this approach, combined with an ambiguous relationship between the
common law test and the Federal Rules of Evidence, prompted a different approach.
Through a trilogy of cases, the Supreme Court formally embraced the notion of
gatekeeping, which charges judges with the responsibility of monitoring experts.

the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board on October 25, 2002." Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two
Masters: Corporate and Securities Law After Enron, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 517 (2002); see also generally
John Yozzo, The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Disaster: You Can't Make This Stuff Up!, 22
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 30 (Feb. 2003). The sorts of tasks imposed on the PCAOB are distinct from the duty of
corporate reliability proposed here. See infra Part III.C and accompanying text.
145.

See, e.g., RICHARD NISBETr & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF

SOCIAL JUDGMENT 8 (1980) (contending "people effectively assign inferential weight to physical and social
data in proportion to the data's salience and vividness"); Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability
Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 706 (1999) (defining vividness as a phenomenon where
"vivid information makes a far greater impression than dry or statistical information") (citing NISBETT & Ross,
supra, at 45-61, 123-25).
146. See supra notes 120 and 124 and accompanying text.

2004]

Gatekeeping

Evidentiary gatekeepers now bear a duty of deciding whether to admit or exclude expert
testimony.
This decision is based on two principles: relevance and reliability. Evidentiary
gatekeepers first must determine whether a proffered expert's data and theories "fit" the
ultimate conclusions in a way that assists the trier of fact. In the process, evidentiary
gatekeepers must select the appropriate criteria to determine whether the proffered
expert's conclusions and reasoning process are sufficiently dependable to resolve the
case's particular factual disputes.
This Part completes the foundation necessary to set up the ultimate intradisciplinary
comparison between corporate and evidentiary gatekeeping. To contextualize evidentiary
gatekeeping, the problems of partisanship and indeterminacy are examined critically
through the prism of economic analysis. The contours of evidentiary gatekeeping are then
delineated by distilling the voluminous common law and literature on this subject.
Although mindful of corollary corporate notions, the analysis here is not explicitly
comparative. The analysis seeks to provide a parallel account of evidentiary gatekeepers
that ultimately suggests structural and substantive connections with their public corporate
analogue.
A. The Economics of Expertise
Since their earliest appearances in courts, 14 7 expert witnesses have been a
problematic resource for judges and triers of fact. According to Dean Wigmore, the
introduction of expert knowledge "has done more than any one rule... to reduce our
litigation to a state of legalized gambling."' 148 A rich debate that neatly encapsulates these
problems with experts concerns the economic analysis of evidentiary law. 149 Proponents

147. Learned Hand has traced references to the use of experts in cases back to the fourteenth century. See
Learned Hand, Historicaland PracticalConsiderationsRegardingExpert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 4249 (1901). Until the sixteenth century, however, experts typically served on the jury. See David L. Faigman et
al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understandingthe Present,
and Worrying About the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOzO L. REV. 1799, 1800 n.2 (1994). According
to some commentators, the first "clear reference" to a party introducing an expert witness is Folkes v. Chadd, 99
Eng. Rep. 589 (1782). Faigman, supra, at 1800 n.2 (citations omitted).
148. 7 JOHN HENRY WiGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW: INCLUDING THE STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF ALL JURISDICTIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA § 1929, at 39 (3d ed. 1978); see also JOHN PITr TAYLOR, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF

EVIDENCE § 50, at 65 (3d ed. 1858) ("Perhaps the testimony which least deserves credit with a jury is that of
skilled witnesses.") (emphasis in original); Letter from Lord Salisbury to Lord Lytton (June 15, 1877), in 2
GWENDOLEN CECIL, LIFE OF ROBERT, MARQUIS OF SALISBURY 153 (1921) ("No lesson seems to be so deeply
inculcated by the experience of life as that you never should trust experts.... They all require to have their
strong wine diluted by a very large admixture of insipid common sense."); Frank S. Rice, The Medical Expert
as a Witness, 10 GREEN BAG 464 (1898) ("[O]f all species of evidence offered in a court of justice, none is so
thatched with suspicion or further removed from every suggestion of usefulness as is the evidence of a medical
expert.").
149. This debate over experts largely flows from scholarly exchanges between Judge Richard Posner and
Richard Lempert. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV.
1477, 1537-41 (1999) [hereinafter Posner, Economics of Evidence]; Richard 0. Lempert, The Economic
Analysis of Evidence Law: Common Sense on Stilts, 87 VA. L. REV. 1619, 1694-98 (2001) [hereinafter Lempert,
Economic Analysis]; Richard A. Posner, Comment on Lempert on Posner, 87 VA. L. REV. 1713 (2001)
[hereinafter Posner, Comment on Lempert]. A more concise version of Judge Posner's seminal article can be
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of this analysis focus on a set of particular issues within the domain of expert evidence,
most commonly, the threats of partisan experts and of indeterminate conflicting
150
conclusions to the trier of fact's truth-finding function.
1. Partisanship
The problem of partisanship concerns triers of fact relying upon experts that "are
partisans of whoever hired them.., rather than disinterested, and hence presumptively
truthful, witnesses,"' 15 1 and its economic model turns on reputational capital. One-time
and repeat expert witnesses, as well as their employing firms, 152 face different incentives
for providing accurate and objective knowledge to protect their reputations. As a onetime player, an expert witness is divested of any long-term stakes to provide fraudulent or
substandard testimony.153 In the short-run, the same reasons that any other witness might
found in POSNER, supra note 49, § 22.9, at 627-29, and a more elaborate version in Richard A. Posner, The Law
and Economics of the Economic Expert Witness, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 91 (1999) [hereinafter Posner, Economic
Expert]. Richard Friedman has noted that Judge Posner's original article "is a hasty scan through the entire
domain of evidence law" and thus is not "a good gauge of the potential of economic analysis to advance
understanding of evidence." Richard D. Friedman, "E'"Is for Eclectic: Multiple Perspectives on Evidence, 87
VA. L. REV.2029, 2037 (2001); see also Lempert, Economic Analysis, supra, at 1698 (contending that "at least
until we have more reliable empirical information, economic analysis of the kind Posner employs will ordinarily
have little to offer evidence law"). My purpose here is not to defend economic analysis of evidentiary law, but
rather to use the debate to delineate some persistent problems with expert evidence.
150. Judge Posner dubs these issues, respectively, "partisanship" and "indeterminacy." Posner, Economics
of Evidence, supra note 149, at 1536, 1539. The remaining issues in the set are intelligibility and externalities.
Id. at 1538-40. The problem of intelligibility concerns the ability of expert witnesses to "hide behind an
impenetrable expertise expressed in an unintelligible jargon." Id. at 1536; see also Hand, supra note 147, at 54
("[H]ow can the jury judge between two statements each founded upon an experience confessedly foreign in
kind to their own?"). The problem of externalities concerns "the deflection of academic researchers, especially
those with tenure, from scholarly work to testify," Posner, Economics of Evidence, supra note 149, at 1540, as
well as the possible "reluctan[ce] to publish results of academic research that undermine the positions
previously taken, or that were to be taken in the future," Posner, Economic Expert, supra note 149, at 96. The
dynamics of intelligibility are more philosophical than economic in nature, see infra note 219, whereas the
limited scope of externalities to academic experts overlaps Richard Lempert's critique of partisan experts, see
infra note 159 and accompanying text. Accordingly, neither intelligibility nor externalities is discussed
explicitly here.
151. Posner, Economics of Evidence, supra note 149, at 1536; see also TAYLOR, supra note 148, § 50, at 69
("[I]t is often quite surprising to see with what facility, and to what extent, [skilled witnesses'] views can be
made to correspond with the wishes and interests of the parties who call them."); Stephen D. Easton,
Ammunition for the Shoot-Out with the Hired Gun's Hired Gun:A ProposalforFull Expert Witness Disclosure,
32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 465 (2000). For empirical analyses of the problems posed by partisans, or "hired guns," see,
for example, MICHAEL J. SAKS & RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION
(1983); Joel Cooper & Isaac M. Neuhaus, The "Hired Gun " Effect: Assessing the Effect of Pay, Frequency of
Testifying, and Credentials on the Perception of Expert Testimony, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 149 (2000);
Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 622 (2001) (summarizing 45 years
of empirical research on jury deliberative processes, including those involving experts); Scott E. Sundby, The
Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How CapitalJuries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV.
1109 (1997).
152. See, e.g., Posner, Economics of Evidence, supra note 149, at 1537 ("Many expert witnesses ...are
employed by consulting firms, which have a corporate reputation that can be damaged by the errors of any of
their employees.").
153. This is not to say that the one-time expert witness has no incentive to provide fraudulent or
substandard testimony. Although contingent fee arrangements are prohibited, see infra note 155 and
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154
have for conveying truthful knowledge, such as personal integrity, arguably apply.
In contrast, the short-run and long-run stakes are linked for the repeat expert
witness, who is heavily invested in pleasing the client so as to maintain prospective
business. 155 While expert witnesses cannot work on a contingency fee basis, 156 the
57
repeat player can establish a track record of being instrumental in favorable outcomes.1
Experts with a reputation for providing accurate and compelling knowledge might appeal
to high-quality litigants, who are willing to pay premium prices for a premium signal to
triers of fact. But experts that provide fraudulent or substandard knowledge also
command a market, 158 where litigants (of any quality) might find fraud more profitable
than the risks of being caught. 159 A diminished reputation may result in the expert

accompanying text, the expert witness certainly would prefer to avoid litigation stemming from unsatisfactory
services.
154. Posner, Economics of Evidence, supra note 149, at 1537; see also Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence,
1991 Wis. L. REv. 1113, 1176 ("To some extent honesty in testimony is enforced directly by the process of
cross-examination and rebuttal. Nobody likes to be caught lying, regardless of the consequences."). Judge
Posner contends that "the one-time expert witness has nothing to lose or gain from giving dishonest or slanted
testimony." Posner, Economics of Evidence, supra note 149, at 1537 (emphasis in original). Whether loss is
symmetrical to gain ex ante would seem to be a prior, and perhaps debatable, question. Moreover, the one-time
expert witness may be rather amenable to a client interested in fraudulent or substandard testimony. With no
long-term reputational stake, this expert witness presumably has less at risk and thus likely requires a lower fee
than the repeat expert witness to make such complicity profitable. Experts in regulated industries, such as
doctors and lawyers, also may have ethical or professional incentives to provide truthful testimony. Cf infra
note 157.
155. See, e.g., Posner, Economics of Evidence, supra note 149, at 1537 ("Because most expert witnesses...
are repeat players, they have a financial interest in creating and preserving a reputation for being honest and
competent.... [I]t is ...the repeat player who has an incentive to please his client, so that he will be hired in
the future."). But see, e.g., Gross, supra note 154, at 1115 ("To put it bluntly, in many professions, service as an
expert witness is not generally considered honest work."). Samuel Gross cites a study that interviewed lawyers,
who "frequently described expert witnesses as 'prostitutes' or 'whores."' Id. at 1135 n.66 (quoting SAKS & VAN
DUIzEND, supra note 151, at 73).
156. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L REsP. DR 7-109(C) (2003); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
3.4(b) (2004).
157. See, e.g., Bennett v. State, 766 S.W.2d 227, 231 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (Teague, J., dissenting)
(describing an expert psychiatrist as having "earned the nickname of 'Dr. Death' because of the number of
times he has testified on behalf of the State at the punishment stage of a capital murder trial" and because of
"the number of times the jury has returned affirmative answers to the submitted issues"). See also James S.
Leibman, The Overproductionof Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2093 n. 156 (2000) (noting that Dr. Death's
testimony contributed to 115 death sentences in 124 capital cases) (quoting Alan Berlow, The Wrong Man, THE
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1999, at 78).

158. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 706 Advisory Committee's note (2003) (criticizing "the practice of shopping
for experts"). See also generally Deanne M. Short & Edward L. Sattler, The Marketfor Expert Witnesses, 22 J.
ECON. 87, 89 (1996). As of 1997, the top four economic consulting firms reported revenues of $185 million
with average revenue per expert of approximately $300,000. Michael J. Mandel, Going for the Gold:
Economists as Expert Witnesses, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 113, 114 (1999) ("Extrapolating this figure to four other
large private economic litigation suggests a total revenue of about $300 million. This number is almost surely
an underestimate ...").
159. See, e.g., Posner, Economics of Evidence, supra note 149, at 1537 ("Professors may incur heavy
nonpecuniary costs in diminished academic reputation (something they greatly value, or else they probably
would not be in academia)."). Academics, however, may not be the most representative providers of expert
evidence. See, e.g., Lempert, Economic Analysis, supra note 149, at 1695 ("The most commonly found experts
in civil litigation are ...

physicians .... In criminal cases they are usually police officers or forensic

scientists ....It is unlikely that the reputational sanctions that Posner sees as disciplining expert testimony will
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immediately losing clientele as well as incurring future losses in subsequent cases where
disclosures or cross-examination can reveal past misconduct. 160 The market for these
services, therefore, turns on the value of reputational capital and the costs of being
caught.
Whether using substandard expert services involve repercussions that extend beyond
the immediate case, however, is unclear. Subsequent litigants seeking to attack a
disreputable expert, for instance, may not have the requisite information or be prone to
overlook inconsistencies within the evidence. 16 1 In part, this may be attributable to
bounded rationality. 162 Further, judicial exclusion of such an expert may not signal
disrepute clearly. In the same way a denial of certiorari can be ambiguous, subsequent
litigants may "misread" an exclusionary ruling to be based on substantive, rather than
63
reputational, grounds, or vice versa.1

have much bite with such witnesses."). Although supporting anecdotal evidence exists, so too does counterevidence. Compare, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896-902 (1983) (involving an expert psychiatrist
who regularly testified against the weight of his peers' widely-held professional opinion); In re an Investigation
of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab, Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d 501 (W. Va. 1993) (delineating methods of a
forensic serologist who manipulated results in over 130 cases to procure convictions); Sanchez v. The Black
Bros. Co., 423 N.E.2d 1309, 1320 (I11.
App. 1981) (involving an expert engineer explaining his testifying
technique: "Under direct examination, the jury understands everything that I say. Under cross examination,
there are some things that I will allow the jury to understand and there are some things that I will not allow the
jury to understand."), with Commonwealth v. Santiago, 2002 WL 31780152, at *2 (Mass. App. Ct. Dec. 12,
2002) (referencing physician that "indicated to counsel that he no longer felt comfortable supporting the
defendant's position" upon reading the findings of the opposing expert, a surgeon "with a world-renowned
reputation in the field of cardio-pulmonary") (unpublished disposition); Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 640
n.2 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing with approval an expert report concluding that a "physician's practice is particularly
dependent upon the physician's maintaining a reputation of unimpeachable integrity"). One ironic possibility is
that the same factfinder biases Richard Lempert holds partially responsible for credentialism may be partially
responsible for why he believes academics, economists, and scientists possess greater prestige, and thus greater
stakes, than at least forensicists and police officers.
160. Because these costs are greatest for high-quality experts, the payoffs have to be sizable. In contrast,
low-quality experts face lower costs, and thus can charge less expensive fees.
161. Lempert, Economic Analysis, supra note 149, at 1695-96 ("[lt is a mistake to suppose that
information about an expert's past failings as a witness will be uncovered by a later litigant or used effectively
if it is."); see also Erica Beecher-Monas, Heuristics,Biases, and the Importance of Gatekeeping 20, 23 (Mar.
2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (discussing how jurors "may believe that the information
provided to them [by an expert] ... is honest, relevant and appropriately specific").
162. Posner, Economics of Evidence, supra note 149, at 1523 ("[P]eople do not have zero costs of
absorbing and analyzing information and so encounter problems of overload. This type of cognitive limitation is
entirely consistent with rationality ....). Two seminal texts on the subject of cognitive limitations are, of
course, HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL (1957); Herbert A. Simon, A
Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955). Cf JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000); see also supra note 123.
163. See Lempert, Economic Analysis, supra note 149, at 1695 (deeming the risk of misconstrual a
"substantial danger"). Lempert in fact cites Daubert v. Merrell Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (establishing
the admissibility test for scientific, specialized, and technical experts), as an example where one could
misconstrue the trial court as having excluded the testimony of reputable experts for "shoddy science" instead
of overwhelming contrary evidence. Lempert, Economic Analysis, supra note 149, at 1695-96; see also infra
Part ll.B. Another form of this problem is that "expert testimony may bear on only part of a case," and an
adverse judgment may be confused for rejection of the testimony. Lempert, Economic Analysis, supra note 149,
at 1696.
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2. Indeterminacy

The problem of indeterminacy concerns the prospect that "opposing experts often
simply cancel each other out,"' 164 and establishes a thin justification for judicial
involvement via court-appointed experts. As a preliminary matter, the cancel-out effect
may occur less frequently than might be expected. 165 Instinctually, the effect would seem
to involve equally conflicting expert knowledge. 16 6 This seems to be the unstated
premise behind Judge Posner's prediction that, when faced with an expert evidentiary
stalemate, "the parties would agree not to call [the experts], in order to reduce the
expense of litigation." 16 7 The underlying premise is that litigants would prefer no

164. Posner, Economics of Evidence, supra note 149, at 1536; see also Tahirih V. Lee, Court-Appointed
Experts and Judicial Reluctance: A Proposalto Amend Rule 706 of the FederalRules of Evidence, 6 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 480, 480 (1988) ("Evidence cancelling [sic] out evidence is merely one of the increasingly visible
problems with partisan expert testimony."). Judge Posner refers to the problem of indeterminacy as the "expert
cancel-out effect." Posner, Economics of Evidence, supra note 149, at 1539. "Canceling out" misleadingly
suggests an absence of net conclusions that precludes any possible choice, akin to the well-known tale of
Buridan's Ass. That tale recounts how a hungry donkey, equidistant from two identical bales of hay, starves to
death due to the absence of any justifiable reason for selecting one bale over the other. See MICHAEL CLARK,
PARADOXES FROM A TO Z 27 (2002) (citing, as further reading, Benedictus de Spinoza, Ethics, in 2 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF SPINOZA 409, 490 (Edwin Curley, ed., trans., 1985)). However, one might draw net
conclusions from equivalently conflicting expert evidence. There arguably is value in knowing that experts do
disagree on a point; the value may be in realizing that there is no consensus view among the presented experts
or perhaps within their peer community. This conclusion might establish that inadequate evidence exists to find
the defendant guilty or liable. Moreover, jurors can and sometimes do choose between experts; the choice
simply may be arbitrary. These are better captured by the notion of indeterminacy. See generally RUSSELL
HARDIN, INDETERMINACY AND SOCIETY (2003) (discussing indeterminacy within social interactions). See also
Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REV. 283, 283 (1989) ("In adjudication, law is indeterminate to the
extent that authoritative legal materials and methods permit multiple outcomes to lawsuits.").
165. See infra note 167. To an extent, indeterminacy folds into the problem of credentialism, where
factfinders use background information to decide which particular expert to believe. See, e.g., Gross, supra note
154, at 1186-88 (recounting Irving Younger's experienced observations that jurors often use credentials as a
proxy for credibility to resolve conflicting expert testimony, subject to common sense) (citing Irving Younger,
A PracticalApproach to the Use of Expert Testimony, 31 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1 (1982)); Eileen A. Scallen &
William E. Wiethoff, The Ethos of Expert Witnesses: Confusing the Admissibility, Sufficiency and Credibility of
Expert Testimony, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1143, 1144 (1998) (contending "the law fails to view expert testimony as
argument, the ultimate success of which rests primarily on the persuasive power of the expert's ethos-the
perception of credibility"); see also Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844, 859 (D.D.C. 1971) (referencing
necessity of using a "common sense approach" where competing expert evidence was equally biased and
complex).
166. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 164, at 488 ("[I]t is not uncommon for one expert to contradict another
expert at trial.... [Tihe resulting evidentiary stalemate creates a need for some guidance for the jury attempting
to weigh the conflicting experts' opinions."); Richard 0. Lempert, Experts, Stories, and Information, 87 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1169, 1174 (1993) ("When witnesses claiming the same expertise disagree, the frailness of each
expert's claim to special testimonial status is evident ... ");but see, e.g., Gross, supra note 154, at 1180
("[W]here the evidence is in direct conflict, decision making may be no more inaccurate than when the evidence
is simply incomplete, but it is more unpleasant.").
167. Posner, Economics of Evidence, supra note 149, at 1539. Judge Posner admits that this does not occur
frequently, "maybe because a lawyer who suggested it would be understood to be signaling that he thought his
expert less credible than the opponent's expert." Id. at 1539-40; but cf Stephen D. Easton, "Red Rover, Red
Rover, Send That Expert Right Over": Clearing the Way for Parties To Introduce the Testimony of Their
Opponents' Expert Witnesses, 55 SMU L. REV. 1427 (2002). This fear of signaling, however, might be muted
when the lawyers have contingent fee agreements; both might realize that increased expert costs, which may not
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testimony over testimony that likely will be negated; this preference is based on a belief
that the savings in expert fees would exceed any prospective net benefits from a battle of
168
equally matched experts.
Mere equivalence between expert testimony, however, may not be sufficient for
169
indeterminacy to obtain. One reason is the litigants' respective burdens of persuasion.
Gauging the strength of expert testimony is likely to be more difficult in relation to a
burden of persuasion rather than to a competing set of testimony; 170 one can more easily
glean whether expert testimony is equally matched rather than whether such testimony
sufficiently offsets its counterpart to satisfy the burden of persuasion. This is because
conflicting expert testimony need not be equally effective to establish, for instance, the
reasonable doubt requisite for success in a criminal case. 17 1 Even overmatched expert
enhance the chances of winning greatly, would diminish the net possible receipt.
168. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reconceptualizing the Expert Witness: Social Costs, Current Controls
and ProposedResponses, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 263 (2001) ("If together the testimony does little or nothing
to move the jurors closer to the truth, there is a net loss-resources expended with no advancement in the 'truthseeking' objective.").
169. Burdens of proof conventionally comprise both the burden of persuasion and the burden of production.
See JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2485, at 299 (James Harmon Chadboume rev. ed. 1981) ("The
[burden of persuasion] operates when the case has come into the hands of the jury, while the... [burden of
production] implies a liability to a ruling by the judge.") (emphasis omitted). But burdens of production
arguably are simply a function of burdens of persuasion, effectively collapsing the distinction between the two.
See generally James McNaughton, Burden of Production of Evidence: A Function of a Burden of Persuasion,
68 HARV. L. REV. 1382 (1955).
170. This, however, raises the specter of proof paradoxes. The conventional proof paradox posits that even
though the probability of individual elements to a cause of action may satisfy the applicable burden of
persuasion, the aggregate probability of these elements fall short. See generally L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE
PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977); see generally L. Jonathan Cohen, The Role of Evidential Weight in
Criminal Proof 66 B.U. L. REv. 635 (1988). See also V.C. Ball, Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and
Standards of Proof 14 VAND. L. REV. 807 (1961); Lea Brilmayer & Lewis Komhauser, Quantitative Methods
and Legal Decisions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 116 (1978); D.H. Kaye, Review: The Laws of Probabilityand the Law
of the Land, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 35 (1979); D.H. Kaye, The Paradoxof the Gatecrasherand Other Stories, 1979
ARiz. ST. L.J. 101. These issues recently have caught a second wind. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Sarah A. Jehl,
Burdens of Persuasion in Civil Cases: Algorithms v. Explanations, 2003 MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 893 (Winter
2003); D.H. Kaye, Two Theories of the Civil Burden of Persuasion,in 2 LAW, PROBABILITY AND RISK 1
(2003); Saul Levmore, Conjunction and Aggregation, 99 MICH. L. REV. 723 (2001); Alex Stein, Of Two
Wrongs That Make a Right: Two Paradoxesof the Evidence Law and Their Combined Economic Justification,
79 TEX. L. REv. 1199 (2001). See also generally Symposium, Probability and Inference in the Law of
Evidence, 66 B.U. L. REv. 377 (1996). Even though burdens of persuasion do not involve aggregate
probabilities, see Allen & Jehl, supra, at 897-904 (surveying federal and most state civil jury instructions, and
concluding that they only mandate a cause of action's constituent elements meet the minimum probability);
Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proofin Criminal Cases: Some Doubt about Reasonable Doubt,
78 TEx. L. REV. 105, 126 (1999) ("Our courts do not use jury instructions based on percentages of certainty,
and I do not suggest here that they begin doing so."). The paradox has eluded a clear answer. Saul Levmore and
Alex Stein separately have proposed solutions to this formal paradox. See Levmore, supra; Stein, supra. Allen
and Jehl, however, reject these solutions on the grounds that the consequences are not practically pernicious,
and reveal more about a deficiency in algorithms than about existing burdens of proof. See Allen & Jehl, supra,
at 929-43.
171. For an excellent analysis of the historical iterations of reasonable doubt, see generally Steve M.
Sheppard, The Metamorphoses ofReasonable Doubt: How Changes in the Burden of ProofHave Weakened the
Presumption of Innocence, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1165 (2003). An interesting analogy exists within
corporate law. Consider a corporation with two shareholders, with the controlling one owning 60% of the total
shares. In most situations, the minority shareholder is overmatched unless a supermajority requirement
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testimony still may function to exceed the minimum allowable amount of reasonable
doubt. 172 Indeed, the cancel-out effect within this example would be moot, since equally
matched testimony could not satisfy reasonable doubt. 173 So the more prudent course
might be to proceed with expert testimony, even if there is a sizable risk of
indeterminacy.
But the problem of indeterminacy remains unsolved. Certainly the most popular
solution is for courts to appoint their own expert witness to arbitrate impartially between
competing testimony, an idea which Learned Hand first proposed in 1901,174 and which
76
the Federal Rules codified in 1975.175 Federal courts, however, rarely appoint experts, 1
exceeding 60% exists. I thank Dan Kleinberger for this point.
172. Sir Blackstone quantified this threshold of reasonable doubt as the acceptable error rate for false
acquittals, which he believed to be 10 to 1. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 358 (photo. reprint 1978) (9th ed. 1783). Under Sir Blackstone's formula, conflicting expert
testimony that is only 10% effective would be sufficient to establish reasonable doubt. See id. A survey by
Judge Jack Weinstein of his colleagues in the Eastern District of New York revealed their belief that jurors
should be approximately 85-90% certain before concluding that reasonable doubt does not exist. See United
States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). See also Rita James Simon & Linda Mahan,
Quantifying Burdens of Proof"A View from the Bench, the Jury, and the Classroom, 5 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 319
(1971); Solan, supra note 170, at 125-27 (reporting findings of Judge Weinstein's survey as well as two others
involving federal and state judges) (citing C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof"Degrees of Belief Quanta of
Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?,35 VAND. L. REV. 1293 (1982)). The underlying study found that 126
of the 171 responding judges believed the probability threshold for reasonable doubt was at least 90%.
McCauliff, supra, at 1325. One of the judges, however, found a 50% probability to be sufficient. Id.
173. Certainly this problem is less thorny in civil cases, where a standard such as preponderance of the
evidence is involved. But cf T.P. Gallanis, The Rise of Modern Evidence Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 499 (1999)
(contending that contemporary conceptions of some fundamental evidentiary rules originated in criminal cases).
But one still would have to guess the strength of expert testimony relative to a burden of persuasion.
Additionally, because of the standard's proximity to a 50% probability, there would be greater uncertainty about
whether the superior expert testimony was sufficient to establish a preponderance of the evidence in light of all
possible variables. In particular, one also would have to take into account the effect of presumptions on
deliberations. At any rate, civil cases are still susceptible to proof paradoxes. See supra note 170.
174. See Hand, supra note 147, at 56-58. See also I JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM
OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 563, at 967 (2d ed. 1923); Emory Washburn, Testimony of
Experts, 1 AM. L. REV. 45, 61-62 (1866). According to Samuel Gross, "[a]ll of the major proposals to solve the
problems of expert evidence share a central feature: the use of expertise obtained outside the usual adversarial
channels." Gross, supra note 154, at 1187.
175. See FED. R. EVID. 706(a) (2003) (empowering courts to "appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by
the parties, and may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection"). According to Michael Saks:
Rule 706 was not intended be an evidentiary tool so much as it was to be a phantom. It would...
keep expert testimony honest, accurate, and helpful by frightening lawyers and their experts into
good behavior by its threat to materialize if they did not behave themselves. The findings of Cecil
and Willging strongly suggest that judges are carrying out their mandate admirably. Rule 706 is
employed so infrequently that some judges report that other judges don't even know it exists.
Michael J. Saks, Court-Appointed Experts: Defining the Role of Experts Appointed Under Federal Rule of
Evidence 706, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 233, 234-35 (1995) (reviewing JOE S. CECIL & THOMAS E. WILLGING,
COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS:

DEFINING THE ROLE OF EXPERTS APPOINTED UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF

EVIDENCE 706 (1993)).

176. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 154, at 1190-91 ("Weinstein and Berger, for example, comment on 'the
remarkably few cases in which federal judges have appointed experts,' and add that '[t]he federal experience is
not unique."') (quoting JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE

706[01], at

706-13 (1988)). Gross also cites Federal Judicial Center studies that reveal judges almost never appoint an
expert witness, and if so, typically no more than once. Id. (citing THOMAS E. WILLGING, COURT APPOINTED
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for reasons that are not altogether clear. 177 Further, judicial sanction may lend courtappointed experts undue influence on the trier of fact's deliberations. 178 One solution
might be to allow both litigants' experts to designate a mutually agreeable neutral expert,
akin to how consenting parties select arbitrators. 179 But when the experts' field is equally
split or quite novel, no neutral position may be available for a court-appointed or a
consensually-selected arbiter. As even Judge Posner has admitted, "I do not have a
solution to this problem."

180

At the very least, historical efforts to increase use of court-

appointed experts have proven unsuccessful,18 and seem likely to remain so.
B. The Common Law of Expertise

The current doctrinal framework for determining the admissibility of expert
evidence is the product of friction between Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (Rule 702) and
the once dominant common law standard from Frye v. United States.1 8 2 That case

EXPERTS 3 n. 1 (1986)). See also DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 1-3.8, at 43 (1997 & Supp. 2000) ("Although rules of evidence have long
provided for court-appointed experts, judges are reluctant to embrace this option.") (citations omitted). But see,
e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 147 (1997) ("Judges should be strongly encouraged to make greater
use of their inherent authority... to appoint experts .. ")(Breyer, J.,
concurring); Edward V. DiLello, Note,
FightingFire with Firefighters:A Proposalfor Expert Judges at the Trial Level, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 483
(1993) (noting use of court-appointed experts "to be increasing at a modest rate").
177. Samuel Gross partially attributes the underutilization of FED. R. EVID. 706 to its deficient structure
and inadequate guidance as to how to locate and select experts. See Gross, supra note 154, at 1191. There are
also social and structural reasons, of which "the most obvious ...is the steadfast hostility of trial lawyers" due
to a sense of territorialism. Id. at 1197-1200.
178. See, e.g., Ellen E. Deason, Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses: Scientific Positivism Meets Bias and
Deference, 77 OR. L. REV. 59 (1998) (criticizing court-appointed experts as a breach of the discrete decisionmaking and evidence-producing functions, and proposing a set of procedural safeguards for selecting neutral
advisors); Gross, supra note 154, at 1193 ("[Court-appointed experts] are all but impossible to impeach or
contradict, and, as a result, their testimony is dispositive of any issue they touch."). This undue influence can be
traced to the "false aura of infallibility" that surrounds court-appointed experts. Id. at 1193 (citing United States
v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 370 (Md. 1978)).
179. See, e.g., Posner, Economics of Evidence, supra note 149, at 1539 (drawing an analogy to the process
by which parties select arbitrators ); see also Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Scientific Authority: The Breast
Implant Litigation and Beyond, 86 VA. L. REV. 801 (2000) (proposing courts appoint a panel of experts for
scientific matters).
180. Posner, Economics of Evidence, supra note 149, at 1540.
181. See, e.g., Saks, supra note 175, at 240.
Court appointment of non-party experts is one of the most commonly recommended reforms. It
also has been a resounding failure everywhere it has been tried. Either it is rarely used, as Cecil and
Willging's data show for federal judges, or, where it had been used more aggressively, it promptly
fell into disuse.
Id. (reviewing CECIL & WILLGING, supra note 175).
182. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Prior to Frye, federal courts admitted experts based on whether their
"occupations and experience enabled them to express opinions ... upon which [a] court might rely with some
confidence in making up its judgment." The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. 170, 175 (1854); see
generally John B. Chapin, Experts and Expert Testimony, 22 ALB. L.J. 365 (1880); Albert S. Osborn, Reasons
and Reasoning in Expert Testimony, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 488 (1935). Some have labeled this the
"commercial marketplace test," where "courts sought to determine whether the proposed expert witness was
offering relevant facts or opinions that were beyond the ken of the fact finder .... The implicit test of expertise
was whether there was a commercial market for the witness's learning." Faigman et al., supra note 147, at
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involved the D.C. Circuit's refusal to admit testimony about results from an early form of
the polygraph test on the basis that the technology was "unprecedented."' 183 To assess
this sort of testimony, the court established that admission of "novel" and "scientific"
expert evidence 1 84 requires parties to demonstrate that the proffered expert evidence is
reliably based on a scientific technique generally accepted in the peer community. 185 The
"general acceptance" standard, as it became known, eventually emerged from the pack of
competing circuit standards to become "the dominant standard for determining the
admissibility of novel scientific evidence at trial." 186 A doctrinal gap then emerged with

1803-05.
183. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
184. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Does the Cold Nose Know? The Unscientific Myth of the Dog Scent
Lineup, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 15, 61-62 (1990) (contending the dual requirements of novelty and scientificity have
been neglected). Although Frye and the Court's superseding decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), were self-restricted to scientific experts, the Court subsequently
expanded its mandated gatekeeping approach to all types of experts. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526
U.S. 137, 141 (1999) ("We conclude that Daubert's general holding-setting forth the trial judge's general
'gatekeeping' obligation-applies not only to testimony based on 'scientific' knowledge, but also to testimony
based on 'technical' and 'other specialized' knowledge."). Nevertheless, the Frye standard potentially could
apply to knowledge from all fields. See generally Peter B. Oh, The Proper Test for Assessing the Admissibility
of Nonscientific Expert Evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 437 (1997),
reprinted in 48 DEF. L.J. 221 (1999) (criticizing Daubert for establishing an explicitly scientific test and
proposing a return to the uniform Frye test). In light of Kumho Tire this article does not focus on the peculiar
issues and problems associated with scientific expert knowledge, such as the distinction between scientific
validity and reliability. See infra note 219.
185. Frye, 293 F. at 1014 ("the thing from which a deduction is made must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs"); see also EDWARD IMWINKELRIED,
EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 287 (4th ed. 1998) ("When Frye applies, the proponent of the witness's testimony
must present foundational evidence that the theory or technique has gained widespread popularity within the
pertinent scientific circles."). Courts and commentators generally disfavored the Frye test. See, e.g., Daubert,
509 U.S. at 587 ("The merits of the Frye test have been much debated, and scholarship on its proper scope and
application is legion.") (citing cases and commentary); Paul C. Giannelli, Frye v. United States: Background
Paper Preparedfor the National Conference of Lawyers and Science, 99 F.R.D. 189, 191-92 (1983) ("A
number of courts have rejected [the Frye test] and commentators have labeled it 'archaic,' 'a sport,' 'infamous,'
and 'antiquated on the day of its pronouncement."') (citations omitted). See also, e.g., CHARLES T.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 363-64 (1954) [hereinafter MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE];
Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half-Century Later,
80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1219 (1980) ("Courts that accept the Frye test often have difficulty deciding when to
apply it ....Indeed, the selective application of the general acceptance standard is one of its most notable
features-inconsistencies in application abound."); D. H. Kaye, The Dynamics of Daubert: Methodology,
Conclusions, and Fit in Statistical and Econometric Studies, 87 VA. L. REV. 1933, 1956 (2001) ("The general
acceptance standard never was popular with evidence scholars, and by the 1970s and 1980s, more and more
courts abandoned it in favor of various substitutes.") (citations omitted).
186. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Skeens, 494 F.2d 1050, 1053
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (noting that Frye "has been followed uniformly in this and other circuits"); Reed v. State, 391
A.2d 364, 368 (Md. 1978) ("'[G]eneral acceptance' ... has come to be the standard in almost all of the courts in
the country which have considered the question of the admissibility of scientific evidence."). But, as Bert Black
points out, the general acceptance standard went "unnoted" for virtually thirty years. Bert Black et al., Science
and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientfic Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 722 n.30
(1994); see also Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law's Formative Encounters with
ForensicIdentification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1076 (1998) ("If the first myth of the Frye test is that it
was a revolutionary judicial invention, the second myth is that it thereafter dominated the courts' scientific
admissibility decisions. In actuality, the Frye corollary was so minor a variant that it went unnoticed for
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the introduction of Rule 702,187 which contained no explicit reference to the general
acceptance standard.188
Specifically, Rule 702 provided no guidance as to the relationship between its selfprofessed "liberal" standard and the "austere" one of Frye, prompting the Court's
decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc. 189 A divided Court, 190 led by
Justice Blackmun, adhered to its previous holding that "under the Federal Rules no
common law of evidence remains ....
"191 Accordingly, the Court held that the
enactment of Rule 702's "assist the trier of fact" standard had displaced Frye and its
192
common law progeny.
decades."). For an excellent history of the Frye test, see David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye, Again: The Past,
Present,and Future ofthe General Acceptance Test, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 385 (2001).
187. The complete Rule provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1)
the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the
facts of the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702 (2003). The concluding, three-pronged conditional was not present in Rule 702 at the time
the Court decided Daubert and its immediate progeny-GeneralElec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), and
Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). Congress added the conditional in 2000, which some have
interpreted as essentially a codification of Daubertand Kumho Tire. See, e.g., Catherine E. Brixen & Christine
M. Meis, Note, Codifying the "Daubert Trilogy": The Amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 40
JURIMETRICS J. 527 (2000); Michael H. Graham, The Expert Witness Predicament: Determining "Reliable"
under the Gatekeeping Test of Daubert, Kumho, and Proposed Amended Rule 702 of the FederalRules of
Evidence, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 317 (2000). But see, e.g., Rhoda B. Billings, Expert Testimony to Accommodate
the Frye, Daubert, and Kumho Tire Standards of Admissibility, 54 OKLA. L. REV.613, 622-23 (2001) ("While
the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence chose merely to recommend codification of the
Daubert and Kumho Tire rules, the Drafting Committee to Revise the Uniform Rules of Evidence chose to
combine a modified Frye test with the reliability standard of Daubert.") (citing Evidence: Panel of Scholars
Look Back at Daubert-InspiredChanges to Federal,Uniform Evidence Rules, 68 CRiM. L. REP. (BNA) 75 (Oct.
25, 2000) (remarks by Kenneth S. Brown, member of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Evidence)); Michael H. Gottesman, From Barefoot to Daubert to Joiner: Triple Play or Double Error?, 40
ARIz. L. REV. 753 (1998) (contending that, while the Court's decisions have changed over time, the Federal
Rules of Evidence governing scientific expertise have remained essentially the same).
188. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588 ("The drafting history [of Rule 702] makes no mention of Frye, and a
rigid 'general acceptance' requirement would be at odds with the 'liberal thrust' of the Federal Rules and their
'general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to 'opinion' testimony.").
189. 509 U.S. at 588, 589. This is not to say that Rule 702 or its construction in Daubert is unambiguous.
See, e.g., Randolph N. Jonakait, The Supreme Court,Plain Meaning, and the Changed Rules of Evidence, 68
TEX. L. REV. 745 (1990); Andrew Taslitz, Daubert'sGuide to the FederalRules of Evidence: A Not-So-PlainMeaning Jurisprudence,32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 3, 4-5 (1995).
190. Justices Rehnquist and Stevens submitted a ratio decidendi dissent that distanced themselves from the
Court's inclusion of relevance as a "touchstone" of admitting expert testimony and ambiguous reliance on
certain scientific principles such as falsifiability. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 598-601 (Rehnquist and Stevens, JJ.,
partially dissenting).
191. Daubert,509 U.S. at 588 (quoting United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 51-52 (1984) (quoting Edward
W. Cleary, PreliminaryNotes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB. L. REV. 908, 915 (1978)) (quotation
marks omitted). Cleary, however, notes that "in reality, of course, the body of common law continues to exist,
though in the somewhat altered form of a source of guidance in the exercise of delegated power." Cleary, supra,
at 915.
192. Daubert,509 U.S. at 589 ("The primary locus of this [gatekeeping] obligation is Rule 702.
); see

2004]

Gatekeeping

The Court, however, salvaged this common law for federal courts through the
conceptual vehicle of evidentiary gatekeeping by judges. 193 As a preliminary matter,
some regard evidentiary gatekeeping as "hardly a new concept in the law of evidence" in
that "there was nothing particularly novel [in Daubert] about a trial judge having the
power to exclude inappropriate expert testimony. .... "194 According to these
also supra note 186. As might be expected from a ruling on such a significant issue, Daubert, Joiner, and
Kumho Tire have generated a maelstrom of commentary, simply illustrated by the number of related symposia.
See, e.g., The Randolph W Thrower Symposium: The Impact of Science and Technology on the Courts, 43
EMORY L.J. 853 (1994); Symposium: Comparing New York and FederalEvidence Law, 11 TOURO L. REV. 107
(1994); Symposium, Scientific Evidence After the Death of Frye, 15 CARDOzO L. REV. 1745 (1994);
Symposium, Truth & Its Rivals: Evidence Reform and the Goals of Evidence Law, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 289
(1998); Symposium: InternationalPerspectives on Scientific Evidence, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 941 (1997);
Second Annual Appellate Judges and Lawyers Symposium: Scientific Methodology and the Admissibility of
Expert Testimony: Setting the Stage: Frye, Daubert, and the States, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 2 (1999);
Symposium, At the Daubert Gate: Managing and MeasuringExpertise in an Age of Science, Specialization, and
Speculation, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 901 (2000); Symposium, New Perspectives on Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV.
1491 (2001); Special Theme: Expert Testimony in the Courts: The Influence of the Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho
Decisions, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 139 (2002); Expert Admissibility Symposium: Reliability StandardsToo High, Too Low, or Just Right?, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 881 (2003); Expert Admissibility Symposium:
What Is the Question? What Is the Answer? How Should the Court Frame A Question to Which Standards of
Reliability Are to Be Applied?, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (2003).
193. Many state courts continue to apply the Frye test. See generally David E. Bernstein & Jeffrey D.
Jackson, The Daubert Trilogy in the States, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 351(2004) (contending that a significant number
of states use a general acceptance test and that, even among states rejecting this test, Daubert'sgatekeeping is
not even the majority standard), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract-498786 (last visited Apr. 7, 2004). In part,
this may be attributable to path dependence. See generally W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND
PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY (1994); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path
Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999); Oona A. Hathaway, Path
Dependence in the Law: The Course and Patternof Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV.
601 (2001); Richard A. Posner, Path-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique of History in Adjudication and
Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 573, 583 (2000); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and
Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 643-58 (1996). But see generally S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis,
Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995) (challenging the analytical utility
and validity of path dependence). Another contributing factor may be a perception that one standard is more
lenient than the other, as manifested by forum shopping. See, e.g., Oh, JurisdictionalApproach, supra note 54,
at 459 n.314 (citing evidence that plaintiffs seeking to introduce marginal expert evidence may prefer state
courts, while defense counsel may prefer federal courts); Christina L. Studebaker & Jane Goodman-Delahunty,
Changes in the Standardsfor Admitting Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Cases Since the Daubert Decision, 8
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 251 (2002) (suggesting Daubert has tightened expert admissibility standards). But
see, e.g., FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 176, § 1-3.3, at 6-8 (Supp. 2000) (comparing the two tests, and
concluding that "Daubert sets a higher threshold for admissibility under some circumstances and a lower
threshold under other circumstances"); Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of
Expert Testimony in State and FederalCriminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 339, 364 (2002) ("[T]he
Daubert decision did not impact on the admission rates of expert testimony [in criminal cases] at either the trial
or the appellate court levels.").
194. Kaye, supra note 185, at 1963 n.159 (quoting Margaret A. Berger, Expert Testimony: The Supreme
Court's Rules, 16 ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 57, 57-58 (2000)); id. at 1962 ("The impact of Daubertfar exceeds its
substance. The opinion adds little to the relevancy-plus standard developed in the decades preceding it.").
Indeed, there is a widely held belief that federal judges performed gatekeeping functions under Frye. See, e.g.,
Thomas M. Crowley, Help Me Mr. Wizard! Can We Really Have "'Neutral"Rule 706 Experts?, 1998 DET. C.L.
REV. 927, 931 ("[J]udges had, until Daubert, been 'keeping the gate' under the Frye 'generally accepted' [sic]
test.") (citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)); Jennifer L. Mnookin, FingerprintEvidence
in an Age of DNA Profiling,67 BROOK. L. REV. 13, 32 (2001) ("In the early twentieth century, there was no
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commentators, the Daubert Court prescribed an evidentiary gatekeeping function
195
unremarkably grounded in established exclusionary rules.
This conception of evidentiary gatekeeping, however, is incomplete. Absent is any
recognition of the implicit flip-side of exclusion, that is, admission. Daubert is premised
on the "'liberal thrust' of the Federal Rules [of Evidence] and their general approach of
relaxing the traditional barriers to 'opinion' testimony." 196 Consistent with this premise,
the objective of evidentiary gatekeeping is "to ensure the reliability and relevancy of
expert testimony." 197 In essence, evidentiary gatekeepers are charged with verifying and
pledging the presumption in favor of admitting, and not excluding, proffered expert
98

evidence. 1

Exclusion and admission, however, are simply co-extensive options in evidentiary
gatekeeping. Whether proffered evidence is excluded or admitted only manifests the

doctrinally mandated gatekeeping approach to expert evidence like those that apply today, [such as] the Frye v.
United States test of general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.") (citing Frye, 293 F. 1013). This
belief may be traceable to the Court's suggestion that "while the Federal Rules of Evidence allow district courts
to admit a somewhat broader range of scientific testimony than would have been admissible under Frye, they
leave in place the 'gatekeeper' role of the trial judge .... Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997).
The problem with these assertions (or perhaps just their cited support) is that nothing in Frye explicitly
references or otherwise suggests any sort of gatekeeping approach. This is not to say that a conception of expert
gatekeeping did not preexist Daubert, only that Frye does not appear to be an explicit instantiation of this
conception. See, e.g., Arvin Maskin, The Impact of Daubert on the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: The
Supreme Court Catches Up with a Decade of Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1929, 1931 (1994) (while
contending Daubertreflects prior federal court practice, the decision "really is more"). See also Christophersen
v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991); Hon. Martin L. C. Feldman, May IHave the Next Dance,
Mrs. Frye?, 69 TUL. L. REV. 793 (1995) (contending Christophersen was a circuit court predecessor to
Daubert). To the extent Daubert embraced the Federal Rules of Evidence and its displacement of Frye, the
Daubert Court can be credited with at least mandating that judges assume the role of an expert gatekeeper.
Moreover, Daubert'sconception of gatekeeping is certainly more prevalent in federal and state courts than any
conception based on Frye. See, e.g., MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 46, § 7.17, at 660 (noting that
Daubert "represents a new departure for federal law, and it applies in federal courts throughout the land," as
well as the fact that at least 26 states have either adopted the case wholesale or taken a similar approach); id.
("Even among the 16 states declining to follow Daubert, however, some opinions indicate that the Daubert
reliability factors count in deciding whether to admit or exclude scientific evidence."). Accordingly, even if
Frye does envision judges acting as gatekeepers, Daubertsupplies the more prominent doctrinal conception of
gatekeeping for this article's purposes.
195. Broadly defined, exclusionary rules comprise "any evidentiary doctrine which can have the effect of
barring the admission of logically relevant evidence." EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY DISTINCTIONS:
UNDERSTANDING THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 71 (1993). According to Justice Stevens, exclusionary
rules "impede[ ] the discovery of truth... 'as well [as] the doing of justice."' United States v. Scheffer, 523
U.S. 303, 329 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 81 (1958)
(Stewart, J., concurring)); see also Joelle Anne Moreno, Beyond the Polemic Against Junk Science: Navigating
the Oceans that Divide Science and Law with Justice Breyer at the Helm, 81 B.U. L. REV. 1033, 1045 (2001)
(calling Scheffer "[t]he Bastard of Daubert'sProgeny"). Arguably, this exclusionary conception of gatekeeping
has a basis in Rule 104(a). See infra note 221.
196. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
197. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999) (emphasis added).
198. See id. at 148 ("Daubert pointed out that Federal Rules 702 and 703 grant expert witnesses testimonial
latitude unavailable to other witnesses on the 'assumption that the expert's opinion will have a reliable basis in
the knowledge and experience of his discipline."') (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592). See also Robert P.
Bums, Notes on the Future of Evidence Law, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 69, 74 (2001) ("Excluding evidence is ...a
crude instrument for assuring reliability.").
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outcome of the judge's function. The core of evidentiary gatekeeping lies in the judicial
decision to exclude or admit. This decision is the "gate" that anyone proffering expert
evidence must confront. And it is this decision that forms the "special obligation" judges
assume under Daubert.199 According to Margaret Berger, "[p]erhaps the most significant
part of Daubertis the Court's appointment of the trial judge as the 'gatekeeper' who must
screen proffered expertise to determine whether the relevancy and reliability prongs are
20 0
met.,,
Conceived this way, expert gatekeeping under Daubert mandates a different role for
judges than what Frye envisions. Under the "general acceptance" standard, litigants bear
20 1
the burden of establishing the relevance and validity of disputed expert testimony.
Judges need not possess any independent knowledge of expertise; they simply perform
20 2
their traditional role of examining and weighing the litigants' conflicting arguments.
This is a markedly more passive judicial role than Daubert'scharge that "the trial judge
[is not] disabled from screening [by virtue of the Court's opinion]. To the contrary, under
the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all [expert] testimony or evidence
admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." 20 3 Evidentiary gatekeeping thus usurps from
litigants the responsibility of monitoring each other's proffered expert testimony. 20 4 This

199. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 147 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589); id. at 141 (interpreting Daubert as
"setting forth the trial judge's general 'gatekeeping' obligation"); see also Berger, supra note 194, at 58
("Daubert stressed that the trial court has an obligation to act as gatekeeper even though some courts would
rather have left this task to the jury, especially when the screening entailed complex scientific issues.");
Crowley, supra note 194, at 931 n.22 ("Gatekeepers are not mere doormen; they have the power and the duty to
let in only 'friends' and to keep out 'foes."').
200. Berger, supra note 194, at 58. While some contend that judges acted as gatekeepers under Frye,
certainly Daubert is responsible for making gatekeeping a mandatory judicial duty and is the test that all federal
courts (and many state courts) apply. See supra note 194.
201. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
202. See, e.g., United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("[G]eneral acceptance...
assures that those most qualified to assess the general validity of a scientific method (i.e., the experts' peers)
will have the determinative voice.").
203. Daubert,509 U.S. at 589; see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997) (referencing the
"'gatekeeper' role in screening such evidence"); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th
Cir. 1995) (Evidentiary gatekeepers must "satisfy themselves that [expert] scientific evidence meets a certain
standard of reliability before it is admitted ...[which] require[s] some objective, independent validation of the
expert's methodology."); G. Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its EssentialDilemma, and Its
Progeny, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 948 (1996) ("Before Daubert, the trial judge ...had to decide: 'Has the
proponent of this evidence shown me that scientists agree with her?' After Daubert, the trial judge has to
decide: 'Is this good science?'). But see, e.g., Pamela J. Jensen, Note, Frye versus Daubert: Practicallythe
Same?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1579 (2003).
204. See, e.g., David G. Owen, A Decade of Daubert, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 345, 372 (2002) ("By
abandoning Frye's 'general acceptance' standard... Daubert switched the basic responsibility for making
[expert admissibility] decisions to the courts, which on balance appears to make good sense."). See also infra
note 221. Arguably this also usurps the jury's fact-finding function. According to Justice Stevens, Daubert's
reliability requirement reflects "a fear that the average jury is not able to assess the weight of [expert evidence]"
and a "distressing lack of confidence in the intelligence of the average American." United States v. Scheffer,
523 U.S. 303, 337 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Neil Vidmar, along with other law professors, submitted an
amicus brief in Kumho Tire on this precise issue. The brief challenged a competing amicus's claim that
"gatekeeping serves an important check on the jury's inclination to give great (and sometimes undue) deference
to expert testimony." Neil Vidmar, The Origin and Outcome of an Amicus Brief in Kumho Tire v. Carmichael
(1999), 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 383, 387 (2000); see also Michel F. Baumeister & Dorothea M. Capone,
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responsibility now belongs to the judge, who must evaluate not only the expert
conclusions, but also their underlying method. 20 5 Imposing gatekeeping duties on judges,
then, represents the Court's preferred strategy for dealing with the problems of
partisanship and indeterminacy. Evidentiary gatekeepers now must decide whether to
admit or exclude proffered expert testimony based on two principles: relevance and
20 6
reliability.
1. Relevance
20 7
The law of evidence orthodoxy distinguishes between two species of relevance.

Admissibility Standards as Politics - The Imperial Gate Closers Arrive!!!, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1025, 1039
(2003) ("'Implicit[ ] in the Daubert line of cases' is an assumption that trial judges have the skills necessary 'to
understand and interpret expert evidence, or at least they have-possess better skills than six or twelve' jurors.")
(quoting Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1167
(2001)); Joseph Sanders, Scientifically Complex Cases, Trial by Jury, and the Erosion of the Adversarial
Processes, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 355, 359-67 (1998) (providing a useful meta-survey of empirical studies of juror
competence within complex cases); Neil Vidmar, Assessing the Impact of Statistical Evidence, A Social Science
Perspective, in THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS 279, 297
(Stephen E. Feinberg ed., 1989) (referencing numerous field surveys and laboratory simulation experiments,
and stating that, despite "many methodological problems that plague individual studies,... [t]he main
conclusion that the authors of almost all of these studies draw is that jurors do not give undue weight or
credibility to expert evidence").
205. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (noting that Rule 702, upon which evidentiary gatekeeping is based, "clearly
contemplates some degree of regulation of the subjects and theories about which an expert may testify").
According to Justice Breyer, gatekeeping functions to "secure the basic objectives of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which are... the ascertainment of truth and the just determination of proceedings." Joiner, 522 U.S.
at 150 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) ("The right to offer the
testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a
defense ...to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies."). But see, e.g., Christopher B. Mueller, MetaEvidence: Do We Need t?, 25 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 819, 822 (1992) (referencing as a cultural competitor to truthseeking vision of trials the "rhetorical vision, holding that parties are responsible for trying suits and must have
not only the means to develop and uncover truth in any particular case, but also the means to persuade fact
finders as to what is true") (emphasis in original). According to Mueller, "[n]ot surprisingly, academic scholars
emphasize the former, while practicing lawyers emphasize the latter, and judges are harder to characterize." Id.
But see, e.g., Eileen A. Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning and the Law of Evidence, 44 AM. U. L.
REv. 1717 (1995).
206. Some commentators conceptualize evidentiary gatekeepers as administering three separate tests. See,
e.g., Bert Black et al., The Law of Expert Testimony-A Post-Daubert Analysis, in EXPERT EVIDENCE: A
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO LAW, SCIENCE, AND THE FJC MANUAL 9, 18 (Bert Black & Patrick W. Lee eds.,
1997) [hereinafter Black, Law of Expert Testimony] ("Rule 702 ... lays out three tests [i.e., knowledge,
helpfulness, and qualifications], each of which must be met before a witness can testify as an expert."). But see,
e.g., FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 176, § 1-3.2, at 15 (noting that, although "many commentators suspect that, in
practice, some courts adhere to [the view].... no modem court has held that qualifications alone suffice [for
admission]"). Courts, however, have always examined a proffered expert's qualifications. And the 2000
amendments to Rule 702 did not modify the language concerning an expert's qualifications, and so they could
not have been an explicit part of the Court's evidentiary gatekeeping analysis. See supra note 187. Indeed,
Christopher Mueller and Laird Kirkpatrick have observed that "[t]he third element in Daubert [qualifications] is
not so much a requirement as a reference to other considerations affecting admissibility .. " MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 46, § 7.17, at 655. Accordingly, this article addresses qualifications only insofar as
they are part of, or pertinent to, Daubert's twin principles. See infra Part II.B.1-2.
207. See generally Herman L. Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L.
REV. 385 (1952). But see FED. R. EVID. 401 Advisory Committee's note (2003) (concluding a requirement
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Logical relevance is codified in Rule 401's definition of "relevant evidence," which
essentially must be "material" to be admissible. 208 Consistent with the relational nature
of relevance, 20 9 materiality here requires a direct connection between the proffered
2 10
Legal (or pragmatic) 2 11
evidence and significant issues before the trier of fact.
relevance, on the other hand, is captured in Rule 403's exclusion of otherwise probative
evidence. 2 12 Exclusion is justified on the basis of the evidence's effect, namely whether
2 13
there is a threat of "unfair prejudice" to the trier of fact.
supplementing logical relevancy would be "unworkable and unrealistic"). Richard Lempert has advanced a third
species, narrative relevance. See, e.g., Lempert, Economic Analysis, supra note 149, at 1678 ("[T]he lesson I
draw from Old Chief v. United States [519 U.S. 172 (1997)], where the Court recognizes what I call narrative
relevance: Namely, that evidence may be admissible simply because it fills out the contours of a party's story.")
(citation omitted). See also generally WALTER R. FISHER, HUMAN COMMUNICATION As NARRATION: TOWARD
A PHILOSOPHY OF REASON, VALUE, AND ACTION (1987). Narrative relevance, however, does not necessarily
stand apart from the two orthodox species. See, e.g., Posner, Comment on Lempert, supra note 149, at 1721
("Relevance is defined in Federal Rule [of Evidence] 401, and, as I noted in my article, the definition includes
what Lempert calls narrative relevance.") (citing Posner, Economics of Evidence, supra note 149, at 1522).
208. FED. R. EVID. 401 (2003) ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence."). For a Bayesian formulation of this rule, see Richard 0. Lempert,
Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1025 (1977) [hereinafter Lempert, Modeling Relevance]
("[Elvidence is logically relevant only when the probability of finding that evidence given the truth of some
hypothesis at issue in the case differs from the probability of finding the same evidence given the falsity of the
hypothesis at issue."). See also generally Michael 0. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to
Identification Evidence, 83 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1970). But see, e.g., Alvin I. Goldman, Quasi-Objective
Bayesianism and Legal Evidence, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 237, 241 (2002) ("In a Bayesian spirit, Richard Lempert
suggests that a misled juror might be a juror who misestimates the likelihood ratio associated with the item of
evidence ....Obviously, such a judgment presupposes that there are objective likelihoods.").
209. See, e.g., MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 46, § 4.2, at 154 ("Relevance is a relational concept
and carries meaning only in context.").
210. See, e.g., 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 185, § 185, at 637 ("Materiality... looks to the
relation between the propositions that the evidence is offered to prove and the issues in the case.").
211. See, e.g., MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 46, § 4.9, at 171 (denominating legal relevance as
"pragmatic relevance"); Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J.
1535, 1544 (1998) ("'Pragmatically' relevant evidence is evidence whose probative value is not 'substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."') (citing FED.
R. EVID. 403) (emphasis in original). See also Frances A. Gilligan et al., The Theory of "Unconscious
Transference":The Latest Threat to the Shield Laws Protectingthe Privacy of Victims of Sex Offenses, 38 B.C.
L. REV. 107, 124 (1996) (observing that the "term 'legal' relevance has been much criticized; the usage,
however, persists") (citation omitted).
212. Rule 403 provides that "evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403. For an alternate
formulation of this rule based on decision theory, known as the "regret matrix," see Lempert, Modeling
Relevance, supra note 208, at 1032-41.
213. See FED. R. EvID. 403 Advisory Committee's note (defining "unfair prejudice" as "an undue tendency
to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one"). Christopher
Mueller and Laird Kirkpatrick nicely summarize Rule 403 as:
encompass[ing] two analytically distinct but frequently overlapping forms of unfair prejudice. The
first is the injection of undue emotionalism into the proceeding arousing hostility, anger, or
sympathy on the part of the jury. The second is the likelihood that the jury will misuse the evidence
in some way or give it undue weight.
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Parties seeking to introduce expert knowledge must satisfy both forms of relevance.
First, evidentiary gatekeepers must determine whether "fit" exists between a proffered
expert's data or experiential set and ultimate conclusions, 2 14 as well as between these
conclusions and material facts at issue in the case. 2 15 At the same time, evidentiary
gatekeepers also must ensure that the trier of fact will be assisted, rather than unfairly
prejudiced, by the proffered expert knowledge. 2 16 Conceptually, these requirements of
logical and legal relevance can be seen as a chain to assist the trier of fact that links
together the expert's knowledge and conclusions with the facts of the case.
2. Reliability

The true controversy surrounding expert gatekeeping concerns its principle of

"evidentiary reliability-that is, trustworthiness." 2 17 This notion is in contrast to the
distinction between scientific reliability, that is, "does application of the principle

produce consistent results?," and validity, that is, "does the principle support what it
purports to show?"'2 18 Evidentiary reliability, on the other hand, entails judges not only
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 46, § 4.10, at 175-76.
214. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997), which states:
[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit
opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipsit dixit of the expert. A court may
conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993) (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d
1224, 142 (3d Cir. 1985)). See also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 46, § 7.17, at 654 ("Expert...
testimony... extrapolates or draws conclusions resting on theories, tests, and experience, and its utility turns in
part on how closely the conclusion is connected with the underlying data ....The closer the connection, the
better the 'fit.'); Joseph Sanders, The Merits of the Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the
Admissibility of Expert Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 881, 888 (2003) ("The 'fit' requirement involves an
assessment of whether expert's chain of reasoning contains an inferential gap that is too wide."). But see, e.g.,
Note, Reliable Evaluation of Expert Testimony, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2142, 2152 n.50 (2003) (characterizing the
question of "fit" to be "as-applied" reliability, despite noting that courts regard the inquiry into "reliability" to
be distinct from "fit").
215. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 ("Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is not
relevant and, ergo, non-helpful.") (citing 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 176,
702[02], at 702-18
(1988)); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 743 (3d Cir. 1994) (focusing on the connection between
an expert's conclusions and the case's factual particulars). See also I MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note
185, § 185, at 637 ("Materiality concerns thefit between the evidence and the case.") (emphasis added).
216. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 ("Rule 403 permits the exclusion of relevant evidence .. ").See also
Gilligan et al., supra note 211, at 124 ("Even a demonstration of both facial and underlying logical relevance
does not impel the trial judge to admit an item of evidence. The opponent can still object on the ground that the
item is not 'legally' relevant.").
217. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9 (emphasis in original). But see, e.g., D. Michael Risinger et al., The
Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and
Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2002) (contending the psychological phenomena of "observer effects," i.e.,
expectation and suggestion, combined with the particular type of expertise involved, can "undermine to some
degree the reliability of virtually any form of expertise"). The Court bizarrely proceeded to note that Rule 602's
"require[ment] that a witness who testifies to a fact which can be perceived by the senses must have had an
opportunity to observe, and must have actually observed the fact' is a 'most pervasive manifestation' of the
common law insistence upon 'the most reliable sources of information."' Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 602
Advisory Committee's note). Expert witnesses, however, are expressly exempt from the personal knowledge
requirement of Rule 602. See JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL RULES PAMPHLET § 602.5, at 341 (2002).
218. Daubert,509 U.S. at 590 n.9; see also Moreno, supra note 195, at 1054 (contending Daubert operated
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deciding "whether or not [an] expert's relevant testimony is reliable," 2 19 but also "how to
test an expert's reliability, and ... whether or when special briefing or other proceedings
are needed to investigate reliability ... ,,220
The determination of evidentiary reliability essentially involves two steps. 22 1 First,
to "eliminate or diminish the Court's inquiry into more general questions of scientific reliability/validity").
Although noting that "[iun a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon
scientific validity," the Court curiously opined that "the difference between accuracy, validity, and reliability
may be such that each is distinct from the other by no more than a hen's kick .. " Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590
n.9 (quoting James E. Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructuredand Revitalized: A Proposalto Amend Federal
Evidence Rule 702, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 249, 256 (1986)) (internal quotations omitted); see also Bert Black, A
Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 599-600 (1988) (defining validity as being
"that which results from sound and cogent reasoning" while reliability is generating "consistent" results); David
L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38
EMORY L.J. 1005, 1010 n.16 (1989) (same).
219. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999) (emphasis in original). Although Kumho
Tire expanded the scope of expert gatekeeping to all types of scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge, see supra Part II.A.2, commentators continue to be preoccupied with the means and propriety of
assessing reliability as scientific validity. See, e.g., Jan Beyea & Daniel Berger, Scientific Misconceptions
Among Daubert Gatekeepers: The Need for Reform of Expert Review Procedures,64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
327, 327-28 (2001) (contending that Daubertand Kumho Tire "contain two inconsistent views of science," and
attempting to reconcile them "by recognizing that subjective assumptions and inferences can never be
completely eliminated from expert testimony"); David M. Malone & Paul J. Zwier, Epistemology after Daubert,
Kumho Tire, and the New FederalRule of Evidence 702, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 103, 104 (2001) (contending Rule
702 incorporates "a three-fold epistemological criterion of sufficiency, reliability, and reliable applicability to
the case at hand [that] seems to require that a federal district judge perform a logic[al] analysis on each expert's
testimony"). Admittedly, significant questions remain about the philosophical underpinnings of science and the
status of the scientific method, as well as about how lay judges can assess scientific experts. Scott Brewer, for
instance, contends that non-expert judges, without such competence, render epistemically arbitrary judgments
that can be constrained with a notion of "intellectual due process." Brewer, supra 211, at 1672-79; see also
generally Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV.
1491 (2001). But cf Erica Beecher-Monas, A Ray of Light for Judges Blinded by Science: Triers of Science and
Intellectual Due Process, 33 GA. L. REV. 1047 (1999); Erica Beecher-Monas, The Heuristics of Intellectual
Due Process: A Primerfor Triers of Science, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1563 (2000). To the extent that evidentiary
rules are a form of legal epistemology, the debate over epistemic incompetence resembles a meta-issue whose
functional utility seems limited. Judges may be epistemically incompetent, but they nevertheless can and do
render decisions, and arguably quality ones. In any event, these questions are beyond this article's scope.
220. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 (emphasis in original); see also Judge Harvey Brown, ProceduralIssues
Under Daubert, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1133, 1134 (1999) ("Reliability requires an examination of the expert's
methodology, the foundational data and assumptions utilized by the expert, and the reasoning process used by
the expert to apply that methodology or foundational data to the facts of the case."); Mark P. Denbeaux & D.
Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire andExpert Reliability: How the Question You Ask Gives the Answer You Get, 34
SETON HALL L. REV. 15, 23-24 (2003) ("What the Daubert and Kumho Tire decisions did was to move expert
evidence generally from the area of 'light touch control' and party autonomy to the area of heavier judicial
evaluation and control, in the name of 'reliability."'). The latitude in deciding how to test reliability is distinct
from the evidentiary gatekeeper's duty to engage in such testing. See, e.g., Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 158-59
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("[T]he discretion [the Court] endorses.., is not discretion to abandon the gatekeeping
function.").
221. Mark Denbeaux and D. Michael Risinger, however, interpret expert gatekeeping as consisting of a
four-part reliability inquiry:
In regard to any proffer of expertise, is there good reason to believe that the proffered product of
the claimed expertise (given its specific form and the methods and conditions of which it is a
product) provides the jury with appropriately reliable information on the case-specific question
upon which the expert is proffered?
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evidentiary gatekeepers must verify whether the proffered conclusions are based on a
sound reasoning process, 222 as gauged by a panoply of non-exclusive and suggested

Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 220, at 33-34. But see, e.g., Robert J. Goodwin, The Hidden Significance of
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael: A Compassfor Problems of Definition and Procedure Created by Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 52 BAYLOR L. REv. 603, 626-45 (2000) (proposing a three-part reliability
inquiry); Graham, supra note 187, at 336 ("As employed in Daubert, Kumho and elsewhere, 'reliable' appears
to be given two meanings at the same time. On the one hand 'reliable' is taken to mean that the explanative
theory actually works .... On the other hand, 'reliable' refers to meriting confidence worthy of dependence or
reliance ... ").
Elements of the two-step inquiry also appear in a judge's prior determination under Rule 104(a),
which provides that "[p]reliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the
existence of privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the
provisions of subdivision (b) [Relevancy conditioned on fact]." FED. R. EVID. 104(a). But not everyone agrees
that Rule 104 indicates judges can or will admit expert evidence on a preliminary basis. See, e.g., Black et al.,
supra note 186, at 748, n.235 (citing, inter alia, Daubert, 509 U.S. 579). One commentator, however, has
argued that a Rule 104(a) inquiry "is not the 'gatekeeper' role envisioned by Daubert." Fenner, supra note 203,
at 957. This seems attributable to Rule 104(a)'s emphasis on sufficiency whereas expert gatekeeping concerns
admissibility. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 220, at 1153 ("The 'admissibility' and 'sufficiency' of scientific
evidence necessitate different inquiries and involve different stakes."); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Logerquist v.
McVey: The Majority's Flawed Procedural Assumptions, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 121, 132 (2001) ("Rule 104(a)
limits the judge's power to determining the foundational or preliminary facts. The judge inquires only into the
sufficiency of the proof of the foundational facts .... In short, 104(a) neither requires nor permits the judge to
weigh the believability of the entirety of the witness's proposed testimony."). But see, e.g., Daniel J. Capra, The
Daubert Puzzle, 32 GA. L. REV. 699, 754 (1998) ("[T]he dispute over whether [Daubert] applies to sufficiency
review is more apparent than real. This is because admissibility and sufficiency often go hand in hand... [in
that] exclusion of an expert on admissibility grounds is usually tantamount to a dismissal on insufficiency
grounds.").
While acknowledging that Daubert clearly envisioned a role for Rule 104(a) as to expert evidence,
Eileen Scallen and William Wiethoff present an interesting question grounded in Rule 104(b). The subprovision, "Relevancy conditioned on fact," provides: "When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the
fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence
sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition." FED. R. EVID. 104(b). The question is
whether admission of expert evidence is an "evidentiary issue to be decided by the judge like most other
evidentiary questions under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), or is this a question of relevance conditioned on
factual determinations which requires the jury to take a role in the process under Rule 104(b)"? Scallen &
Wiethoff, supra note 165, at 1152. The Daubert Court arguably elected to cite Rule 104(a) explicitly as a way
to avoid its prior decision in Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687-91 (1988), which held that Rule
104(b) applies to relevance issues that involve reliability determinations. See Scallen & Wiethoff, supra note
165, at 1152 (citing Scallen, supra note 205, at 1788). If this true, Scallen and Wiethoff contend, the Court may
have "deprived the jury of one of its most cherished historical functions-to evaluate credibility." Scallen &
Wiethoff, supra note 165, at 1152. At the very least, this seems consistent with the suspicions Justice Stevens
expressed in United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 337 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra note 195.
222. See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 (the evidentiary gatekeeper must "make certain that an expert...
employs in the court room the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the
relevant field."); Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95 ("[The] overarching subject [of the inquiry envisioned by Rule
702] is the scientific validity.., of the principles that underlie a proposed submission."). The Daubert Court
emphasized that the "focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions
that they generate .... Daubert,509 U.S. at 595 (emphasis added). But see, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522
U.S. 136, 146 (1997) ("[C]onclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another.... But
nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence
which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.") (citing Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1360 (6th Cir. 1992)); Michael J. Saks, The Aftermath of Daubert: An Evolving
Jurisprudence of Expert Evidence, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 229, 241 (2000) ("The [Kumho Tire] Court needlessly
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factors. 223 Not surprisingly, without any rigid delimitation, these factors have expanded
over time. Daubert began by identifying four factors: (1) a technique's or theory's
testability (or falsifiability), (2) a high known or potential error rate, (3) peer review and
publication, and (4) general acceptance. 224 On remand of Daubert, the Ninth Circuit
added a fifth factor: "whether the experts are proposing to testify about matters growing
naturally and directly out of research that they have conducted independent of the
litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions expressly for purposes of
testifying." 225 Kumho Tire proceeded to suggest one more factor appropriate for the
expansion of expert gatekeeping to "experience-based testimony": (6) whether the
methodology has produced erroneous results. 226 Evidentiary gatekeepers then must
utilize these factors to assess whether the proffered evidence, in light of "the particular
circumstances of the particular case at issue," provides dependable assistance to the trier
227
of fact.
The multiplicity of factors, combined with a particularized focus, suggests that
evidentiary reliability is a flexible inquiry. Judges are afforded a significant degree of
latitude to fashion the appropriate means for assessing reliability. This latitude implicitly
recognizes that judges may encounter diverse types of expert knowledge, each of which
can present peculiar issues. What factors a judge selects to apply may play a significant
role in the ultimate decision about whether to admit or exclude proffered expert
knowledge. Evidentiary gatekeeping, then, entails an expansive duty that ranges from the
initial assessment criteria to the assessment itself, all with the express purpose of
providing trustworthy information for the trier of fact.
III. INTRADISCIPLINARY GATEKEEPING
The previous Parts have navigated through the complex areas of corporate and
abandoned Daubert's useful distinction between methodology and conclusions."). David Kaye, however,
contends that a distinction between a general methodology and a specific conclusion is not only possible, but
desirable. See Kaye, supra note 185, at 1972-75.
223. See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 141-42 ("Daubert's list of specific factors neither necessarily nor
exclusively applies to all experts or in every case. Rather, the law grants a district court the same broad latitude
when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability determination.").
224. Daubert,509 U.S. at 593-95.
225. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995).
226. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 151. And the numbers keep growing. In 2000, the Advisory Committee on
Rule 702 embraced the first five factors along with four others: (7) whether there was unjustifiable extrapolation
from an accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion, (8) whether the expert has adequately accounted for
alternative explanations, (9) whether the expert has exercised appropriate care, and (10) whether the relevant
field is known to reach reliable results. FED. R. EVID. 702 Advisory Committee's note (2000). One
commentator has even proposed 12 "guideposts." See Black, Law of Expert Testimony, supra note 206, at 13-20
(Supp. 2000); but cf THIS Is SPINAL TAP (Spinal Tap Productions 1984) ("Why don't you just make ten louder
and make ten be the top number and make that a little louder?") (Rob Reiner as Marty DiBergi).
227. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 150. D. Michael Risinger contends that "what is clearly not consistejit with
Kumho Tire is any attempt to approach an issue of reliability globally." D. Michael Risinger, Defining the
"Task at Hand": Non-Science Forensic Science After Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
767, 773 (2000). But see, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the Supreme Court: What Is the Problem?, 34
SETON HALL L. REv. 1, 6 (2003) ("[E]xpert testimony cannot advance accurate outcomes locally unless it rests
on acceptable epistemological warrant globally. A necessary but not sufficient condition of appropriate
testimony 'locally' is reliable expertise 'globally."').
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evidentiary gatekeeping. As the voluminous literature in each area attests, both
conceptions of gatekeeping present specific issues that have received particularized
scrutiny. At the same time, these conceptions of gatekeeping exhibit certain parallels that
support constructing a viable intradisciplinary analogy between the corporate and
evidentiary contexts.
Structural analysis reveals that public corporate gatekeepers exhibit the same
features as their evidentiary counterparts. Both gatekeepers pursue deterrence strategies
in furtherance of improving the quality of information for the benefit of the public.
Further, both gatekeepers are distinctly capable of monitoring not only parties that proffer
information, but also other gatekeepers. And both public corporate and evidentiary
gatekeepers can interdict at multiples stages in the flow of information, allowing both
corrective and punitive monitoring.
Moreover, substantive analysis establishes that these gatekeepers bear similar duties.
Evidentiary gatekeepers must assess the relevancy of expert testimony. This notion of
relevancy strikingly resembles the notion of materiality within the securities laws that
public corporate gatekeepers must apply and enforce. Evidentiary gatekeepers, however,
also must evaluate the reliability of expert testimony, a duty that has no corporate
corollary. Realizing that nothing in how reliability is conceived or applied ties the
principle to the evidentiary context allows the possibility of extending reliability to public
corporate gatekeepers.
This Part establishes this possibility and makes it concrete. Reliability for public
corporate gatekeepers charges them with the responsibility of assessing the reasoning
process and conclusions of both issuers and other gatekeepers in connection with
disclosures. The suggested factors that evidentiary gatekeepers utilize to determine
reliability apply to public corporate gatekeepers as well. The result is a duty that builds
upon existing securities laws and regulations to expand the scope and intensity of
monitoring by public corporate gatekeepers such as the SEC. 228 This duty is contrasted
with a narrower, competing proposal for reliability that applies only to certain securities
analysts. As the previous Parts have established, there are distinct advantages to imposing
duties upon public gatekeepers. When the dust settles, this intradisciplinary approach to
corporate reliability stands as a superior means for improving the quality of disclosures.
A. StructuralSynthesis
The general theoretical definition of gatekeeping posits an actor serving as an access
and quality mechanism for the benefit of multiple parties. 2 29 All corporate gatekeepers
act as an intermediary between an issuer and the investing public. On the one hand, the
corporate gatekeeper services the issuer by monitoring the quality of its financial
information. 230 On the other hand, the corporate gatekeeper services the investing public

228. An intriguing permutation of this duty would have the SEC engage in what might be called
"information heralding," where monitoring of complex financial disclosures also entails identifying material
information to combat investor information burial. I thank Saul Levmore for suggesting this idea, which seems
more appropriately reserved for reputational intermediaries and is beyond this article's scope.
229. See supra note 25.
230. See supra notes 91 and 93 and accompanying text.
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by communicating its withheld or granted support for an issuer's disclosures. 2 3 1 Many of
the same parties that act as corporate gatekeepers, however, can act as reputational
intermediaries. 232 Accordingly, corporate gatekeepers share their position with
reputational intermediaries, which also serve an issuer and signal the value of its
information to the investing public. 233 There are thus three discrete parties involved in
the corporate intermediary model: (1) the issuer, (2) the gatekeeper or reputational
intermediary, and (3) public investors.
At first blush, this seems distinct from the evidentiary intermediary model.
Evidentiary gatekeepers appear to act as an intermediary among four discrete parties. The
evidentiary gatekeeper serves the trier of fact by admitting or excluding expert testimony,
and serves the expert by monitoring the quality of her testimony. The evidentiary
gatekeeper, however, also serves the litigant; this is because the decision to admit or
exclude expert testimony ultimately affects the litigant's presented case. Further, at least
formally, the expert is a provider of impartial information with interests that should be
discrete from the litigant's. 234 This suggests the following comparison to corporate
gatekeeping:
A STRUCTURAL COMPARISON OF GATEKEEPING
CORPORAl::

Issuer

EVIDENTIARY

Litigant

Gatekeeper
I Reputational Intermediary
; Expert
Gatekeeper

Investing
Public
Trier of Fact

The comparison is structural in its focus on the respective parties in the corporate
and evidentiary contexts. The issuer is aligned with the litigant and the investing public is
aligned with the trier of fact. The chart reflects the apparent difference between the two
contexts; the corporate gatekeeper and the reputational intermediary occupy the same
position while the evidentiary gatekeeper, the expert, and the litigant occupy different
positions.
But, as the chart's perforated lines reflect, the expert is in reality not a party discrete
231. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. The SEC is one party that theoretically cannot perform
these dual roles, since no party retains the agency for its signaling services. This, however, may not extend to all
public corporate gatekeepers. For instance, Stephen Choi and Reinier Kraakman both regard organizations such
as Underwriter's Laboratory to be reputational intermediaries. See, e.g., Choi, Gatekeepers, supra note 59, at
934; Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 25, at 93-94. On the other hand, Frank Partnoy has raised some
significant doubts about this characterization. See, e.g., Partnoy, Barbarians,supra note 27, at 509. See also
supra note 90.
233. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text. As this Part proceeds to argue, only private corporate
gatekeepers share the same position with reputational intermediaries. See infra notes 246-248 and
accompanying text. Importantly, this shared position should not be understood as equating private corporate
gatekeepers with reputational intermediaries. See supra Part I.A.
234. When Rule 702 was first proposed, the Advisory Committee noted that "an intelligent evaluation of
facts is often difficult or impossible without the application of some scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge. The most common source of this knowledge is the expert witness, although there are other
techniques for supplying it." FED. R. EVID. 702 Advisory Committee's note (Proposed Official Draft 1972); see
also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 46, § 7.6, at 621 ("Often the best thing an expert can do is to
provide standards or criteria, estimates of feasibility or likelihood, or descriptions of social frameworks that
juries can then constructively use in resolving more particular issues .... ") (citing cases).
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from the litigant or the evidentiary gatekeeper. The problem of partisanship suggests that
the expert is simply a "hired gun" for the litigant.2 35 The partisan expert is paid and
proffered to present favorable knowledge, and thus is neither disinterested nor
presumptively truthful. 23 6 Accordingly, the partisan expert cannot be modeled as an
impartial provider of information that stands apart from the litigant. Moreover, the
problem of indeterminacy suggests triers of fact cannot sift through conflicting testimony
from partisan experts. 23 7 Under Rule 706, evidentiary gatekeepers can appoint impartial
experts that work for the court.23 8 The possibility that the trier of fact may impute an
unduly elevated aura of authority to these court-appointed experts only strengthens their
2 39
alignment with the court.
One refinement to the chart might be to align reputational intermediaries with
experts. Recall that the economic model of expertise largely turns on reputational
capital. 240 This is structurally the same view that applies to reputational
intermediaries. 241 Both experts and reputational intermediaries function to signal the
value of their client's information, respectively, the litigant's case and the issuer's
finances. Equally important, experts and reputational intermediaries share an interest in
preserving their own reputations. Consistent with this shared interest, experts and
reputational intermediaries perform the reputational calculus. 2 42 In the short-run, both
parties are unlikely to provide substandard services because their benefits are usually less
than the costs of losing prospective business in the long-run. 243 In the long-run, both
parties regularly will provide substandard services if they are catering to consumers in
that market. 244 Engaging in fraud typically will require a substantial payout because both
parties' welfare heavily depends on maintaining a durable reputation. 24 5 Accordingly,
experts and reputational intermediaries should be realigned as analogues.
This realignment bears a significant implication for corporate gatekeepers. The
parties that act as reputational intermediaries also can act as private corporate
gatekeepers. 246 These parties respond to market-based incentives in much the same way
reputational intermediaries do. 2 4 7 Along these lines, private corporate gatekeepers bear a

235. See generally supra Part IhA. 1.
236. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
237. See supra Part II.A.2.
238. See supra notes 175-176 and accompanying text. Whether or not courts rarely appoint experts, see
supra note 176, is of little consequence here, as their interests still are aligned with the court unlike partisan
experts.
239. See supranote 178 and accompanying text.
240. See supranotes 152-160 and accompanying text.
241. See supra Part II.A.
242. Compare supra notes 152-160 and accompanying text, with notes 63-70, 80-85 and accompanying
text. This applies most forcefully to partisan experts. See supra Part II.A. 1. Court-appointed experts would have
different and limited incentives to provide substandard services, such as a preference not to serve in this
capacity.
243. Comparesupra note 153-154 and accompanying text, with note 80 and accompanying text.
244. Compare supranotes 155-160 and accompanying text, with note 81 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 82-85 and accompanying text. Agency problems might be another possible cause of
fraud.
246. See generally Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, supra note 32.
247. Indeed, according to some commentators, private corporate gatekeepers can and should be
conceptualized under the reputational capital view. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text. While I
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close resemblance to reputational intermediaries, and thus their expert analogue:
A REVISED

CORPORATE

EVIDENTIARY

STRUCTURAL COMPARISON OF GATEKEEPING

Issuer

Litigant

Reputational
Intermediary
Private
Gatekeeper

Public

Investing

Gatekeeper

Public

Expert

Gatekeeper

Trier of Fact

The revised chart now captures the distinction between private and public corporate
gatekeepers.

24 8

Moreover, the chart properly aligns public corporate gatekeepers with evidentiary
gatekeepers. Public corporate gatekeepers such as the SEC exhibit three defining
attributes. First, the SEC is concerned with deterring issuers from disclosing fraudulent
information for the express social purpose of "protect[ing] investors." 24 9 Second, the
SEC monitors not only issuers, but also other corporate gatekeepers such as attorneys,
auditors, and securities analysts. 2 50 Finally, by virtue of its involvement throughout the
disclosure process, the SEC can engage in both corrective and punitive monitoring.

25 1

Evidentiary gatekeepers likewise exhibit these defining attributes. Rule 702
envisions an active role for evidentiary gatekeepers in deterring the introduction of
' 252
irrelevant or unreliable expert testimony for the goal of "assist[ing] the trier of fact."
Further, appellate courts review the performance of evidentiary gatekeepers for abuse of
their discretion. 2 53 Preliminary hearings under Rule 104,254 proceedings under Rule 702,
and final jury instructions allow evidentiary gatekeepers multiple opportunities to
interdict inadmissible expert testimony before, during, and after its proffer. 255 These
believe this conception fails to recognize the core monitoring duties that define corporate gatekeeping, see
supranotes 90-96 and accompanying text, the point here is that the conception only strengthens the analogy.
248. See supra Part I.B.
249. See supranote 121.
250. See generallysupra Part I.B.
251. See supranotes 134-141 and accompanying text.
252. FED. R. EVID. 702.
253. See generally Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
254. The analogy between a preliminary hearing under Rule 104(a) and the SEC's "selective review"
process might seem a bit strained. Not only is the preliminary hearing arguably not part of the evidentiary
gatekeeping process, but Rule 104(a) contemplates judges inquiring into the sufficiency of expert knowledge,
rather than the sort of corrective measures the SEC offers to prospective registrants and investment banks. See
supra note 221. The point here, though, is merely that a Rule 104(a) hearing chronologically takes place prior to
the final proffer of an expert's knowledge.
255. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) ("Vigorous crossexamination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instructionon the burden of proofare the traditional
and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.") (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44
(1987)) (emphasis added); see also Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us
About the Jury Instruction Process,3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 589, 610 (1997) (suggesting that courts could
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parallels evince that evidentiary gatekeepers are the structural analogue to public
corporate gatekeepers.
B. Substantive Synthesis
There are also substantive connections between evidentiary and public corporate
gatekeepers. Evidentiary gatekeeping is conventionally conceived as an exclusionary
function; that is, the purpose of this monitoring is to prevent irrelevant or unreliable
expert testimony from reaching the trier of fact. 256 In contrast, corporate gatekeeping is
conventionally conceived as a sanctioning function; that is, the purpose of this
257
monitoring is to ensure quality financial information reaches the investing public.
Metaphorically speaking, evidentiary and corporate gatekeeping seem to protect
directionally-opposed "gates."
The previous Parts have established, however, that both "gates" involve co258
extensive options. Evidentiary gatekeepers either admit or exclude expert testimony;
259
and corporate gatekeepers either grant or withhold support for disclosures.
In both
contexts the respective gatekeeper's ultimate decision is reciprocal in nature. 260 The trier
of fact receives assistance in determining whether proper expert testimony is admitted or
improper expert testimony is avoided. Similarly, the investing public receives
information as to whether quality disclosures are sanctioned or fraudulent disclosures
lack support. This reciprocity evinces that the ultimate decision manifests very little
about what gatekeeping in either context entails.
Gatekeeping involves mediation of conflicting interests. The interdiction strategy
works only because the gatekeeper's decision is a necessary step in the flow of
information. 26 1 Litigants and issuers must utilize gatekeeping services to submit expert
testimony and disclose financial information. 262 Without these services, expert testimony
and disclosures cannot reach their intended audience. 263 But this dependent relationship
is not mutual. Performance of gatekeeping functions is not contingent upon the litigants'
or issuers' approval. Unlike reputational intermediaries and experts, any alignment of
interests between a gatekeeper and litigants or issuers is purely coincidental. Evidentiary
gatekeepers do not admit or exclude expert testimony on behalf of litigants, but to assist
better facilitate the trier of fact's decision-making through improved jury instructions). But see, e.g., JEFFREY
ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY (1994) (contending jurors

have difficulty understanding expert evidence or jury instructions in complex cases); supra note 204.
256. See, e.g., supra note 193 and accompanying text.
257. See, e.g., supra note 119 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 195-198 and accompanying text. Recall that the thrust of conceiving evidentiary
gatekeeping as exclusionary rules is to dispel the novelty of Daubert and its immediate progeny, which is of no
consequence here. See supra notes 192-193 and accompanying text. Other extra-legal contexts share this
exclusionary conception of gatekeeping. See, e.g., Groseclose & Krehbiel, supra note 4 (manuscript at 4) ("The
most important function of [political] standing committees are screening and drafting. The screening function,
also known as gatekeeping, is the power to say no.") (emphasis in original).
259. See supranotes 88-94 and accompanying text.
260. This notion of reciprocity is derived from Ronald Coase's seminal work on externalities. See generally
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
261. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
262. See supra Part II.B.
263. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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the trier of fact; and corporate gatekeepers do not grant or withhold support on behalf of
an issuer, but to inform the investing public.
The execution of these functions forms the core of gatekeeping, a process of
deliberative monitoring. Both evidentiary and corporate gatekeepers bear a "special
obligation" to assess the quality of proffered information. 264 In both contexts the duty
charges gatekeepers with the responsibility of deciding whether or not such information
should be allowed to pass. Included within this deliberation are choices about what and
how criteria should be applied to the proffered information. These choices determine
whether the gatekeeper ultimately admits or excludes expert testimony, or grants or
withholds support for disclosures. These choices protect the "gate" behind which the trier
of fact or investing public stands.
As analogues, evidentiary and public corporate gatekeepers are disposed to make the
same types of choices. In determining the "fit" between expert testimony and a particular
case, evidentiary gatekeepers enjoy a degree of latitude in selecting numerous suggested
factors. 26 5 Evidentiary gatekeepers then use their discretion in applying these factors to
determine whether the expert is sufficiently "material" and "helpful. '266 This
determination entails judgments about whether the proffered expert testimony has "any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence," 267 and
has "probative value [that is not] substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
268
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
Similarly, public corporate gatekeepers conduct their own version of the "fit"
inquiry. For instance, the SEC preliminarily reviews disclosures on a selective basis and
according to its own self-selected criteria. 269 Further, the SEC correctively and punitively
monitors disclosures on the basis of its "materiality" and "usefulness" under the securities
laws. 270 Classically formulated, the standard for "materiality" asks whether there is "a

264. Compare note 93 and accompanying text with note 196 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 219.
266. See supra Part II.A. 1.
267. FED. R. EVID. 401; see also Daubert,509 U.S. at 591; IMWINKELRIED, supra note 185, at 135 ("To be
admissible... the evidence must be material; the evidence must have some logical connection with the material
facts of consequence in the case."); supra notes 207-210, 214-216 and accompanying text.
268. FED. R. EVID. 403; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 46, §
7.17, at 652 ("Courts [assessing expert knowledge] are to consider... the risks or dangers that the evidence will
confuse the issues or mislead the jury (the concerns embodied in FRE 403)."); supra notes 208-209, 212 and
accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 135-137 and accompanying text.
270. See generally Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) ("[T]o fulfill the materiality
requirement 'there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made
available."') (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) ("The general standard of
materiality best comporting with the policies of Rule 14a-9 is as follows: An omitted fact is material if there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.")). The
argument here is restricted to only "public corporate gatekeepers" since they are the closest analogue to
evidentiary gatekeepers. Certainly private corporate gatekeepers heed the securities laws and assess information
for its "materiality" and "usefulness." These public and private inquiries, however, can be differentiated simply
by resorting back to the proposed topography. Unlike private corporate gatekeepers, the SEC evaluates
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substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider [an omitted fact]
important in deciding how to vote .... 271 Equally well-established is the securities
laws' concern for protecting investors "against false and deceptive practices that might
injure them" 2 72 and from "an overabundance of information," where "lead management
'simply... bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information-a result that is
hardly conducive to informed decisionmaking."' 2 73 Corporate gatekeepers, therefore,
bear certain monitoring duties that evidentiary gatekeepers bear.
C. CorporateReliability

The first two synthesizing steps established structural and substantive parallels that
suggest public corporate and evidentiary gatekeepers can and should bear a full
complementary set of monitoring duties. As structural analogues, evidentiary and public
corporate gatekeepers occupy the same intermediate position within the flow of
information; 274 and both types of gatekeepers share a substantive duty to determine
whether this information is sufficiently relevant or material to be passed along to the
public. Evidentiary gatekeepers, however, bear a duty of reliability that has no corporate
corollary.
The task, then, is to fashion such a duty for public corporate gatekeepers. As a
preliminary matter, the duty of reliability is not restricted to evidentiary law in any
specific sense. Reliability is "evidentiary" only insofar as it is a distinct specie from its
information from both companies (and their market-motivated gatekeepers) from an ex ante and ex post
standpoint that is free from client capture. See supra Part I.A.2.
271. TSC, 426 U.S. at 449; see also id. (stating that materiality is "fully consistent with ... [the]
requirement that 'the defect have a significant propensity to affect the voting process') (referencing Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970)) (emphasis in original); Basic, 485 U.S. at 232 (expanding the
"materiality" standard beyond proxy solicitations under Section 14(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Rule
14a-9 to actions under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5). But see, e.g., SEC v.
Bausch & Lomb Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 9 (2d Cir. 1977) (Materiality is "one of the most unpredictable and elusive
concepts of the federal securities laws."). Alternatively, the Court in TSC expounded that satisfying
"materiality" required "a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed
by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available." TSC,
426 U.S. at 449; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003) (prohibiting "any untrue statement of a material fact or
[omission] to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading...."); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) ("Rule [1Ob-5] is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities
marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material
information .. ") (citing In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, Exchange Act. Rel. No. 34, 6668
(1961)).
272. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 198 (1976) (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 11-12 (1971); J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1964); SEC v. Capital Gains Reserve Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195
(1963)). In Ernst, the SEC argued for an "effect-oriented approach" to support its preferred standard of
negligence in all cases under Rule lOb-5. Ernst, 425 U.S. at 198. The Court rejected this standard as being
based on a selective interpretation of Rule lob-5 and leading to unpalatable logical consequences. See id. The
Court in Ernst did not necessarily reject the approach per se. In any event, the notion of "effect" there is
different than that argued in connection with the legal relevance component of evidentiary gatekeeping. See
supra Part II.B.1.
273. Basic, 485 U.S. at 231 (quoting TSC, 426 U.S. at 448-49).
274. See supra notes 248-255 and accompanying text.
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well-established "scientific" relative. In essence, the distinction serves a clarifying
purpose. 275 Consistent with this purpose, nothing within evidentiary reliability's two-step
inquiry suggests that it cannot be applied in a different legal context. 276 Verifying the
soundness of the reasoning process underlying a conclusion and its dependability for
assistance in a specific case are general requirements that uniformly function without
regard to who the proffering party is. 277 Indeed, as Reinier Kraakman has noted, a
significant evaluative criterion for corporate gatekeepers is whether they "can and will
prevent misconduct reliably, regardless of the preferences and market alternatives of
278
wrongdoers."
This is manifest in how the requirements of reliability remain unaffected by whether
one considers a corporate issuer to be an analogue of a litigant or an expert. 279 In the first
regard, an issuer, like any party, can be a litigant that must confront the reliability
requirement to introduce information successfully. 280 The analogue to the expert is only
slightly more complicated. In a legal sense, an issuer that is a corporation or some
28 1
unincorporated business is an entity that enjoys the status of a legal person;
accordingly, the issuer is the functional equivalent to the human being that testifies as an
accounting or actuarial expert. 282 Reliability, therefore, applies the same way whether an

275. See supra notes 217-220 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 219-220, 221-227 and accompanying text.
277. This is not to say that reliability does not entail determining the kind of proffering party involved. See
supra notes 214-215 and accompanying text. The point here is that reliability concerns the selection of specific
suggested factors. See supra notes 221-227 and accompanying text. Each non-exclusive factor is general in
nature. Id.
278. Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 25, at 61 (emphasis added).
279. Although the corporate client is the closest analogue to the evidentiary litigant, the analogue arguably
also extends to the partisan expert because of the identity between its interests and the litigant's. See supra notes
235-236 and accompanying text.
280. This suggests that another refinement to the Revised Structural Comparison of Gatekeeping proposed
earlier might involve deleting the line that separates the issuer from the litigant. See supra Part.III.A. for the
chart entitled "A Revised Structural Comparison of Gatekeeping."
281. See, e.g., Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 57 U.S. 314 (1853) (stating that a corporation,
though not a citizen, is a legal entity). See also Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 AM.
PHIL. Q. 207 (1979) (arguing that corporations can have the same moral "privileges, rights, and duties"
accorded to persons). Indeed, this is one of the key premises behind the movement toward entity rationalization.
See, e.g., Symposium, Entity Rationalization,58 Bus. LAW. 1003 (2003). As I have argued elsewhere, however,
this movement still must address continuing path dependence on certain blurring distinctions. See generally Oh,
JurisdictionalApproach, supranote 54.
282. Although beyond this Article's scope, an interesting question is whether accounting or financial
experts should be subject to principles of scientific reliability and validity. See supra note 218 and
accompanying text. If financial professionals, such as certified public accountants, apply quantitative methods
with scientific rigor, then Kumho Tire's expansive conception of reliability is of no consequence for corporate
disclosures. See generally Sofia Adrogue & Alan Ratliff, Kicking the Tires After Kumho: The Bottom Line on
Admitting FinancialExpert Testimony, 37 Hous. L. REv. 431 (2000) (suggesting CPAs and economists are
used interchangeably as experts). But see, e.g., McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., 197 F. Supp. 2d 622, 695
(E.D. Tex. 2001) ("It is necessary for accountants and financial experts in particular industries to have a basic
understanding of the science and technology in those industries. That certainly does not make these financial
experts scientists."). Lurking behind this point is whether economics assumes the status of a "behavioral" or a
"hard" science. Compare, e.g., BECKER, supra note 49, with ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS S. ULEN, LAW &
ECONOMICS 4 (4th ed. 2004) ("At this stage in the history of social science, economics is the most useful part of
behavioral science to law."); see also supra notes 49 and 123. Some economists, however, believe this matter
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283
expert is testifying about an appraisal or whether an issuer is disclosing financial data.
In either situation, reliability only demands that the proffered information be sufficiently
trustworthy and helpful.
These requirements can apply to any party because the crux of reliability lies in its
status as a gatekeeping duty. Reliability is but a principle that is part of the monitoring
that gatekeepers perform, and, because reliability is not tied to the evidentiary context,
any gatekeeper can bear this duty. For public corporate gatekeepers, reliability entails two
basic steps. First, regulatory bodies such as the SEC would apply heightened scrutiny to
an issuer's prospective disclosures or another gatekeeper's monitoring to ensure that their
conclusions are based on a sound reasoning process. 2 84 This might consist of certain
"suggested" factors for experts testifying on the basis of their experience, 285 including
but not limited to: (1) "publication," 286 or whether the documentation underlying the
issuer's conclusions or gatekeeper's decision is available to the investing public; (2)
"general acceptance," 2 87 or whether any other issuers or gatekeepers approve of the
conclusions' or decision's deviations from Generally Accepted Accounting Principles;
(3) "extrapolation," 28 8 or whether any material assumptions or premises are critical to the

has already been resolved:
The question [whether economics is a Science] should be retired. It was meaningful only in a brief
period in the middle of the twentieth century, and now it merely serves to show that the person
asking it has not read anything in science studies since 1955 and does not believe that biology,
evolution, and geology are sciences.
DEIDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, KNOWLEDGE AND PERSUASION IN ECONOMICS 56 (1994). But see, e.g., DANIEL M.
HAUSMAN, TRE INEXACT AND SEPARATE SCIENCE OF ECONOMICS 279-80 (1992) ("[T]he justification for a
particular paradigm or research program, like the justification for the commitment to economics as a separate
science, is success and progress, including especially empirical success and progress. Since economics has not
been very successful and has not made much empirical progress, economists should be exploring
alternatives .... ) (missing source).
283. See, e.g., Robert H. Stier, Jr. et al., Guide to Economic Damages, in EXPERT EVIDENCE, supra note
206, at 401, 414-18 (examining the role and acceptability of, inter alia, accounting and actuarial experts).
284. Only the effect of reliability on issuers is examined here. Public corporate gatekeepers are capable of
monitoring their private counterparts; arguably these latter type of gatekeepers could also bear a duty of
reliability. Whether the same suggested factors would apply to both public and private corporate gatekeepers is
beyond this article's scope.
285. See FED. R. EVID. 702 ("[A] witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify .. ") (emphasis added). See, e.g., Betterbox Communications Ltd. v. BB Tech., Inc.,
300 F.3d 325, 327-28 (3d Cir. 2002) ("[S]pecialized knowledge 'can be practical experience as well as
academic training and credentials'....") (quoting Waldorf v. Shuta, 142 F.3d 601, 625 (3d Cir. 1998));
Thomas v. Newton Int'l Enter., 42 F.3d 1266, 1269 (9th Cir. 1994) (ruling that 29 years of longshore experience
"lays at least the minimal foundation of knowledge, skill, and experience required in order to give 'expert'
testimony").
286. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) ("The fact of publication (or
lack thereof) ... will be a relevant, though not dispositive, consideration in assessing the scientific validity of a
particular technique or methodology on which an opinion is premised."); Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999) ("Whether [a theory or technique] 'has been subjected to peer review and
publication'....") (quoting Daubert 509 U.S. at 593). See also supranote 226 and accompanying text.
287. See, e.g., Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 ("'[Gleneral acceptance' can yet have a bearing on the inquiry ....
Widespread acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible .... ); Kumho Tire,
526 U.S. at 150 ("Whether the theory or technique enjoys 'general acceptance' within a 'relevant scientific
community."') (quoting Daubert,509 U.S. at 593). See also supra note 226 and accompanying text.
288. See, e.g., Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93 ("[T]he trial judge must [conduct an]... assessment of whether
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issuer's conclusions or gatekeeper's decision; (4) "falsifiability, '289 or whether any
alternatively plausible explanation or contradictory information exists that, if publicly
known, could call into question the veracity of the issuer's conclusions or gatekeeper's
decision; (5) "extension," 290 or whether the conclusion or decision relies upon documents
prepared in the ordinary course of business or for the express purpose of disclosure or
monitoring; and (6)"error rate," 29 1 or whether any of the issuer's disclosures or
292
gatekeeper's decisions previously have contained erroneous or restated results.
Second, the SEC would assess the overall dependability of an issuer's disclosure or
293
another gatekeeper's decision for the investing public within the proper context.
To an extent, the duty of corporate reliability builds upon elements that already exist
in the securities laws. For instance, "publication" essentially incorporates certain
regulations that require public companies to provide supporting documentation that, in
turn, is made public. 294 Further, "general acceptance" expands provisions within the
newly minted Corporate Fraud Accountability Act that subject accounting methodologies
to heightened scrutiny. 295 "[E]xtrapolation" expresses regulations that call for disclosure
296
of potentially material, adverse risks.

the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid ....). See also supra note 226
and accompanying text.
289. See, e.g., Daubert,509 U.S. at 593 ("Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining whether
a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and has
been) tested."); Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 149 ("Whether a 'theory or technique... can be (and has been)
tested'....") (quoting Daubert,509 U.S. at593). See also supra note 226 and accompanying text.
290. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[W]hether the experts are
proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of research that they have conducted
independent of the litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions expressly for purposes of
testifying.").
291. See, e.g., Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 ("[t]n the case of a particular scientific technique, the court
ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error ....
")(citing United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d
348, 353-54 (7th Cir. 1989)); Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 149 ("Whether, in respect to a particular technique, there
is a high 'known or potential rate of error' and whether there are 'standards controlling the technique's
operation'....") (quoting Daubert,509 U.S. at 594). See also supra note 226 and accompanying text.
292. Cf supra note 226 and accompanying text. Like their evidentiary counterparts, these proposed factors
would be non-exclusive and non-mandatory in the sense that corporate gatekeepers might not have to
demonstrate all of the factors to establish reliability. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
293. Cf supra note 227 and accompanying text.
294. See, e.g., Regulation S-K, Instructions to Item 301, 17 C.F.R. § 229.301 n.2 (2003) (listing select,
required financial data that must be disclosed). See generally id. § 210 (providing instructions for financial
disclosure).
295. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B)(ii) (Supp. 2003) (requiring auditors to "devise and maintain a
system of internal accounting controls" that ensure "transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation
of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria
applicable to such statements"); id. at § 78m(i) (requiring auditors to include all material correcting adjustments
in a report that must be prepared "in accordance with (or reconciled to) generally accepted accounting
principles"). Further, Form 8-K requires registrants to disclose disagreements over an audit's scope,
methodology, or procedures. See Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8106, 34-46084; Exchange Act Release No.
34-46084 (June 17, 2002) (delineating Form 8-K and proposed amendments). However, this is only when the
registrant dismisses its principal accountant for the purpose of discouraging "opinion-shopping" and not
improving the quality of disclosures.
296. See, e.g., Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2003) (requiring company management to disclose
and examine financial results, as well as events and trends likely to have a material effect on future prospects).
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At the same time, corporate reliability presses regulatory agencies such as the SEC
for qualitatively superior corporate gatekeeping. By examining an issuer's or a
gatekeeper's "error rate," the SEC can better situate publicly released information within
a historical context. Recurring errors or restatements would prompt the SEC to engage in
more intensive review and could spur requests for additional information. 297 The SEC
could then identify and recommend methodological or systemic corrections for an issuer
or a gatekeeper to implement on a going forward basis. 298 This corrective monitoring
benefits from the factor of "extension," which improves the transparency of an issuer's
financial record-keeping and a gatekeeper's deliberative process. 299 The extent to which
an issuer or a gatekeeper relies upon documents created in connection with the disclosure
process may indicate whether the existing financial information is comprehensive and
current. 300 Knowing that such information may be deficient facilitates the SEC's ability
to concentrate more efficiently on suspicious disclosures rather than merely reviewing
companies on a selective basis. 30 1 This supplied information, combined with the factor of
"falsifiability," ultimately increases the prospects of the SEC detecting defects within an
issuer's or a gatekeeper's practices.
Furthermore, corporate reliability enables public corporate gatekeepers to engage in
monitoring that is more expansive and more discriminating. For instance, under the
Corporate Fraud Accountability Act, the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board 30 2 targets certain potential conflicts of interests only within auditors. 30 3 In
contrast, corporate reliability represents a far more reaching inquiry by the SEC into the
quality of not a private gatekeeper, but also an issuer's disclosures. Further, the suggested
factors encompass various phases of the process by which an issuer and a gatekeeper
maintain records, review information, and formulate conclusions. Corporate reliability
recognizes that such comprehensive review for all public companies would be a daunting
task; instead, the duty functions to provide the SEC with a means for spotting and
concentrating on the potentially more problematic practices. This permits public
corporate gatekeepers to better take advantage of their valuable capacity to engage in
corrective monitoring and thus ensure the investing public finds financial information
helpful and trustworthy before fraud occurs.
This notion of reliability can be tested by examining a competing conception of the
duty. Jill Fisch and Hillary Sale have proposed their own duty of reliability for sell-side
securities analysts. They state that "with respect to conflicts, an analyst would breach this
duty of reliability if he issued a report or recommendation that would not have been
297. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 136-13 7 and accompanying text.
299. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1197, 1201 (1999) (contending SEC promotion of "corporate social
transparency" would "provide additional information bearing on how profits are being generated, in addition to
financial information stating that profits are being generated").
300. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78() (Supp. 2003) (requiring disclosure of all "material off-balance sheet
transactions, arrangements, obligations (including contingent obligations), and other relationships of the issuer
with unconsolidated entities or other persons, that may have a material current or future effect").
301. See SEC News Digest, Issue 80-222 (1980); Exchange Act Release 6510, 29 SEC Doc. 1005 (1984).
See also generally Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 123.
302. See 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (Supp. 2003); see also supra note 144.
303. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (Supp. 2003).
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issued by a reasonable person, similarly situated, who lacked the conflicting
relationship." 30 4 The proposal presents itself as a superior way to constrain relationships
between these securities analysts and other parties plagued by potential conflicts of
interest. 30 5 Undergirding the duty is a framework Fisch and Sale denominate as the
"quasi-agency model," which recognizes agency costs even when no legal or formal
agency relationship exists. 30 6 This quasi-agency conception of corporate reliability
strives to bond sell-side securities analysts with their recommendations to investors,
thereby decreasing the need for monitoring and thus agency costs. 30 7 Sell-side securities
30 8
analysts breaching this duty would be liable for making implied-in-fact statements.
A critical difference between this intriguing proposal and evidentiary-based
corporate reliability concerns their respective scope. Fisch and Sale explicitly restrict
their proposal only to sell-side securities analysts, a specific type of private corporate
gatekeeper. 30 9 This is a justifiable strategy within the limits of the concerns they have
defined. If, as they contend, sell-side securities analysts are among the most pernicious
sources of quasi-agency concerns, 3 10 quasi-agency reliability presents an effective,
focused attempt to mitigate client capture and conflicts of interest in this particular
private corporate gatekeeper.
Evidentiary-based corporate reliability, however, imposes a similar duty with a less
discriminate scope and more expansive reach. The duty would apply to all regulatory
parties that act as public corporate gatekeepers. 3 11 This includes not only umbrella
304. Fisch & Sale, supra note 47, at 1082.
305. See id. at 1081-82. But see, e.g., Choi & Fisch, supra note 54, at 276 (proposing a "voucher financing
mechanism" that might allow shareholders to direct funding to their preferred intermediaries).
306. See Fisch & Sale, supra note 47, at 1080. Among the support Fisch and Sale cite for this model are the
"legal and regulatory roles imposed on [securities] analysts as gatekeepers who have the capacity to harm
issuers, shareholders, and the market generally." Id. at 1084. As they admit, however, this quasi-agency model
is at odds with the conventional view of securities analysts as an independent and impartial gatekeeper. See id.
at 1084-86 (citing, inter alia, Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 656, 658-59 (1983)). See also supra Part I.B.
307. See Fisch & Sale, supra note 47, at 1082. This would seem to overlap with the purpose of existing
rules requiring securities analysts to disclose their ownership interests. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley §§ 101-09
(Supp. 2003); NYSE Rule 472 ("Communications with the Public"), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/
rule472.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2004); NASD Rule 2210 ("Communications with the Public"), available at
http://cchwallstreet.com/NASD/NASDviewer.asp?SearchTerm=2210&SelectedNode=3%2E15&FileName=%2
Fnasd%2Fnasd%5Frules%2FrulesoftheAssociation%5Fmg%2Exml#2210 (last visited Sept. 19, 2004). If
effectively enforced, these rules would give the investing public advance notice of potential conflicts of
interests in a securities analyst. The investing public could then discount or discard a securities analyst's advice
as they see fit; those that want detached advice can always seek it from alternative sources.
308. See Fisch & Sale, supra note 47, at 1082-83 (citing Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S.
1083, 1092 (1991)).
309. See Fisch & Sale, supra note 47, at 1041 ("This Article, like most recent congressional and media
attention, focuses on sell-side analysts.").
310. See id. at 1085-92 (discussing ways in which "analysts can affirmatively harm corporate operations").
311. This is not to suggest that, by comparison, Fisch and Sale believe that only sell-side securities analysts
can bear their proposed duty of corporate reliability. Indeed, buy-side securities analysts would seem to suffer
from equal, if not more, pernicious agency and conflict problems. See id. at 1084 n.344 (delineating the
elements and genesis of agency problems for securities analysts). Buy-side securities analysts thus might stand
to benefit greatly from a comparable duty of reliability. The simple point here is that Fisch and Sale have
limited their focus to a specific private corporate gatekeeper, whereas evidentiary-based corporate reliability
applies more broadly to a different type of corporate gatekeeper. An interesting question beyond this article's
scope is whether non-governmental parties such as consumers groups and stock exchanges could and should
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regulatory agencies like the SEC, but also specialized monitoring bodies that already
exist under federal regulations and statutes. 3 12 Further, evidentiary-based corporate
reliability capitalizes on the fact that public corporate gatekeepers monitor not only
issuers, but also other gatekeepers. 3 13 For example, the SEC would be charged with the
assessing the quality of decisions to grant or withhold support rendered by private
corporate gatekeepers such as securities analysts. 314 In this sense evidentiary-based
corporate reliability can subsume the duty Fisch and Sale have proposed.
Further, evidentiary-based reliability represents a more comprehensive approach to
monitoring. Because public corporate gatekeepers distinctively participate in multiple
stages of the disclosure process, the duty works in both a corrective and punitive
fashion. 3 15 The duty spurs public corporate gatekeepers to engage in more intense
corrective efforts in a way that securities analysts could not. Equally important, the SEC
does not suffer the sort of agency problems and conflicts of interest that plague securities
analysts. 3 16 Rather than imposing a duty on a private corporate gatekeeper to redress its
specific problems, evidentiary-based reliability channels the strength of agencies such as
the SEC to improve the quality of disclosures.
CONCLUSION

For whatever reasons, the field of corporate law seems fascinated, if not obsessed,
with metaphors. Corporate law is replete with references to, for instance, "piercing" and
"reverse piercing" of the corporate "veil" for personal assets, 3 17 implementing "poison
pills" against takeover bids, 318 engaging in "greenmail" to induce repurchase of
shares, 3 19 granting "golden parachutes" in executive compensation, 320 and racing to the

bear a duty of intradisciplinary corporate reliability to the extent they qualify as public corporate gatekeepers.
312. See, e.g., supranote 8. For the sake of convenience, I focus here only on the SEC since its general and
specific attributes have been delineated most clearly in Part I.B.
313. See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.
314. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 126-130 and accompanying text.
316. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
317. See generally STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL (1991-97); Franklin A. Gevurtz,
PiercingPiercing:An Attempt to Lift the Veil of Confusion Surroundingthe Doctrineof Piercingthe Corporate
Veil, 76 OR. L. REV. 853 (1997); Robert B. Thompson, Piercingthe Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1991). See also, Michael J. Gaertner, Note, Reverse Piercing the Corporate Veil:
Should CorporationOwners Have It Both Ways?, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 667 (1989).
318. See generally MARTIN LIPTON & ERICA H. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS (2002);
William J. Carney & Leonard A. Silverstein, The Illusory Protections of the Poison Pill, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 179 (2003); John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific
Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271 (2000); Julian Velasco, The Enduring Illegitimacy of the Poison Pill, 27 J.
CORP. L. 381 (2002); see also, Symposium, CorporateControl Transactions, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 463 (2003).
But see, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive
Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHl. L. REV. 871 (2002).
319. See generally Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock Repurchases, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1377 (1986); Jonathan R. Macey & Fred S. McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail,
95 YALE L.J. 13 (1985). These articles prompted a series of comments and replies that appeared in the Yale Law
Journal. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Takeover Defense Tactics: A Comment on Two
Models, 96 YALE L.J. 295 (1986); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock Repurchases and
the Appraisal Remedy, 96 YALE L.J. 322 (1986); Jonathan R. Macey, Takeover Defense Tactics and Legal
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"top" or "bottom" with corporate charters. 32 1 Even within the sub-field of corporate
32 2
"chaperones," 323 "watchdogs," 324
informational monitors, there are "bouncers,"
"whistleblowers," 325 and, of course, "gatekeepers."
Such metaphors can present problems. There is a mature and justifiable concern that
metaphors are among the more obvious progenitors of ambiguity and imprecision within
corporate law,3 26 though there is no basis or need for selfishly maintaining such a
territorial barrier. 327 Accordingly, resort to metaphors always demands a healthy amount
of cautious circumspection.
At the same time, metaphors can facilitate dialogue among fields of law that
Scholarship:Market Forces Versus the Policymaker's Dilemma, 96 YALE L.J. 342 (1986); Fred S. McChesney,
Assumptions, EmpiricalEvidence and Social Science Method, 96 YALE L.J. 339 (1986).
320. See Charles R. Knoeber, Golden Parachutes,Shark Repellants, and Hostile Tender Offers, 76 AM.
ECON. REV. 155 (1986). See also Richard P. Bress, Golden Parachutes: Untanglingthe Ripcords, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 955 (1987).
321. See generally William L. Cary, Federalism and CorporateLaw: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663 (1974); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection,and the Theory of the Corporation, 6
J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977); Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent
Developments in Delaware'sCorporationLaw, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913 (1982); Ralph K. Winter, The "Racefor
the Top" Revisited: A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1526 (1989). See also ROBERTA ROMANO,
THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993); Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State
Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775 (2002); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani,
Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition Over Corporate Charters,112 YALE L.J. 553
(2002); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in CorporateLaw, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679
(2002); Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003). For an interesting application of
the "race" metaphor to bankruptcy law, see Marcus Cole, "Delaware Is Not A State": Are We Witnessing
JurisdictionalCompetition in Bankruptcy?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1845 (2002).
322. See, e.g., Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 25, at 63-64. According to Kraakman, the "real
function-and interest-lies in [the bouncer's] ability to enlist the screening services of discriminating monitors."
Id. at 64.
323. See, e.g., id. at 64-65. According to Kraakman, the "paradigmatic chaperone regime... is Section 11
of the Securities Act of 1933, which imposes a rigorous duty on underwriters, accountants, and other key
participants in public issues of securities to detect and veto misrepresentations by issuing firms." Id. at 64. Cf
supra Part I.B.
324. Functionally defined, a "watchdog" monitors from a position where its sanction is not necessary to the
success of a client's disclosure or transaction. See generally Joseph I. Goldstein & Catherine Dixon, New Teeth
for the Public's Watchdog: The Expanded Role of the Independent Accountant in Detecting, Preventing,and
Reporting FinancialFraud,44 BuS. LAW. 439 (1989); Kostant, supra note 57; Gregory S. Miller, The Press as
a Watchdog for Accounting Fraud (2003), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=484423 (last visited Sept. 19,
2004); Harold S. Peckron, Watchdogs That Failedto Bark: Standardsof Tax Review After Enron, 5 FLA. TAX
REV. 853 (2002); see also supra note 101.
325. See supra note 57.
326. See, e.g., PHILIP L. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN THE
LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 8 (1983) (The "alter ego" doctrine "is jurisprudence by
metaphor or epithet. It does not contribute to legal understanding because it is an intellectual construct, divorced
from business realities."). See also Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers, supra note 20 (manuscript at 7 n.6)
("The implicit scholarly stalemate in developing a useful definition of the term ['gatekeeper'] shows that, as
with other metaphors, promiscuous use of the term is likely to become more misleading than useful.") (citing
Berkley v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94 (1926) (Cardozo, J.) ("Metaphors in law are to be narrowly
watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it.")).
327. See, e.g., Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 391 (1912) (Holmes, J. dissenting) ("It is one of the
misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted in phrases and thereafter for a long time cease to provoke
further analysis.").
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engender concrete benefits. This article has culled from evidentiary gatekeeping a duty
specifically suited for public corporate gatekeepers to improve the reliability of their
monitoring. The proposal paves a way to inquire whether a version of this duty, or even
an altogether different one, can be appropriately tailored for private corporate gatekeepers
from evidentiary law. More ambitiously, perhaps a broader avenue now exists for
corporate law to look beyond its traditional domain for inspiration or perspective. Such
possibilities start from a recognition that the intradisciplinary approach to gatekeeping is
an endeavor that is highly profitable, and hardly foolish.

